The Origin and Development of Religion

§ I. Mistaken Attempts to Explain the Origin of Religion

That religion has always been regarded as a highly important factor in human life is a fact which cannot be denied. The atheistic world-view and the theory of materialistic evolution are incompatible with this universal conviction of mankind. As a consequence, atheists and materialists are eager to demonstrate the falsity and worthlessness of religion. Their efforts are first of all directed towards the destruction of the natural, as the foundation of revealed, religion. They try to show that the religious life of mankind is not based on nature and man’s dependence upon God, but owes its existence to arbitrary invention and weakness.

The various attempts that have been made to claim a purely natural origin for religion may be divided into four groups. (1) Some hold that religion is a human invention. (2) Others trace it to self-deception. (3) Others again regard it as a mere sentiment, and (4) a fourth group believes to have discovered the ultimate source of religious phenomena in animal instinct.¹1Some of the theories concerning the origin of religion with which we deal here, are no longer held by scientific ethnologists; yet they cannot be ignored because “nearly all psychological theories concerning the nature of religion which have been excogitated since man began to reflect, still have living, scientifically trained defenders,—beginning with the robust but sterile interpretation of religion as the product of sacerdotal deception and pathological degeneracy up to the most highly sublimated and spiritualized theories, which in their profundity can be appreciated only by those conversant with philosophical speculation.” (K. Girgensohn, Der seelische Aufbau des religiösen Erlebens, Leipsic, 1921, p. 3). A careful analysis of these theories will show their falsity and thus in a negative way confirm the objective truth of religion.

1. Religion Not a Human Invention

Those who hold that religion is a human invention may be divided into two groups. The first of these groups asserts that religion was the invention of a few deceivers, who imposed it by fraud upon the masses, while the second maintains that it was introduced by the common consent of all.

We maintain that religion was not introduced by fraud and intentional deception on the part of priests and lawgivers.

The theory that priests and lawgivers invented religion is as old as the hills, but it did not become popular until the so-called era of enlightenment, when Voltaire and other rabidly anti-Christian writers based their claims on the ancient legislative codes with their largely religious content and on the close connection that existed between religion and civil government among the nations of antiquity. Legislators and priests, they contended, introduced religion for their own advantage and for the benefit of the commonwealth. “Is fecit, cui prodest.”

That religion, in ancient as well as in modern times, has frequently been made to serve the purposes of State polity, and that unscrupulous priests and rulers sometimes deceived the masses for selfish motives (as we read, e. g., in the Book of Daniel) cannot be denied; but this was merely an abuse of something that already existed, and hence no conclusions can be drawn therefrom as to the origin of religion.

a) If religion had originated in the manner alleged by Voltaire, it ought to be possible to ascertain when and where it was invented. But this is impossible. On the contrary, no matter how far back we go, we always meet with religious opinions and practices. All the known founders of religions took up the beliefs and customs which existed among the people and altered them, thus substituting a new religion for an old one.

b) The argument adduced by our opponents merely proves that religion was held in high honor by the ancients and that religious needs are more deeply rooted in human nature than political considerations. It also furnishes welcome testimony to the great importance attributed to religion by the rulers and statesmen of the early days.²2Cfr. W. Schneider, Göttliche Weltordnung, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1909, pp. 367 sqq.; F. J. Mach, Notwendigkeit der Offenbarung Gottes, Mayence, 1883, p. 104; P. von Schanz, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 109. But it does not prove that religion was invented by priests or lawgivers.

c) Voltaire’s theory is psychologically impossible. How could a nation have been persuaded by designing and selfish leaders to believe in the existence of superhuman beings and to impose upon itself the most burdensome sacrifices and obligations, not for a decade or a generation, but for centuries? How could the whole of humanity at all times and everywhere have been induced to shoulder the most onerous duties without inquiring into their objective validity and discovering the intended deception? This would be conceivable only on the assumption that error and lack of solid argument appeal more strongly to the minds of men than the truth with all its convincing demonstrations.

