Chapter III
Testing Her Claims by Examining the Chief Characteristics of Her Constitution
Some of the Chief Characteristics of Her Constitution
Characteristic IV.—She Is Bound to Recognise the Sovereign and the State as Having the Sole Power to Appoint Archbishops and Bishops, Even the Archbishop Who Is to Be Regarded as Her Chief Representative
She is not free to appoint the Prelates who are to rule her flock, and to preside over her sanctuary. She has no hand in their selection or in their confirmation.
A man may be chosen who is “indignus” not fit, according to the standard of the Apostles. A man whom she may consider totally unworthy both in point of faith and in point of morals may be thrust into her sanctuary. Nay, a man of ill-concealed and justly suspected Agnostic tendencies may be forced upon her, and she is powerless to prevent it; she must tolerate the scandal, and quiescently accept what the State thinks proper to give her in this line as in every other.
Mr. Pye in his pamphlet points to the various fictions of the law connected with the matter, and then, in a footnote, shows the way in which, in virtue of an Act of Henry VIII., a Bishop is appointed.28 We reproduce the procedure as it is given in Mr. Pye’s words:—
“The King is empowered to grant to the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral Church ‘a license under the great seal, as of old time hath been accustomed, to proceed to election of an Archbishop or Bishop of the See’. “So far,” says Mr. Pye, “all seems to be in accordance with the ancient mode of proceeding. But it is added”: ‘With a letter missive, containing the name of the person whom they shall elect and choose’; “and then the Act proceeds,” ‘by virtue of which license, the said Dean and Chapter … to whom said license and letters missive shall be directed, shall with all speed and celerity, in due form elect and choose the same person named in the said letters missive … and none other.’29 “The worst part of this legal fiction,” says Mr. Pye, “is that before the Dean and Chapter proceed to the election, they invoke the Holy Ghost to guide them in the choice, knowing all the while they have no choice in the matter.” Mr. Pye proceeds to the further legal fiction of confirming a Bishop after the election. He says: “When the Pope’s position was questioned in this country, it was still thought necessary to imitate what he used to do in the matter, in times past, and so, in the Act referred to in the last note, it is provided that the mock election shall be followed by a confirmation such as the Pope used to give; thus it is said, ‘The King’s Highness, by his letters patent under his great seal, shall signify the said election to the Archbishop and Metropolitan of the province where the See of said bishoprick was void … requiring and commanding such Archbishop … to confirm the said election’.”30
Nothing could bring out the Erastian character of the Church of England more clearly than this. Nothing could more effectively “uncover her shrouded weakness” than this. Nor is there anything that could better explain the anxious efforts the State has made all along to hide from public view, as much as was in its power, the “arbitrary” dominion (any weaker phrase would not adequately express the idea) it can and does claim both in theory and practice over her. Neither is there anything that reveals more distinctly that Christ’s kingdom cannot retain its essence, if it submits to the exercise of State control. It shows that the State has had recourse to a variety of devices or palliatives, for the purpose of rendering the exercise of that dominion less repulsive, or at least less unacceptable, in the eyes of the Church herself, and in the eyes of the nation at large. It is natural it should be so. State officials, as representing the Crown, did not wish to have it thought that they had taken the ultimate or supreme management of her affairs into their own hands. In fact, it looks as if they were in a sense ashamed to allow this unrestricted Erastianism to become visible, in its true colours, to the masses of the community. And as we have already intimated, in the expedients which they have employed to keep the thing out of view, or rather to disguise it under ecclesiastical appearances, is found the true explanation of retaining the congé d’élire of pre-Reformation times, of the prayer for supernatural guidance, and of the Royal confirmations which have been brought into requisition on the occasion of appointments to bishoprics and archbishoprics.
