Chapter II
The Necessity of Religion, or Religion as a Duty
1. In asserting the necessity of religion for man, we take the term in its subjective sense, i.e., as the free service of God.
2. We speak here of religion as such, not of any particular form of it that might be prescribed, for instance, by way of supernatural revelation. What we call religion in this section of our treatise is the substance of all religions, i. e., that which follows as a necessary consequence from the Divine Essence and from human nature. Hence, the term Natural Religion, i. e., religion as necessarily issuing from the nature of things, not as the result of an immediate intervention of the Divinity, though, as Newman has observed, the second element predominates in the actual religions.1
3. The necessity or duty of natural religion is absolute, because it is founded on the nature both of God and man. Religion is the necessary means for the attainment of an end:—on the part of man, in so far as that end is human; on the part of God, in so far as that end is divine. Religion raises man to the highest perfection of which his nature is capable, whilst it procures for God the honor and glory that are His due.
4. The duty of natural religion is not abolished by supernatural revealed religion, nor, on the other hand, must it be thought that God has a right to demand of man only such religious service as is manifested by the natural law. If there were no supernaturally revealed religion, all men would be obliged to practice natural religion, and the natural duty of submitting to God remains even after supernatural revelation has become a reality.
A. Religion is necessary for man because he is absolutely dependent upon God.
The proof for this thesis is based (1) on the nature of human activity, and (2) on man’s duty to promote the honor and glory of God.
1. A creature can attain the perfection for which God has intended it only by the natural development of its faculties; but man acts in harmony with nature only if he practically acknowledges his dependence upon God as his first cause and final end; therefore, man can attain the divinely intended perfection of his nature in no other way than by practically acknowledging that he is dependent upon God as his first cause and final end.
Now, this acknowledgment is what we call religion; therefore, man can attain the divinely intended perfection of his nature only by means of religion.
The activity of a being flows from its nature; it is the revelation of its essence. Every being acts according to its nature, its powers and faculties. God has indicated His will in regard to the activities of His creatures by endowing each with a certain nature and definite faculties. If the creature’s activities correspond fully to its nature, then they represent the complete development and perfection of that nature as intended by the Creator.
This rule applies to all creatures, as all creatures without exception are and remain, as long as they exist, absolutely dependent upon God in their nature and activity.
But in another respect there is an essential distinction between rational and irrational creatures. The irrational creature attains its perfection when its activity, which is subject to the laws of physical necessity, unfolds itself without interference. The rational creature, on the other hand, is free to use its powers and faculties according to its own good pleasure. In other words, it can freely determine the nature, the object, and the goal of its activities.
If this free activity and self-determination of the rational creature is to remain natural, every action must be performed with a constant voluntary submission to His law. The rational creature, if it wishes to follow its nature, may employ its faculties only according to the laws which God has implanted in its nature. Here we have the essence of religious activity. Man attains his divinely intended perfection only by serving his Creator.
2. Our second argument is based on man’s duty to promote the honor and glory of God. According to the theistic philosophy, it necessarily follows that every creature must promote the honor and glory of God to the best of its ability; now man, being endowed with reason and free will, is capable not only of objectively representing the divine perfections, like the irrational creature, but also of acknowledging them by intelligent and free acts; therefore, man is in duty bound to promote the honor and glory of God by acknowledging His divine perfections subjectively. To comply with this duty means to practice religion. Consequently, man is in duty bound to practice religion.
In creating the world, God in His infinite wisdom must have acted with a purpose. As He is absolutely perfect, and His perfection excludes change,—most of all any change caused by creatures,—the final purpose or end of His creative activity can be none other than Himself, i. e., the external manifestation of His glory. Hence the revelation of His perfection, to the extent compatible with the nature of the creature, was the only possible, and at the same time the absolutely necessary, purpose of creation. The irrational creatures attain this purpose by objectively showing forth the perfections of their Creator. The rational creatures, on the other hand, are capable of something more, and therefore something more is demanded of them, namely, that they should manifest the greatness of their Creator by conscious and free acts, i. e., by acknowledging Him as the first cause and final end of all things and conducting themselves in accordance with this belief. The glory of God thus manifested is called religion. Consequently, every rational creature, including man, is in duty bound to practice religion.