Religion was not introduced as the result of a common agreement among men.

a) The assertion of Hobbes and Rousseau that religion was introduced as the result of a common agreement among men, is based upon the arbitrary assumption that the human race originally had no religious beliefs whatever. In spite of many and strenuous efforts it has not been possible to establish the existence, either in the past or present, of any nation entirely destitute of religious beliefs and practices.

b) If it were a historical fact that religion was introduced among men as the result of a common agreement, it ought to be possible to show when and where this agreement was made. But no one has ever been able to do so.

c) If religion had originated in the manner described by Hobbes and Rousseau, it would be impossible to understand how it could have held its own up to the present day. The readiness of men to assume a multitude of burdensome obligations for the sake of an imaginary higher order simply cannot be explained, and it remains an unsolved riddle why this common agreement, regarding which no one knows how, when, and where it was entered into, has not been abrogated long since, for men are usually quick to abolish burdensome contracts whose juridical basis is doubtful.

2. Religion Not the Result of Self-Deception

Religion is alleged to be the result of self-deception either on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will.

A. Religion Not a Result of Self-Deception on the Part of the Intellect

Those who ascribe the origin of religion to an error of the intellect, unanimously assert that religion is the result of a crude and faulty manner of thinking, due to a defective development of reason, and conclude that it can be tolerated only so long as man is unable to discern the truth from falsehood.

When it comes to specifying the reasons for this alleged error of the intellect, our opponents are very much at variance. The principal reasons alleged by them are: fear, an unbridled imagination, and a false interpretation of the data of moral consciousness.

a) The opinion that fear is the mother of religion may be traced to such ancient writers as Epicurus (d. 271 B. C.), Lucretius (d. 55 B. C.), Petronius (d. 67 A. D.),³3The fragments preserved to us from the writings of Petronius contain the following verse: “Primus in orbe deos fecit timor, ardua caelo
Fulmina dum caderent.” and Statius (d. 96 A. D.). Among its modern champions David Hume⁴4Natural History of Religion, Section II (Works, Vol. IV). and David Friedrich Strauss⁵5Der alte und der neue Glaube, 15th ed., Leipsic, 1903. are the most prominent.

If religion is a product of fear, how did men get religion? Terrifying natural phenomena and strokes of misfortune, say the defenders of this theory, aroused fear in the childish mind of primitive man. He found himself helplessly facing thunder and lightning, the waves of the sea and the ravages of epidemics. Storms and earthquakes filled him with terror. As the causes of these phenomena were unknown to him, and he was naturally inclined to conceive the powers of nature after the analogy of his own, he concluded that all the phenomena which inspired him with dread were traceable to higher beings resembling man. Though these beings caused damage, they did not seem to be entirely malevolent, since nature offers many blessings, and hence men had reason to believe that they could conciliate these powers by submissiveness, gifts, petitions, and sacrifices. This belief, we are assured, gave rise to the crude forms of primitive worship.

b) If this theory were well-founded, the existing religions would have to show at least some traces of their origin. This applies especially to the most ancient religions of mankind and the lowest forms of nature-worship among the primitives of the present time, since they are as near to the origin of religious development as it is possible for us to get. Now, we can nowhere discover phenomena which might serve as a connecting link between religion and fear. The gods of the Vedas of ancient India, those of the Egyptian papyri, and those of the Persians and Chinese, all stand high above nature and appear primarily as protectors and governors of the moral order.

The sentiment of fear, it is true, plays a certain rôle in the oldest religions of pagan antiquity and in the writings of the Old and the New Testament; but it is a noble fear, transformed into reverence, a fear inspiring dread of divine retribution, and hence not the cause, but an effect, of religious convictions. The question how the latter originated cannot be answered by ascribing them to the former.

Among barbarous tribes that live in a state of abject intellectual degradation, the deity is almost always regarded as a being inspiring fear, one that makes man feel his impotence amid the destructive phenomena of nature. But even here there has usually been preserved a memory of the fact that mankind formerly stood in a more satisfactory relation towards the deity. Besides, fear among these tribes is not the cause, but the effect of an already existing religious belief. No causal relation can be shown to exist between fear and the origin of natural religion.

c) If fear of the humanly conceived forces of nature had inspired religion, the cultured portion of humanity at least would long since have given up religious faith and practice. As man becomes more familiar with nature, its laws and their mode of operation, he loses his fear of natural phenomena. If the religious beliefs of humanity rested on no other basis than fear, faith would disappear simultaneously with fear. That faith continues to flourish with unbroken power in the life of highly cultured nations, is an additional argument against the hypothesis here under examination.