The policy of the State, from the outset of the compromise, seems to have been to rule the Church in all her departments with a strong, imperious hand, and at the same time to try to make it appear that she was ruling herself by laws which were of her own making, and which were in harmony with the spirit and practice of the faithful of the early centuries. And hence, to succeed in attaining this end, they have striven to conceal the invasion of her rights under the semblance of a free election, and under the veil of a prayer which, to employ the mildest language, is a work of supererogation. We do not wish to use hard words. But it will be fresh in the memories of most, that many very hard words were used freely by the London daily press, on the occasion of the recent election and confirmation respectively of the Archbishop of Canterbury and of the Bishop of London. What chiefly called forth the epithets of the press of the Metropolis was—the congé d’élire, the petition for Divine guidance, and the circumstances which preceded, accompanied and followed these fictions of the law. In other words, it was the license to Dean and Chapter to elect a candidate, when a candidate had been already appointed by Royal mandate; it was the prayer offered to obtain heaven’s help in choosing a candidate, when the choice had been already made by State authority; it was the invitation to people to object to the confirmation of the person elected (in case they had objections to make), and the refusal to hear such objections when put forward; and lastly, it was the Royal confirmation of the election which was merely a repetition of the arbitrary act by which the election itself had been originally controlled.
Some of the papers alluded to designated the process as “whimsical,” others called it “a farce,” “a sham” and “a mockery”. Even The Times admitted that such mode of proceeding “did not tend to edification”. It (The Times) quoted, too, words spoken by Sir James Parker Deane on a former similar occasion. Sir James had declared that the citation of objectors, who could not be heard when they came forward, would be, even in matters temporal, a “mockery and sham,” while in matters spiritual it was “a scandal and a sacrilege”. That was on the occasion of the election of the same Dr. Temple as Bishop of Exeter in 1869. The Times in a leading article, 23rd December, 1896, observed: “It is rather curious that Sir James Parker Deane, now the Vicar-General, was on that occasion counsel for the ‘opposers,’ and used very strong language about the state of the law which he expounded and practically enforced yesterday. … It was upon the Vicar-General’s (Sir James’) advice that the Commissioners acted in refusing to listen to Mr. Brownjohn.”
Mr. Brownjohn, seeing that his “protest was summarily repelled” by Sir James, said, that if the Vicar-General’s decision was to regulate the action of the Court, the invitation to state objections which had just been read by the Apparitor-General was practically reduced to a nullity.
The Times, admitting the justness of this declaration, said: “It is not easy to dispute this assertion”. It said also in the same article: “We publish some correspondence on the subject, which points to the expediency, if not necessity, of making material changes in the form of the proceedings on confirmation”.31
But now, let us ask, what is the object in holding to these ancient forms,—the congé d’élire, the petition for supernatural direction, the summoning of objectors, and the Royal confirmation of Episcopal elections? Is it not, that while the State forces the appointments of Prelates, and takes the matter altogether under its own management, it, at the same time, wishes such appointments to look like the result of a free election on the part of the Church herself?
And is not this mode of proceeding equivalent to a tacit admission on the part of the civil rulers, that the Church is under their management in a way which would be at variance with the feelings of the people, if the people adverted fully to the true state of the case; in a way at variance with the old English traditions; in a way, too, opposed to the spirit of the Gospel?
It seems to us the whole process makes clear that, at the outset, the sudden transfer of ecclesiastical jurisdiction—from its former recognised source—to the Crown, brought about a change so novel, so sensational, so abnormal, that the State authorities were afraid to allow the nation to realise its full significance, that they did not wish to make known the wholesale manner in which they had appropriated to themselves the supreme regulation of Church affairs, and that, being timid and nervous about permitting the fact to be seen in its unrelieved nakedness, they strove to clothe it in the garb of the ecclesiastical forms heretofore in use.
This feeling appears to have influenced the successive rulers of the State from then till now, since these same forms have been persistently maintained. And that it influences those of the present day seems to be indicated by the fact, that they still continue to insist upon their observance; even at the risk of having applied to them, by members of their own communion, the disagreeable names mentioned above.
