The Notion of Religion

I. Derivation of the Word.—The etymology of the word religion (Latin, religio), which is common to all the languages of Western Europe, has been variously explained.

Cicero derives religio from relegere,¹1De Natura Deorum, II, 28: “Qui omnia, quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent, dicti sunt religiosi ex relegendo.” Lactantius²2According to Lactantius men are bound to God (religati) by the tie of piety, and it is from this that religion has received its name. De Div. Instit., IV, 28 (Migne, P. L., VI, 536): “Hac conditione gignimur, ut generati nos Deo iusta et debita obsequia praebeamus, hunc solum noverimus, hunc sequamur; hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo religati sumus. Unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo.” and St. Jerome³3Comment. in Amos, IX, 6 (P. L., XXV, 1089 sq.): “Et fasciculum super terram fundavit: Iste fasciculus una Domini religione constrictus est, unde et ipsa religio religando et in fascem Domini vincendo nomen accepit.” from religare, St. Augustine from either religare⁴4Retract., I, xiii, 9 (P. L., XXXII). Cfr. De Vera Religione, c. lv, n. 111 (P. L., XXXIV): “Religion binds us [religat] to the one almighty God.” or religere.⁵5De Civ. Dei, X, c. 3, n. 2 (P. L., XLI, 280): “Having lost God through neglect [negligentes] we recover Him [religentes] and are drawn to Him.”

The derivation of religio from religere is not well founded; hence there remains only the choice between relegere and religare. For both derivations analogous forms can be cited; for ligare, e.g., postulio, optio, rebellio; for relegere, legio, regio, pugio. The transition from e to i in the second syllable (religio) is also found in other formations, such as dirigo, adimo, corrigia. Analogy, therefore, is not a sufficiently reliable guide.

Perhaps a study of the fundamental meaning of the words ligare and legere will prove helpful for our purpose. From this point of view the derivation of religio from relegere seems to deserve the preference. Relegere means primarily to gather, to collect, secondarily, to recollect, to recall to mind, to reflect. If religio was derived from relegere, interior recollection, devotion, was probably intended to be the root meaning of the word. If, on the other hand, religio was derived from religare (to bind, join, unite), as has been pretty generally held since Lactantius, the idea of union with God must have played the leading rôle. The latter is not, however, as closely related to popular religious consciousness as the feeling of devotion and interior recollection.

But all these theories are purely speculative; it is impossible to establish the etymology of the word with any degree of certainty.⁶6Cfr. Chas. F. Aiken in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 738 sqq.; L. de Grandmaison, S.J., in Lectures on the History of Religions (C.T.S.), Vol. I, London, 1910, I, 1 sqq.; M. Jastrow, The Study of Religion, New York, 1901, pp. 171 sqq.

II. Use and Signification of the Word “Religion” and its Synonyms.—Cicero defines religion as “the worship of the gods,”⁷7“Religio, id est cultus deorum.” “Iustitia erga deos religio dicitur.” or “justice towards the gods,” and applies it to whatever pertains to the cult of a divine being.⁸8“Religio est, quae superioris cuiusdam numinis curam ceremoniamque affert.” He as well as Livy emphasize its binding force.⁹9Cicero: “Tanta religione obstricta tota provincia est, ut” etc. Livy: “Ut religione obstrictos haberent multitudinis animos.” (Cfr. any one of the larger Latin dictionaries).

The Greek classics (Plato, Herodotus, Æschylus, etc.) variously employ the words θρησκεία, εὐσέβεια, θεοσέβεια, λατρεία, and, like the Roman authors quoted, combine with this notion the idea of divine worship or the fear of God.¹⁰10See Liddell and Scott’s Greek Lexicon under the resp. vocables, and S. Weber, Christliche Apologetik, Freiburg, 1907, pp. 20 sqq.