If that hypothesis were true, the scientists who devote their lives to the investigation of natural phenomena and their causes would of necessity become estranged from religion, whereas precisely the contrary is the case. Father K. A. Kneller, S.J.,⁶6K. A. Kneller, S.J., Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science; a Contribution to the History of Culture in the Nineteenth Century, tr. by T. M. Kettle, Freiburg and St. Louis, 1911. Fr. T. A. Findlay, S.J., says in his introduction to the English edition of this excellent work (p. vii): “It stands to the credit of the founders of modern science—the master minds of the 17th and 18th centuries—that they had a salutary sense of the limitations of empirical methods. Their discoveries, which opened the way to all subsequent progress, did not interfere with their faith in God, or their belief in the spirituality and immortality of the human soul. If anything, their reverence for the Mind that reveals itself in Nature grew more profound as their knowledge of natural phenomena became deeper. The more enlightened of their successors in the 19th century have upheld their conception of Nature’s God, and of man’s place in Nature.” See also Jules Riche, Les Savants sont-ils des Croyants? Paris, 1926. has shown that of the men who have done most during the nineteenth century to enlarge our acquaintance with the forces of nature, nearly all have been believers in religion. More than two hundred of them were convinced Christians. These two hundred experts represent all branches of science, from astronomy to zoology, and their example shows that Bacon was right when he said that, while slight draughts of knowledge may lead a man to atheism, a deeper insight into the forces of nature will make him profoundly religious.⁷7“Leves gustus philosophiae movere fortasse ad atheismum, sed pleniores haustus ad religionem reducere.” (De Dign. et Augment. Scientiae, l. I, n. 30). Lord Kelvin (Sir William Thomson) expressed himself in a similar manner.

Those scientists who are opposed to religion have allowed themselves to be carried away by a false philosophy, without taking the time and trouble to subject its assertions and claims to a careful examination. This fact may seem surprising, but it is easily explained. The ability to engage in philosophical speculation gradually diminishes in proportion as the mind occupies itself exclusively with matter and its quantitatively determinable laws; all the more so if the amount of intellectual energy of which a man disposes is not large. The smaller it is, the more he must concentrate in one direction, and the sharper his intellect grows within a certain sphere, the narrower becomes his vision and the less his ability to judge of matters outside of that particular sphere. Thus many a scientist gradually loses interest in, and the ability to study, religious problems. This also explains the curious phenomenon that, as Fr. Kneller notes, the greater minds of science have ever shown warmer friendship and reverence for religion than the lesser, and that it is precisely the most distinguished scientists who remain loyal to the faith.⁸8Kneller, l. c., p. 391 sqq. Cfr. E. Dennert, Die Religion der Naturforscher, 7th ed., Berlin, 1908; IDEM, Weltanschauung des modernen Naturforschers, 2nd ed., Halle, 1911; H. Pesch, S.J., Die soziale Befähigung der Kirche, Berlin, 1911, pp. 46 sq. From this point of view we can understand what the late Bishop Haffner meant when he said in his book on “Materialism in the History of Civilization”: “The human mind with its inventions resembles an animal tamer, who is imprisoned by the beasts which he himself has subdued. His command over matter has intoxicated him, and in this state of intoxication he begins to adore what he had laid at his feet. At the moment when he is able to exercise greater power over material nature than ever before, he seems to be more completely than ever under the control of nature. The more fully man develops the supersensitive power of the intellect and the superterrestrial energy of the will, the more he seems to forget these sublime powers which he unfolds.”⁹9Der Materialismus in der Kulturgeschichte, Mayence, 1865, pp. 10, 276 sqq. (quoted by Pesch, l. c.); cfr. F. Paulsen, System der Ethik, Vol. I, 6th ed., 1903, pp. 438 sq.; M. Scheler, Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Vol. I, Leipsic, 1921, pp. 514 sqq. With many, of course, the chief reason for refusing to accept the true faith is ethical. Faith is a grace which a person can lose through his own fault.

d) Nevertheless, there are some elements of truth in the theory under consideration.