If this unnatural and ill-assorted union between Church and State were a thing justified by the ancient customs of the land, in harmony with the sense of the populace, in accordance with the true teachings of Christ, it would not be necessary for the State to hide its imperious control over promotions to the Episcopate under the hideous form of a mock election, and of an equally mock prayer,—a prayer asking for a Divine guidance which the State itself made impossible to follow.
But does not all this betray a conscience on the part of the civil rulers that they have done a wrong to the Church in thus treating her as a bond slave; and does it not also make manifest the fact that the Church has done wrong in allowing herself to be thus enslaved, or rather in consenting to and co-operating in her own enslavement? And do not both these facts together show that in such a combination there cannot be found that hallowed institution which Christ called His Kingdom, and which He solemnly and emphatically declared was to be a thing not “of this world”?
An ecclesiastical organisation, which in all its departments is subject to civil management, and which is therefore merely a wing of the civil fabric, cannot be the Church which was planned in the mind of a Divine architect, and built up under His guidance by the inspired zeal of His Apostles.
By the very fact of ceding her right of self-government and of allowing it to be transferred to the Crown, i.e., of allowing the “civil magistrate” to have control over her hierarchy, worship and profession of faith, she made it impossible for herself to be the spiritual organisation which Christ called His Kingdom. We contend that the Church of Christ could not enter into a compromise, such as that on which the Anglican Establishment is built, without losing her essence—without ceasing “ipso facto” to be the Church of Christ. Yes, we maintain that from the moment she would sign a contract, which left the secular power free to appoint her chief teachers, to change her creed and code of law,—from that moment she would cease to be “the pillar and the ground of truth,” and therefore cease entirely to be His Kingdom.
Characteristic V.—She Is Bound to Recognise the Same Secular Power as Having Authority to Fix the Boundaries of Her Apostolate
As to her capabilities and opportunities of evangelising pagan nations, her power is curtailed here too, and may be curtailed to any extent the State wishes, by the same prerogative of Royal supremacy.
She is local, essentially and exceptionally local. She was established originally for England and for English-speaking colonies; and she has with difficulty taken root in any but English soil. The same Sovereign and the same State point out to her the circumference within which she is to work, and to discharge the functions proper to her sphere. They can fix as they like the field of her mission. They can say to her any day of the year, and any hour of any day: ‘Thus far shalt thou go and no farther’. They may not be inclined to use this power of “veto” except in cases of urgent national necessity; but there is no doubt that they possess it. And circumstances may occasionally occur of such a nature as to make them think themselves justified (at least politically) in exercising the right of prohibition. If in their transactions with China, Japan or some other pagan land, they deem it expedient, through fear of international complications, or through motives of temporal interest, to prohibit her missionaries from going there to preach the Gospel, they can do so if they like, and her missionaries are bound to obey.32
It is true that there have been from time to time, amongst her Clergy, individuals of noble and sublime aspiration, brave and truly heroic souls, men imbued with genuine religious feeling, full of Apostolic courage, who, believing her creed to be orthodox, have, on their own responsibility and at the risk of their lives, gone to distant lands to bring the message of faith to the heathen. These, however, have been rare exceptions.
It is true also that there exist within her at present large, rich, well-equipped associations for training and preparing missionaries for foreign regions, for transporting Bibles to heathen shores, and for defraying the expenses consequent on foreign missionary enterprise—all with a view to conveying the light of Christ’s revelation to those who are buried in the darkness of paganism.
But the Church, as the Church, that is, the Church by law Established, cannot make the least effort to propagate her creed among Hindoos, Kaffirs, Red Indians, Chinese, Japanese, among the people of any heathen land, without the sanction or against the will of the Government to which she belongs. Should she attempt anything of the kind in opposition to the Government, the law which established her could disestablish her, could withdraw from her missionaries in foreign parts the protecting arm of the civil power; and the fact of such withdrawal might interfere seriously with the exercise of her zeal in the direction of missionary labour.