From the pagan Romans the word religio passed into the Christian vocabulary. The Latin Vulgate translates the Hebrew word used to designate divine worship in Exod. XII, 26, with religio; in Exod. XXIX, 9, Lev. VII, 36 and XVI, 31, and in Numb. XIX, 2, religio takes the place of divine precept. To the former term there corresponds in the New Testament θρησκεία (Jas. I, 27; Col. II, 18) and λατρεία (John XVI, 2; Rom. XII, 1); to the latter also θρησκεία (Acts XXVI, 5; Jas. I, 26).

The sub-Apostolic Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers adopted this usage. We need only mention the Letter to Diognetus,¹¹11Epist. ad Diognet., c. ii (P. G., II, 1168 sqq.); English translation in Loeb’s Classical Library, The Apostolic Fathers, edited by Kirsopp Lake, Vol. II, pp. 347–379. Justin Martyr,¹²12Apol., I, c. 13 (P. G., VI, 345 sq.). Tertullian,¹³13De Oratione, c. 18 (P. L., I, 1178). Lactantius,¹⁴14Div. Inst., IV, 28. St. Augustine,¹⁵15De Vera Religione, c. 55, n. 111. and Eusebius.¹⁶16Praepar. Evang., l. I, c. 1 (P. G., XX, 24). St. Thomas Aquinas, taking his cue from the Fathers and early Scholastics, sums up the case as follows: “Whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it properly denotes a relation to God. For it is He to whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and it is He whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing and protesting our faith.”¹⁷17Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 1.

III. Definition of Religion.—Having studied the name, let us now examine the thing itself.

1. The Basis of Religion, or Religion Objectively Considered.

a) Though the religious beliefs of nations differ widely, all agree in holding that man depends upon the Deity and must conduct himself accordingly. This is evidenced both by the definitions and paraphrases to which the notion of religion has in course of time been subjected and by the character of the religious life led among the various nations, as we shall see later.

b) Since man’s relation to God is the foundation of all religion, it is of the greatest importance that this relation be correctly understood. Every relation is determined by three elements, namely, (α) the subject, (β) the terminus, and (γ) the foundation. The subject of the relation here under consideration is man; its terminus is God. By comparing the subject with the terminus we learn the nature of the foundation or basis underlying man’s relation to the Deity. Hence before determining the essence of religion, two preliminary questions must be answered, namely, first, What is God? secondly, What is man?

c) Philosophy demonstrates that God is an infinitely perfect, absolute, spiritual, personal Being, determined only by Himself, the adequate cause of every other existing thing.¹⁸18Jos. Hontheim, S.J., Theodicea, pp. 148 sqq.; S. H. Joyce, S.J., Principles of Natural Theology, London, 1923, pp. 18 sqq.—F. Heiler asserts (Der Katholizismus, 2nd ed., Munich, 1923, p. 350): “The God whose existence natural theology demonstrates, is not the God of living piety …. Hence we can speak only of rational proofs for the reality of an absolute being, … not of proofs for the existence of God.” This assertion is true in so far as the God demonstrated by philosophy is for our consciousness at first only the God of theoretical reason, and not at the same time the God of the will and of feeling. But the religious life begins with that knowledge of God which springs from the philosophical proofs for His existence. If to this knowledge is added practical acknowledgment, reverent submission, loving consecration, and hopeful trust on the part of the will and sentiment, it attains its full development and perfection; and thus the God of natural theology becomes the God of living piety. However, it is not necessary that the predicates which metaphysics attributes to God should always be actually present to the religious consciousness; it suffices if they are implicitly present as the objectively indispensable and solid foundation of all religious life, to which reflecting reason can always return, in order to lend to religious activity a constantly greater depth and interior solidity. Man also is a personal being, but he is created and determined in his nature and activity by God. He depends far more upon God than upon his fellow-creatures, because He owes to God all that he is and has. Consequently, man’s relation to God must be defined as one of absolute and complete dependency.

d) This relationship is real, that is to say, actually existing, because all its elements—subject, terminus, and foundation—are real.

e) Man’s dependence on God manifests itself in a twofold way. God is man’s first cause and final end. He is man’s first cause because man would not and could not exist without Him. He is man’s final end, first, because He is the final end of all things, having created the world for His own sake; secondly, because man, being endowed with a capacity for enjoying truth and goodness, can find genuine happiness and attain the perfection of his nature only in the possession of Him who is substantial Truth and Goodness. Hence man, in his whole nature and being, both as to origin and destiny, is utterly dependent upon God; even in his most exalted state he is and remains a child of God.

f) This dependence of man upon God as his Creator and final end is the basis of religion in its special and proper meaning, and is frequently itself called religion for short. Religion in the objective sense may, therefore, be defined as man’s dependence upon God as his first cause and ultimate end, or, the sum-total of those truths and duties which arise from man’s objective dependence upon God.