α) Man’s helplessness in the face of nature may have furnished many with an opportunity to meditate on themselves and the things which surround them, and to seek for the true causes of natural phenomena. Thus fear may have led man to form the idea of a super-human, powerful being that created and governs both him and nature, and can protect and aid him in adversity and danger. In that case, of course, the concept of deity is not produced by fear, but fear and terror constitute the extrinsic motive or occasion of inquiring into the conviction of the existence of God and thus arriving at a reverential acknowledgment of Him.

β) Fear may have led man to the conscientious performance of his religious duties and thereby induced the renewal and perfection of the religious life already existing in his soul.

γ) Finally, fear, and the mental disposition of man in general, may have contributed its share towards impressing upon some religions their peculiar character. The final causes in such cases would have been mainly: natural environment and climate. This may largely explain the sadness and melancholia peculiar to the religions of the North and the more joyful character of the Greek religion. But it would be a mistake to generalize, since the native tribes of Mexico, in spite of perpetual sunshine, developed a hideous and bloody cult, of which human sacrifices formed a prominent feature.¹⁰10O. Peschel, Völkerkunde, 7th ed., Leipsic, 1897, p. 328.—C. Crivelli, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, p. 251, s. v. “Mexico,” says: “The religion of all these nations [the aborigines of Mexico] was a monstrous polytheism. Human sacrifice was a feature of the worship of nearly all the tribes, but in none did it assume the gigantic proportions that it did among the Aztecs in their great teocalli, or temple, at the capital. Father Motolinia in his letter of 2 January, 1553, to the Emperor Charles V, speaking of the human sacrifices with which the Emperor Ahuitzotl (1486–1502) celebrated the opening of the great temple in Mexico, says: ‘In a sacrificial service lasting three or four days 80,400 men were sacrificed. They were brought through four streets walking single file until they reached the idols.’ Father Durán, speaking of this same sacrifice and of the great number of victims, adds: ‘Which to me seemed so incredible, that, if history and the fact that I found it recorded in many places outside of history, both in writing and pictorially represented, did not compel me to believe it, I should not dare to assert it.’ The Vatican and Tellerian manuscripts give the number of victims as 20,000; this number seems more probable. … Father Mendieta, as well as Father Motolinia and other authorities, agree in affirming that the number of victims annually sacrificed to Huitzilopozotli and other Aztec deities reached the number of 15,000 to 20,000.”

Religion is not a figment of the imagination and consequently did not originate in Fetishism, Animism, or magic.

Man loves to idealize and to personify inanimate objects. Imagination is a means of transmuting the all too harsh reality and of peopling the world with fantastic figures. This faculty is strongest in childhood, when reason has not yet acquired full control over the senses and the imagination. “The child attributes the life with which he is animated to his environment; he endows all the objects by which he is surrounded with a personality resembling his own. The child knows no dead or lifeless objects; he regards the world as peopled by living beings, with whom he quarrels and chats, at whom he grows angry, whom he loves and fondles.”¹¹11A. Sabatier, Philosophie de la Religion, p. 95. In a similar manner, according to Tylor, Spencer, Lippert, Sabatier, King, and others, we must conceive the childhood of the human race as a time when man had scarcely yet crossed the threshold of instinctive life. It is here that these savants believe to have discovered the fountain-head of religious consciousness. As to the development of this consciousness, they do not agree, but propose various theories, known, respectively, as Animism, Manism, Fetishism, and Magism.

The most comprehensive of these theories is Animism, which comprises Manism and Fetishism, and has been most fully developed by Tylor.¹²12E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, London, 1863, and later editions; a brief statement of the theory in Th. H. Robinson, An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions, pp. 47–67; Windle, Religions Past and Present, pp. 109 sqq. According to this theory, certain striking biological phenomena, such as the opposition existing between sleep and the waking state, trances, dreams, and visions, led to the formation of the idea of a soul. Hand in hand with this notion went a belief in the survival of the soul after death and the transmigration of souls from body to body. In course of time the qualities of the human soul were transferred to other beings, and the universe was conceived as animated by a sort of over-soul (Animism). The cult of deceased ancestors (Manism) further led to the formation of the concept of a pure spirit, which was believed to reside either in material objects (Fetishism) or to enter into relations with nature, its objects and processes (Nature Worship). This, it is asserted, was the origin of the higher forms of Polytheism and the worship of a god of heaven, or of the storm, or of the rain. The ultimate product of this evolution was Monotheism in a more or less pure form.