B. Religion is the necessary basis of morality.
1. The moral law of nature obliges man to perform none but good deeds; but man cannot reasonably comply with this duty unless he acknowledges God as his Lord and absolute Lawgiver; now, so to acknowledge God is an act of religion; therefore, a reasonable submission to the moral law of nature is impossible without religion.
Moral obligation is the state of being in duty bound to do good and to avoid evil. This compulsion asserts itself in the will, which is the principle of all specifically human acts, and consists in the unconditional interior impulse to act in accordance with nature by performing none but good deeds. The morally good act, which bears the character of duty, presents itself to the will as a good that must be desired of necessity. The obligation to perform none but good acts exists always and for all men. Whether we like it or not, we must obey the moral law.
At the same time a morally good action possesses such great value that, if need be, even the most precious earthly possessions have to be sacrificed for its sake.
The infinite value thus accruing to a morally good act and the absolute power of moral goodness in human life, cannot be the product of human conduct as such, because no human action can transcend its subject, which is a finite and contingent being.
There is but one satisfactory explanation of this mystery, namely, that the morally good act is ordered towards an infinitely valuable end, and the human will depends upon a higher will, endowed with unlimited power. Viewed thus, the morally good act performed by man appears as a means necessary for the attainment of a good of infinite value, and the relation between means and end is the work of the Creator, who has implanted into the human soul an irresistible impulse to perform or not to perform certain actions, this being a natural law which free will can, but should not, resist.
Hence, if the moral law is to have a foundation adequate to the demands of reason, the rational creature must first acknowledge God as the supreme Lawgiver; in other words, religion must be made the basis of moral duty.2
2. Our second argument is based on the fact that the moral law of nature would lack sufficient sanction without religion. Every law must have a sufficient sanction; but the moral law has no such sanction except in religion; therefore, religion is necessary as a sanction for the moral law.
By sanction we understand the detriment, reward for observance, or loss of reward, or other coercive intervention annexed to the violation of a law, as a means of enforcing it. In order that all men may obey the law, it is necessary, in view of the weakness of human nature, to back it up with an adequate sanction. The punishment which follows a violation of the law must not be so light that men will readily disregard it, and the rewards that are offered for its faithful observance must be of a kind efficaciously to determine the will to do what is right.
The moral law has a twofold sanction, the one earthly, the other heavenly. The earthly sanction consists essentially in the continuous aptitude and inclination to do good, which follows the habitual observance of the law and the consciousness of duty well performed, bringing peace and what we call a good conscience. Transgression of the law, on the other hand, is followed by an increased tendency towards evil, a rebellion of the lower against the higher faculties of the soul, and the qualms of an uneasy conscience.
In addition to these effects there usually results from the observance of the moral law bodily well-being, whereas a vicious life shatters the health of the sinner and hastens his death.
A virtuous life, finally, obtains for a man the esteem, love, and friendship of his fellowmen, whereas vice entails suspicion, contempt, and disgrace.
Consequently, there exists an earthly sanction of the moral law: virtue by its very nature brings blessings, whereas vice is followed by evil consequences.
But this sanction is inadequate, since the blessings in question do not necessarily follow the observance of the law and the punishments are not necessarily annexed to its transgression. Only those goods or evils that are essentially connected with moral goodness or evil are inseparable from them. The other phenomena accompanying moral conduct frequently fail to make their appearance because their causes do not lie wholly in the moral acts of men, but partly in purely external circumstances, such as good health, wealth, a favorable environment, or bodily predisposition. Thus it may happen that a good man has to suffer excessively, whereas his wicked neighbor enjoys enviable health and is prosperous in all his undertakings.
In order, therefore, that the sanction of the moral law may prove adequate, i. e., fully sufficient for its purpose, it must extend beyond the confines of this world into the next. Religion alone offers such an efficacious sanction by teaching that the final end of man is the eternal possession of God, who is substantial Truth and Goodness, and the enjoyment of the beatific vision in Heaven. This consummation, which comprises within itself the highest perfection of which human nature is capable, has for its necessary condition the observance of the moral law in this world. Perfect happiness in the next world will then be the reward of faithful observance of, whereas eternal loss of happiness will be the punishment of disobedience to, the moral law.