An institution whose power of expansion can be confined within such narrow limits, cannot be the one to which was addressed the Divine command to evangelise all the peoples of the world.
Characteristic VI.—She Is Forced to Recognise That, as an Established Church, She Owes Her Origin and Her Preservation in Life to an Act of the National Parliament
That she was the creation of the Crown and of Parliament, both as to her being and as to the nature of the obligations which membership in her communion brought with it, is clear from the compromise from which she sprang. She was to have the Sovereign as her Supreme Head. To this she freely and deliberately consented. And knowing that her continuance in life depended on sovereign power, she felt she was bound to acknowledge Royal control in its fullest and strictest sense over all her departments. The words of Sir William Harcourt (quoted above), in which he speaks of the principle which was the “bed-rock of the Reformation” and of “the three great pillars on which the Reformed Church of England was reared,” express this point with a clearness to which no objection can be reasonably taken. Lord Macaulay, in his History of England, treating of the same matter and referring to the wide dominion which the compromise gave the reigning monarch over affairs ecclesiastical, adds: “Nor did the Church grudge this extensive power to our princes. By them she had been called into existence and nursed through a feeble infancy.”33
Her foundation was an Act of Parliament, the Act namely by which Henry, with the votes of his Parliamentary abettors, withdrew the spiritual allegiance of the English people from Rome and vested it in the Crown. And the six articles which Henry meant to build upon that foundation, and which he wished to represent the creed of the National Church under the new régime—both for his own day and for future time—were incorporated in another Act of Parliament. It is true these articles expressed the belief which had been the belief of Catholic England till then. But they came no longer to the people through an Apostolic channel; they came through a lay monarch and a lay Parliament, and hence the obligation of the New Church, as a Church, to receive them, could not have anything stronger or higher than Parliamentary force.
It is well to concentrate attention on this point, as it is one which is likely to be overlooked by those outside the Catholic fold; and yet it is one of paramount importance. The reason for taking special notice of it will become more intelligible presently.
The six articles contained in the statute were: (1) Transubstantiation; (2) Communion under one kind; (3) Celibacy of the Clergy; (4) Monastic Vows; (5) The Sacrifice of the Mass for the living and the dead; (6) Auricular Confession.
This statement of religious doctrine put forth by the King was entitled: “Articles devised by the King’s Highnes Majesty to stablyshe Christen quietnes and unitie”.34
Papal supremacy, which had been a doctrine of the Church of old Catholic England in quite as strict a sense, as either the Eucharistic Presence or Sacramental Absolution, was, of course, sedulously put aside. Parliament had to do away with it before it could establish a new Church for the nation. Its deliberate removal from the old creed explained the appearance of the new. And yet, if the traditional pre-Reformation belief of England was to be the motive why some doctrines should be inserted in the new national symbol of faith, there was quite as much reason for giving papal supremacy a place in it, as for giving a place to any of the six articles which had received Parliamentary sanction. Why should the doctrines incorporated in those articles be retained, if the doctrine teaching the Supreme Headship of the Sovereign Pontiff was to be flung aside? Till Henry’s day there was admittedly testimony quite as strong for believing in the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff as for believing in any of the six Doctrinal Statutes.