While Tylor traces the beginnings of religion to the spirits which animate nature—hence the term Animism—Herbert Spencer¹³13The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols., London, 1900. finds the origin of religion in man’s cult of his ancestors (Manism). The spirits of primitive religion are not merely formed according to the type of the human soul, but they are true human souls.¹⁴14A. Borchert, Der Animismus, Freiburg, 1900, p. 3; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., Der Ursprung der Gottesidee, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1926, pp. 18 sqq.; B. C. A. Windle, Religions Past and Present, N. Y., 1927, pp. 109 sqq. J. T. Driscoll in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 526–530, says: “Spencer’s theory is known as ‘the Ghost-theory of Religion’ and at the present time is generally discredited even by evolutionists. With Tylor the worship of the dead is an important subdivision of Animism; with Spencer it is the one and all of religion. Lippert consistently carries out the theory of Spencer and, instead of Animism, uses the word Seelenkult. De la Saussaye says that Lippert pushes his view to an extreme and supports it with rich, but not over-trustworthy, material. Schultze considers Fetishism and Animism as equally primitive. F. B. Jevons rejects the theory that all gods of earlier races were spirits of dead men deified.” This view is at bottom merely a revival of ancient Euhemerism, i. e., the theory that the gods and kings of mythology were deified mortals and their deeds nothing more than the amplification of human acts by the imagination.

Fetishism is intimately related to the two theories we have just mentioned. It means the religion of the fetish. The term fetish is derived from the Latin factitius, i. e., something that is made. Portuguese sailors used feitiço to designate the charms and talismans of the Negroes with whom they came in contact on the West Coast of Africa. The word occurs in books of travel written at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but was not introduced into literature until 170 years ago by a French writer, C. De Brosses.¹⁵15Du Culte des Dieux Fétiches, 1760; cfr. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, Vol. I, 4th ed., Tübingen, 1925, p. 5; J. T. Driscoll, article “Fetishism” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 52–58; A. Le Roy, The Religion of the Primitives, pp. 74, 178, 299; Th. H. Robinson, An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions, London, 1926, pp. 64 sq. Comte employed it to designate the lowest stage of religious development.

The term fetish has been variously defined. Bishop Wm. Schneider, who went to considerable research to establish its true meaning, says: “A fetish is an object of nature or art, frequently of no intrinsic importance, which is permanently or temporarily protected, influenced, or even inhabited by a spirit and invoked and venerated as a miraculous helper and protector. … The common basis of the belief in fetishes is the thought that the world of phenomena, animate as well as inanimate, serves as the abode of spirits and that any beast, plant, or mineral may be chosen by a spirit, not only as an instrument with which to exert its power, but likewise as its permanent or temporary dwelling-place. This belief is accompanied by the confident persuasion that man, when in need of aid, is guided by the hand of his god or guardian spirit in the choice of a fetish.”¹⁶16Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker, Münster i. W., 1921; cfr. A. Le Roy, The Religion of the Primitives, pp. 299 sqq. The Supreme Being is never degraded to the level of a fetish. “The fetish body, whether animated or not, is merely the external object of veneration; the intrinsic reason of this veneration is the fetish spirit, which dwells in, or is incorporated with, the body.”¹⁷17Schneider, op. cit., p. 227. “The notion of fetish is split when it is not limited to actual idols, but extended to the spiritistically influenced means of protection, charms or talismans, and consistently also to their counterpart, namely, magic employed with a hostile intent. Fetish idols exercise their influence as embodied spirits through their own power; … they are regarded as persons. Fetish amulets, on the other hand, produce their effects by means of a force that is communicated to, or cooperates with, them from the outside.”¹⁸18Ibid., p. 172.—Farnell (Evolution of Religion, London, 1905) and other writers do not distinguish clearly between fetish and amulet, which leads Driscoll to say (Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 54): “Farnell … calls relics, crucifixes, the Bible itself, fetishes. In his view any sacred object is a fetish. But objects may be held as sacred by external association with sacred persons or places without having any intrinsic sanctity. This loose use of the word has led writers to consider the national flag (especially a tattered battle-flag), the Scottish stone of Scone, the mascot, the horseshoe as fetishes, whereas these objects have no value in themselves, but are prized merely for their associations,—real in the sense of the battle-flag, fancied in the case of the horseshoe.” Cfr. B. C. A. Windle, Religions Past and Present, pp. 131 sqq.