The sanction of the moral law, as just explained, has its strongest factor in the everlasting duration of both reward and punishment. Eternal duration follows as a necessary consequence from the notion of perfect happiness. If a man had to fear that his happiness would sooner or later end, he could not be perfectly happy. The punishment of the sinner, too, must be everlasting, else the threat of it would not be able to induce him to strive earnestly for his ultimate goal, the possession of God, and to keep him always on the straight and narrow path. If it were possible for a sinner to indulge the hope that, in spite of all his crimes, he might some day attain to eternal happiness, he would not be strong enough to persevere in the ofttimes almost hopeless struggle with his passions.3
To recapitulate: Without the hope of eternal reward and without the fear of eternal punishment, both of which have their basis in religion, the moral law of nature would lack adequate sanction; consequently, religion is necessary for its enforcement.
C. Religion is necessary to make human life on earth bearable.
1. Religion helps the mind of man in regard to the most important problems of life. The empirical sciences can tell us nothing about the many facts that lie outside their sphere, and what information they do furnish, is insufficient to satisfy the craving of the intellect for truth. Those most important questions: “Where does man come from?” “What is his destiny?” “What must he do to attain his ultimate goal?” receive no reply whatever from science. Religion alone is able to answer them definitely, clearly, and satisfactorily.
2. Religion aids the will in acting as well as in suffering.
a) Religion assists the will in acting. The prospect of attaining the sublime goal pointed out by religion in the next world inspires man with enthusiasm and courage to perform heroic deeds, to serve his fellowmen, to endure privations patiently, and thus ennobles his earthly life by giving it a higher content and value.
b) Religion aids the will in suffering. It directs man’s thoughts to the Providence of God, who fondly watches over His creatures and rules the destinies of all with supreme wisdom and benevolence. Religion alone, with its doctrine of eternal retribution in the world beyond, can console and strengthen the poor sufferers who frequently have no other earthly prospect than an inglorious death after a life of agonizing torments. For religion teaches with unshakable certitude that there will be a final equation between the observance of the moral law and happiness, between external fate and interior merit. Without religion man is the most pitiable of all creatures; he is helplessly exposed to the powers of nature, his reason serves but to intensify his sufferings, and there is no prospect for him but dumb resignation, despair, and finally suicide.
D. Religion is necessary for the existence of society.
1. Religion is necessary for the existence of the family, to solidify the union between husband and wife, and to establish the proper relationship between parents and children.
a) Religion is necessary to strengthen the matrimonial bond. The union between husband and wife, which entails a most intimate relationship of love and unreserved mutual devotion, by its very nature demands indissolubility as the only effective means of preserving the dignity and holiness of the married state. Religion is equally necessary for the proper training of children, which constitutes one of the most important tasks incumbent on parents, and for the parents themselves, in order that they may not suffer want in their old age. Now, this indissolubility of the matrimonial bond is secured only by religion. The sexual affection which usually prompts men to marry and establish a family, may and often does grow cold in later years, and the happiness of the family is endangered by accidents, diseases, and difficulties of every description. If there are no higher motives, if duty, based on religion, does not uphold the union, if there is no prospect of a better life in the next world,—which prospect religion alone can hold out,—then the institution of the family, so necessary for the existence of society, is in great danger of dissolution.
b) Religion is necessary also to establish the proper relationship between parents and children. Parents and children are intimately bound together by mutual duties and corresponding rights. The parents are obliged to train their children in morality by giving them the right kind of an education. The children, on their part, are bound to reverence their parents and to obey them in all reasonable matters. To these duties there correspond certain rights. All these precepts are found in the moral law of nature; but religion alone provides a firm basis for authority and duty. It alone can effectually prevent both the abuse of rights and the neglect of duties.
2. Religion is indispensable for the existence and prosperity of the State.
Society could not possibly exist without an authority qualified to impose duties. All duty has its ultimate foundation in God. Consequently, the authority of the State and its power to impose duties, is based upon the very order of nature.