The nation too had clung to it with as unchanging tenacity as to any doctrine which had come down from “antiquity”; nay, was clinging to it tenaciously still; and was deprived of it, not with free consent but by main force, by Parliamentary coercion, by a reign of terror, such as the world had not seen since the early Roman persecutions. Once, however, that dogma was eliminated, and the bond with the See of Peter broken, the obligation to believe in the Statutory Articles ceased to be Apostolic, and became an obligation of purely Parliamentary enactment. We mean, the people, who allowed themselves to be swayed into conformity to the new order of things, could not be looked upon as bound, so far as the authority of the new Church was concerned, to believe the recently established formularies of faith, on the ground that they had been taught originally by an Apostolic voice, but on the ground that they had been spoken by a lay Parliament controlled by a lay King,—a King who had arbitrarily usurped Apostolic prerogatives and privileges. In other words, the strict obligation of the English people, in so far as they were members of the Church of the New Monarchy, to profess the Statutory Articles as the substance of their belief, did not spring from the fact that in them were incorporated several of the hereditary doctrines of the England of pre-Reformation times, but sprang from the fact, that a secular ruler with his Parliamentary advisers had decided and decreed that they should and must form the English profession of faith for the time to come, or until otherwise ordained.
This is clear from the fact that another Act of Parliament could unmake them, and did unmake them. Elizabeth and her Parliament gave their opposites, or the negations of them, to be the necessary object, or part of the necessary object, of the nation’s faith.
If there be any who find it difficult to realise the truth of this statement, or to apprehend its drift, a moment’s reasoning will make the matter clear. Henry, when formulating his statutory standard of faith, could have put aside one or more of the six articles (his daughter, Elizabeth, and her Parliament did away with them all) just as he put aside papal supremacy, and could have substituted for those removed their plain opposites, and might have done so with the majority of the votes of his subservient Parliament; and yet the force of the obligation, in the English Church in the new régime, to take the established articles as the confession of belief, would have remained exactly the same. But this will become still more clear when we notice just now the changes introduced by Elizabeth.35
Henry, having obtained everything he desired, through arrogating to himself supreme spiritual jurisdiction, no longer cared to have any further change or innovation introduced into the doctrines of old Catholic England; he seemed sincerely anxious that his Parliamentary code of religion should remain permanently obligatory in the kingdom.
But he could not bind his successors. Exactly the same power to make a Church or change a Church that he had, they had. They could undo what he had done, unmake what he had made, change what he had intended to be perpetual. And they used their power in the direction of changing, unmaking and undoing with unscrupulous freedom.
Elizabeth demolished the edifice of the six articles which her father had built on the foundation of the royal supremacy. She took care to keep the foundation, if not nominally, at least virtually; but she kept hardly anything more.
The new superstructure, which she raised over the ruins of the preceding one, was entirely different from the one erected by her royal parent.
The six national articles of faith passed by an Act of his Parliament were swept away by an Act of her Parliament. They were replaced by thirty-nine articles, which embodied a creed as different from that established by Henry, as night from day.
To bring into more striking contrast the efforts of the father and daughter, and of their respective Parliaments, in the way of Church making and Church changing, we quote again five out of Henry’s six articles, and place them side by side with five of Elizabeth’s which denied and abolished them.
| Henry’s were:— | Elizabeth’s:— |
|---|---|
| Henry’s first was Transubstantiation. | Twenty-eighth article denies and denounces Transubstantiation as unscriptural. |
| Henry’s second was Communion under one kind. | Elizabeth’s thirtieth article abolished Communion under one kind. |
| Henry’s third was Celibacy of the Clergy. | Elizabeth’s thirty-second article abolished Clerical Celibacy. |
| Henry’s fifth was The Sacrifice of the Mass for the living and the dead. | Elizabeth’s thirty-first article declares the Sacrifice of the Mass to be a blasphemous fable and a dangerous deceit. |
| Henry’s sixth was Auricular Confession. | Elizabeth’s twenty-fifth article pronounces Penance or Auricular Confession to be not a Sacrament but a custom that has “grown partly of the corrupt following of the Apostles”. |
The remaining one of Henry’s six—Monastic Vows—was made to disappear by another process.
The other articles of Elizabeth’s thirty-nine, including the one giving virtually the right of private judgment, consisted of an amalgamation of Lutheranism, Calvinism and Zuinglianism.