J. H. King regarded Magic as the first step in the evolution of religion.¹⁹19The Supernatural, its Origin, Nature, and Evolution, 2 vols., London and Edinburgh, 1892; cfr. J. P. Arendzen in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 197 sq.; Le Roy, The Religion of the Primitives, pp. 216–237. Since we cannot observe the spiritual life of primitive man at the time when religion first took its rise, he says, and since we have no reliable records of that age, the problem can only be solved in the light of psychology. When primitive man, at the beginning of his spiritual development, commenced to observe his proximate and remote environment, he was astonished at many extraordinary phenomena, such as storms, epileptic fits, hallucinations, somnambulism, etc., which he was unable to explain. Prompted by a natural urge to assume an adequate cause for every effect, he postulated occult forces transcending the powers of nature as they were known to him,—in other words, magic, as the cause of that which had aroused his astonishment and filled his soul partly with ardent desire and partly with fear.

In the course of his further development primitive man tried to obtain control of these “supernatural” powers by the use of magic formulas and incantations. This practice gave rise to the caste of magicians or medicine men, who claimed and were believed to be able to control the mysterious powers of nature and to employ them either to the advantage or to the disadvantage of their fellowmen. Under the influence of these sorcerers, and with the cooperation of extraordinary psychic phenomena, such as dreams and hallucinations, these magic powers or forces were personified, and there arose the idea of soul or spirit, from which in course of time developed the concept of God and religious worship.

Though this theory was subjected to numerous modifications by its chief defenders (King, Hubert, Mauss, Durkheim, Preuss, Vierkandt), its fundamental groundwork is everywhere the same, namely, the assumption that primitive man first believed in the existence of an impersonal mysterious power (mana, orenda), transcending all the known forces of nature, which power could be controlled by means of magic, and that the gradual unification and personification of these forces led to the belief in a Supreme Being.²⁰20On the theory of the origin of religion based on the survival, in many of the lower forms of religion, of beliefs which are generally grouped around the words mana and orenda, see Th. H. Robinson, An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions, pp. 32 sqq. The word mana, according to this writer, is derived from Polynesia, the word orenda from the language of the Iroquois Indians. “Mana implies a conception of universal power, which has many uses and manifestations. It is as if there were some universal electric current, which might be tapped at any point and made available for the service (or disservice) of man. Individuals may possess a greater or less share of it themselves, and in proportion to their endowment of mana they will be powerful and successful in such occupations as hunting or war. But other objects may also share in it, and, when they do, have unusual capacities and powers. It may to some extent be controlled by men; they may acquire it for themselves or they may even be able to infuse it into inanimate objects, which then become to all intents and purposes personal.” This would be another proof for the belief that religion springs from a primitive Monotheism, were it not that “mana seems in no sense personal, and can hardly be called an object of worship; it is rather a pervasive influence whose presence may lead to the worship of objects in which it dwells.” (Ibid., pp. 32 sq.) On magic as the origin of religion see Windle, Religions Past and Present, pp. 119 sqq.; Anwander, Die Religionen, pp. 45 sq.

According to this school of thinkers, therefore, religion is not based, as Animism would have it, on the assumption that all things have a soul, but on a belief in “supernatural,” impersonal, magic forces.

We now proceed to prove our assertion that religion did not originate in Fetishism, Animism, or Magic.

a) To begin with, Fetishism cannot be regarded as the first manifestation of religious life. This follows from its very nature. The Fetish worshipper venerates material objects, not for their own sake, but on account of the spirits which are believed to reside in or stand in relation to them. Hence Fetish worship necessarily presupposes a belief in superhuman, spiritual beings, and man’s dependence upon them,—which belief constitutes the essence of religion. In order to ascertain the origin of religion, therefore, we must find a definite answer to the question: How was man led to acknowledge spirits over and above him? Those who regard Fetishism as the most primitive form of religion, fail to explain this difficulty. They confound a definite stage in the evolution of the religious consciousness of man with its origin, and completely overlook the fact that Fetishism is but a degenerate ghost worship.

b) Equally untenable is the Animistic-Manistic theory of the origin of religion, proposed by Tylor and Spencer.