The same truth applies to those who are subject to authority. A nation without religion would be extremely difficult to govern, because it would lack the basis of obedience, namely, the sense of duty, which springs from religion.
Finally, religion alone can furnish the necessary guarantees for the proper administration of justice. Social justice is based on the idea that the State, too, is a creature of Almighty God, and its rulers govern in His name and as His representatives. Justice must be dispensed impartially in the making and enforcement of laws, in the imposition and collection of taxes, in the adjudication of quarrels and disputes, and so forth; for the State cannot flourish without justice. “Iustitia fundamentum regnorum.”
3. Religion is necessary for orderly social intercourse among men. If religion did not supply the motives for right conduct, there would be no justice or charity, no honesty or fidelity amongst men, and egotism would rule supreme. To “get the most out of life” would appear as the only desirable goal to the majority of men. No one would regard himself as bound by promises, contracts, or a relationship of service, except when it was to his own selfish interest. No one would be safe in his person or property, and violence and trickery would be commonly considered the most appropriate means of assuring one’s own life and possessions and those of one’s dependents. “Of all the duties which man has to fulfil,” says Leo XIII, “that, without doubt, is the chiefest and holiest which commands him to worship God with devotion and piety. This follows of necessity from the truth that we are ever in the power of God, are ever guided by His Will and Providence, and, having come forth from Him, must return to Him.”4
A recent writer expresses the opinion that “religion considered as a bond reaching into the other world, and as an activity for the attainment of a goal that lies far beyond the grave, cannot be shown to be necessary for all men in this life. To attempt such a demonstration,” he thinks, “would derogate from the dignity of religion, because if religion were merely a necessary means for the support of earthly institutions, it would have to be entirely determined and governed by the latter.”5 This opinion does not appear to be well founded, for it cannot be shown that earthly utility and indispensability have no connection with a bond extending into the world beyond and an activity tending to a goal lying in that other world. In matter of fact there is such a connection, and it is a most intimate one. In the arguments here under consideration religion is credited with no other utility and indispensability than moral conduct in general. Religion is the foundation of morality, both in general and in particular, i. e., in the individual. As we deduce the necessity of morally good conduct from its relation to an other-worldly goal, so we deduce the necessity of religion from the fact that morality lacks a stable foundation without religion, since religion represents man’s practical acceptance of his goal in the world beyond. By this practical acceptation, it is true, religion at the same time becomes a necessary means for the support of certain earthly institutions, but only in so far as it impresses on these institutions (the family, the State, mutual intercourse between men) the stamp of moral goodness in regard to obligation and sanction. That religion should govern itself according to the earthly institutions in question, therefore, is not a legitimate conclusion, since the necessity of religion, as just explained, implies precisely the opposite relation, namely, that the family, the State, etc., must adapt themselves to the demands of religion.
For further reading, see page 127.
Notes
Grammar of Assent, N. Y. ed., 1870, pp. 378 sqq.
↩Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 372 sqq.; C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Religion, Münster i. W., 1892, pp. 30 sqq., 102 sqq.; Ph. Kneib, Jenseitsmoral, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 20 sqq.; W. Schneider, Göttliche Weltordnung und religionslose Sittlichkeit, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1909, pp. 449 sqq.
↩Cfr. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 379 sqq.; Pohle-Preuss, Eschatology, pp. 65 sqq.; Koch-Preuss, A Handbook of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 203 sqq.; J. P. Arendzen, What Becomes of the Dead? London, 1925; Schneider-Thurston, The Other Life, N. Y., 1920; J. C. Sasia, S.J., The Future Life, N. Y., 1918; D. J. Lanslots, O.S.B., The End of the World and of Man, N. Y., 1925.
↩Leo XIII, Encyclical “Libertas,” of June 20, 1888: “Ex omnibus hominum officiis illud est sine dubitatione maximum ac sanctissimum, quo pie religioseque Deum colere homines iubemur. Idque necessario ex eo consequitur, quod in Dei potestate perpetuo sumus, Dei numine providentiaque gubernamur, ab eoque profecti ad eum reverti debemus.”
↩See Weber, Christliche Apologetik, pp. 38 sq.
↩