Here then was the Church, by law established under Elizabeth, putting forward a profession of faith substantially opposite to the profession of faith put forward by the Church, by law established under Henry; nay, not alone put forward, but forced upon the people’s acceptance by the penalties of fines, imprisonment and death, as for high treason.
And the whole nation was asked, urged and even constrained, so far as could be effected, to receive and to conform to this new creed, not on the ground that it had been the hereditary creed of Catholic England, for Elizabeth and her Parliament were well aware that the majority of the people knew that it was not; neither on the ground that it had come down from the Apostles, for the Queen and her coercive agents saw clearly that the mass of the population believed that it had not so come down; but on the ground that it had passed into the law of the land by an Act of the National Parliament.
Hence we affirm: The obligation incumbent on the members of the new Church to accept the altered summary of belief had not, so far as the authority of that Church herself was concerned, anything beyond civil or legal enactment to enforce it.36 It is true she taught and promulgated the national formularies, but the voice with which she did so was not her own.
It was the voice of the State which imposed its will upon her, not only as to discipline and worship, but doctrine as well.
The State from the outset regarded her as the organ of its voice in teaching the nation a religion, which it (the State) had the chief hand in choosing. In saying so we are but expressing in a different form statements, recently made by distinguished members of her communion, in reference to the authority of the laity over her laws of government, the form of her services and even her symbol of faith. And there surely cannot be much necessity now for adding that, having in view the nature of her constitution, the truth of these statements can no longer be reasonably called in question. Hence it is idle on the part of Ritualists and High Church people to minimise the fact and try to explain it away. So long as she remains the Church of the “compromise,” so long is she bound to recognise, and submit to, the comprehensive control which the State claims over her in all her departments. As the law stands the alternatives are inexorable, i.e., either absolute submission or inevitable dissolution.
The law, which established her on conditions to which she freely agreed, can at once disestablish her if these conditions be broken.
Constituted as she is at present, unrestricted obedience to the secular power is the only guarantee of her preservation in existence.
Such being her foundation, her building up and her changing conditions, we may summarise what has been said about this Characteristic in the following questions:—
Is it not true that it was an Act of Parliament that gave Henry’s Reformed Church to England? Is it not true that it was an Act of Parliament that gave Elizabeth’s Re-Reformed Church to England? Is it not true that the religion taught by the Reformed Church of Elizabeth was substantially different from the religion taught by the Reformed Church of Henry? Is it not true that it was by an Act of Parliament that changes were subsequently introduced into the Reformed religion both of Henry and Elizabeth?
All these questions must needs be answered in the affirmative. And hence it is no exaggeration to say that an Act of Parliament made her, gave her being, substance and form, increased her, diminished her, changed her constituents; and that that Parliament, having the same power now as heretofore, can unmake her, change her again, add to her, take away from her, dissolve her.
Section IV
What the Attitude of the Early Church Would Have Been If the Secular Power Had Attempted to Impose Its Will Upon Her in a Way Similar to That Indicated by the Above Characteristics
Perhaps we may enable some of our separated brethren to see the true state of the case in a still stronger light by a brief reference to the early Church.
Suppose Nero—Roman Emperor—had been a Christian instead of a pagan, and suppose all the subjects of his dominions had embraced Christianity immediately after the preaching of the word began, would St. Peter and St. Paul have deemed it their duty to allow him to assume supreme command over the Church of which they were Apostles?
Suppose the civil ruler, prefect or governor of Corinth, professed Christianity at the time St. Paul excommunicated the incestuous Corinthian, would he (St. Paul) have been satisfied to permit that ruler to undo the censure and restore the erring man—in spite of the Apostolic prohibition—to the communion of the faithful?