α) This theory rests upon the false supposition that religion originated at a time when man was wholly guided by instinct and his imagination was so strong that he projected its figments into the external world, personified, and finally worshipped them as beings of a higher order. This assumption (a logical postulate of the evolution theory) is absolutely gratuitous. That the intellectual life of man should have sprung from animal instinct is impossible, for the simple cannot proceed from the complex, nor the immaterial from the material, nor what is essentially more perfect from what is essentially less perfect, because such a process would contradict the law of causality. Moreover, while it may be admitted that the human imagination has a tendency to idealize and personify material objects, it never exerts itself in the manner demanded by this theory, except in those who are mentally defective. The human race has never passed through a period of infancy such as that postulated by Tylor and Spencer.

β) The theory here under examination finds no support in the existing religions. On the contrary, it openly contradicts the fact that the idea of God in the most ancient religions of civilized man approaches pure Monotheism precisely in proportion to its antiquity, and that traces of Monotheism appear most clearly in the development of the most backward nations, whereas Ancestor Worship is entirely unknown among, for example, the natives of Southeastern Australia and Tierra del Fuego.²¹21Cfr. Andrew Lang, The Making of Religion, London, 1900, pp. 174, 195; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., Der Ursprung der Gottesidee, I, pp. 117, 129 sqq. These writers show that the most primitive savages believe in a supreme and moral God. According to Tylor and Spencer the contrary should be the case:—the religion of the primitives and the religious beliefs of the most backward tribes ought to give the clearest testimony to the primitive worship of ancestors and of the soul.

γ) Ancestor Worship presupposes the existence of religion. Not a single nation or tribe has ever been discovered whose religion consisted of Ancestor Worship pure and simple;²²22A. Borchert, Der Animismus, Freiburg, 1900, p. 157. in fact it can be shown that Ancestor Worship became a constituent of existing religions at a comparatively late period in history.²³23Borchert, op. cit., p. 47. Not even in China, the classic home of Ancestor Worship, did this cult form the beginning of religion. Here, as everywhere else where Monotheism was introduced and spread, distinguished men (heroes, chiefs, etc.) were deified and given a cult similar to that of the gods.²⁴24J. T. Driscoll, Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 529; P. Ehrenreich, Götter und Heilbringer, Berlin, 1906, pp. 576, 599 sq. This extension of divine worship to the spirits of the dead clearly postulates the previous existence of a belief in God and a religious cult. Consequently, Ancestor Worship, in the form in which it was or is actually practiced, cannot by its very nature have been the primitive form of religion.

c) The theory that religion originated in Magic is equally untenable.

α) This theory rests upon false psychological suppositions. To say that primitive man explained various astonishing phenomena of nature by ascribing them to impersonal magic forces, is to misunderstand completely the tendency and need of the human soul to seek a cause for every effect. This tendency and need, which primitive man, who was no less a rational being than his modern descendants, must have felt within himself, have their foundation in reason, which demands an adequate cause for every effect. It is in reflecting upon our own intellectual and volitional activity that we form our first acquaintance with the law of causality. We apply the notion of cause, as we have experienced it within ourselves, to the outside world. Where we find purely material causes insufficient to explain certain effects, we assume that spiritual and personal causes are at work. That is precisely the way primitive man proceeded in contemplating his proximate or remote environment. The more remarkable and imposing were the objects and phenomena which he faced, the more lasting was the impression they made upon him, the greater his astonishment, and the more intensive his speculation as to their probable causes. Under these circumstances the perception of the regular movements of the heavenly bodies, especially the sun and the moon, thunder storms, etc., no doubt soon convinced him that these natural phenomena must be attributed to a personal being greatly superior to man in wisdom and power. This conviction furnished the point of departure and the first inspiration of religious speculation, and there is no reason for assuming that primitive man had recourse to unknown and impersonal magic forces, of which he knew nothing.

β) The theory under consideration is based upon false historical assumptions. It is not true that man’s intellect developed from brute forms and that, at a certain far distant period of time, he passed through a phase of evolution which was favorable to the genesis and growth of magic superstitions. Even if it could be shown that the human body was derived from animal ancestors, it would not follow that the soul is the product of a similar development, for it is metaphysically and physically impossible that a spiritual soul should develop out of a brute soul intrinsically dependent upon matter. It is far more likely that man was in the full possession of reason and free will at the moment of his creation.

γ) The theory of Tylor and Spencer furthermore rests upon unfounded ethnological postulates. If it were true, the idea of magic and its practice would have to occupy a very important place in the life of at least the more backward nations of the earth, almost completely effacing every trace of belief in God. In matter of fact this is not so. “The various tribes of pygmies, which undoubtedly belong to the most ancient races of the earth, show comparatively few traces of magic belief and practice,—fewer at any rate than most ethnologically younger and culturally more highly developed nations …,” and “it is precisely among the pygmies that we find, not only religion in general, but the idea of a Supreme Being most clearly developed.”²⁵25W. Schmidt, S.V.D., Der Ursprung der Gottesidee, Vol. I, p. 487; cfr. A. Le Roy, The Religion of the Primitives, pp. 248 sqq.

In this connection it should be noted that among the aborigenes of Southeastern Australia, who are still in the first stages of civilization, the medicine men claim to have their power from a higher being, which they conceive as a person, though not as a spirit.²⁶26Schmidt, op. cit., p. 423.—On the magic theories in general see the same author, op. cit., pp. 422–488 and “Der Ursprung der Gottesidee: eine weiterführende Überschau,” in Anthropos, Vols. XVI–XVII (1921–1922), pp. 1006–1018; E. R. Hull, S.J., Archaic Religions, Bombay, 1913, pp. 56 sqq., 150 sqq.

We go farther and maintain that religion does not owe its origin to a deception of man’s moral consciousness.

It is through his moral consciousness that man first learns the difference between good and evil. This perception is followed by a prompting to do the one and to avoid the other. After moral thought and sentiment were awakened in man, they soon found their consolidation in community life. Not being able to interpret the nature of duty, the moral law, and the mysterious activity of conscience (say the defenders of this theory, e. g., Paulsen, Gizycki), men at first regarded these factors as immediate effects of higher, superhuman powers, and this belief gave rise to the consciousness of man’s dependence upon divine beings and to religion as the necessary practical complement of this belief. Religion and the belief in God consequently owe their origin to the infancy of the human race. They were adopted at a time when reason was not sufficiently developed to give a correct account of the facts and phenomena of the moral world. Remnants of these ancient religious ideas, resting upon deception, still exist among those who imagine they hear the voice of God in the dictates of conscience and from the facts of moral consciousness conclude that there is a personal God.²⁷27Cfr. W. Schneider, Göttliche Weltordnung, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1909, pp. 452 sq.

1. This theory rests on the false assumption that morality originally flourished without religion. Neither history nor the science of comparative religion gives the slightest support to this assumption. Wherever we meet with moral opinions and principles, we find that they are intimately bound up with religion.²⁸28Op. cit., p. 453; see also the same author’s Allgemeinheit und Einheit des sittlichen Bewusstseins, Cologne, 1895; V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B., 1904, pp. 569 sqq.; Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites, London, 1894, pp. 53, 267; O. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1896, pp. 367 sqq.; Religion und Religionen, Munich, 1906, p. 23.

2. The theory with which we are dealing cannot account for the facts of moral consciousness. Religion and morality are inseparable. The infinite worth of moral goodness and the absolute power of moral obligation imperatively demand the existence of a supra-mundane, personal God. Morality is founded on faith in a supernatural lawgiver of unlimited power and infinite perfection. Without a religious basis, man’s moral consciousness would be an insoluble enigma.

It is true that the moral law is within us, and therefore we obtain our first knowledge of it through instruction. Philosophical proof of its existence comes later. But that which is first for us in the logical order need not necessarily be first also per se in the ontological sphere. As we have an idea of cause and effect before we know God qua first cause and final end of our existence, so, too, reason, starting from conscience and the moral law within us, and proceeding logically from cause to effect, can arrive at the knowledge of God as Author of the moral order by a perfectly legitimate process of ratiocination.