Suppose the Emperor Constantine the Great, who was a Christian, had proclaimed at the Council of Nicea (at which he assisted), that whether he resided at Rome or at Byzantium, he should have sovereign dominion over the government of the Church; that all ecclesiastical jurisdiction was to be derived from him alone; that he, with his official subordinates, was to be the exponent and definer of Christian revelation and the final court of appeal in matters of disputed doctrine; that the decisions of that Council could have no force without his sanction and signature,—would not the venerable Fathers of that august assemblage have looked around with indignant amazement, and cried out with loud acclaim, that his heresy was in its way as pernicious and deadly as the errors of Arius which they had been convened to anathematise?
Did Theodosius the Great, another Christian Emperor, when excommunicated by St. Ambrose for the massacre at Thessalonica, resist the Church’s authority and recriminate on the holy Bishop for having thus publicly punished him? Did he accuse him of insolent and unpardonable disloyalty to the Sovereign ruler of the empire? Or, did he pretend that the excommunication launched against him was null and void, on the ground that he himself, whether he was Emperor of the East only, or of East and West united, was the Supremest Head of the Church in his own dominions, and had therefore spiritual prerogatives which far outreached those of Bishop, Patriarch, and even Pope? No, he bowed his head in meek submission, confessed his fault, and acknowledged that there was a power on earth far higher and far holier than any which even the most exalted temporal monarch could wield.
What would St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Basil, St. Athanasius, St. Gregory Nazianzen have said, if, on the death of a Pope, the Christian Emperor of Rome of their day had proclaimed that to him alone belonged the right of appointing a successor to the deceased Sovereign Pontiff, and had sent out “letters missive” to the effect: the same person named in the said “letters missive” shall be elected and chosen “and none other”? Would they have considered themselves bound in conscience to regard the appointment as valid, or would they not rather have declared with united voice that such sacrilegious arrogance deserved to be punished with the sternest anathema the Church could pronounce?
The substance of the reasoning embodied in this chapter may be condensed as follows:—
The revelation which Christ made to the world cannot be changed by any human teacher, or by any teacher whether human, angelic or Divine; no, not even by Himself. This may be regarded as self-evident. For, if it changed at all, it must needs change into falsehood. Hence it may be argued:—
No Church which changes, or permits to be changed, the doctrine of Christ, can be the true Church.
But the Church of England changes, or permits to be changed, the doctrine of Christ. Therefore, the Church of England cannot be the true Church.
The minor of this syllogism is proved from the fact—that the Established Church (or Church of England) not only can change, but actually has changed the Established religion; and from the fact also, that, in virtue of her structure, she can claim the power of changing it again, or of permitting it to be changed.
Notes
Disestablishment, pp. 19, 20.
↩25 Henry VIII., c. 20, sec. 4.
↩Ibid., sec. v.
↩Times, 23rd December, 1896.
It is true there is an Act of Edward the Sixth abolishing these elections, seeing that they were not real elections but only apparent; they were revived under Elizabeth.
↩It is said the Church of England has established some bishoprics in foreign parts without State intervention. That may be. But the State had authority to prevent her doing so, if it chose to exercise it.
↩History of England, chap. i., p. 29.
↩Disestablishment (H. J. Pye), p. 30.
↩Henry, we have said, could have put aside one or more of those articles; and there seems reason to believe he would have put some of them aside, if the keeping of them had stood in the way of his solicited divorce from Catherine, and his contemplated marriage with Anne. Once he had made up his mind to commit the dreadful sin of plunging the nation into schism—by declaring himself Supreme Head of the Church in England—what dogma of the faith would he have shrunk from sacrificing if the profession of it were an obstacle to the gratification of his desires, or a hindrance in the path of spiritual revolt on which he had entered?
↩This is not the place to discuss the position of those whose errors are the traditions of their fathers, and who, in invincible ignorance, ascribe to her real ecclesiastical authority. Their ignorance, when truly invincible, excuses them individually positis ponendis; but it cannot give to her an authority which it is impossible she could ever have. Her teaching is as purely secular in its sanction to-day as it was in the first decade of her life; since no lapse of time can create a right of prescription which is adequate to change falsehood into truth.
↩