2. Religion in its Proper or Formal Sense.—Concretely or formally, i. e., in its proper sense, religion is man’s conduct as prescribed by his objective dependence upon God. In this aspect, namely, as man’s actual profession of his dependence upon the Deity, religion is found among all nations and tribes of the earth. The mode of divine worship among the different nations, of course, differs according to their ideas of man’s relationship towards God. On the basis of the theistic world-view, which is the only one that can stand before the bar of reason, we define religion as “man’s free and complete dedication of himself to the service of God.”

This definition abstracts entirely from supernatural revelation and has in view only human nature as such, and God as that nature’s adequate goal. The Catholic Church accepts this definition as true and correct so far as it goes, but deepens and broadens it by insisting on a more intimate union of man with God and giving a more definite description of his final end as derived from supernatural revelation.

3. God and Religion.—It would not be correct to say that there is a religion for God either in the objective or subjective sense. For God is infinitely perfect, and since He does not depend upon any other being, cannot admit any such dependence. He is the principle or efficient cause, not the subject, of (creatural) religion.

4. Religion and Morality.—To determine the true relation between religion and morality, we must first explain the meaning of the two words.

a) Religion, objectively considered, as we have seen, is the sum-total of all those beliefs, sentiments, and practices, individual or social, which result from man’s relationship to God. That relationship forms the foundation of the moral order, that is, of the free actions of man in all their phases, taken as a whole. Every moral or free-will act performed by man presupposes his dependence upon God and receives its goal, value, and content from the perception of that dependence.

b) If objective religion be defined as the sum-total of the obligations imposed on man by his dependence upon God, there is no distinction between religious and moral obligations or duties, since the latter (namely, man’s duties towards himself, towards his neighbors, and towards God) may all be deduced from his dependence upon His Creator.

c) As a rule, however, the concept of objective religion is narrowed by including within it only man’s duties towards God. In this sense man’s religious duties represent but a part, though, it is true, the most important part, of his moral obligations.¹⁹19Cfr. Koch-Preuss, A Handbook of Moral Theology, Vol. IV, Man’s Duties to God, 2nd ed., St. Louis, Mo., 1921.

d) From this explanation we can readily see how religion is related to morality. We may subsume under the term religion all those duties which are incumbent upon man as a consequence of his dependence upon God, or, to use a more common phrase, the fulfilment of his duties towards God in the narrower sense. In the former case the fulfilment of man’s moral duties is identical with that of his religious duties, while in the latter, the fulfilment of the religious duties constitutes the principal part of the moral law.²⁰20Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 4th ed., Freiburg, 1904, pp. 14 sqq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin, 1917, pp. 1 sqq.; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, 4th ed., London, 1918, pp. 123 sqq.

Religion, properly understood, therefore, cannot be divorced from morality. In other words, there is no such thing as morality without religion.

5. Religion as a Virtue. a) Taking religion in the narrower sense, we may say that it is a permanent state, a habit of the soul, or a virtue, namely, in the words of St. Thomas, “that virtue which prompts man to render to God the worship and reverence that belong to Him by right.”²¹21Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 1: “Virtus, per quam homines Deo debitum cultum et reverentiam exhibent.”

b) Since religion, unlike the so-called theological virtues, has for its immediate object, not God, but something outside of God, something created, namely, the service of God, and since it is by nature a habit of the will, it is classed among the moral virtues,²²22St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 5; cfr. F. Suarez, De Relig., l. III, c. 3, n. 3 and 4, edit. Vives, Tom. XIII. of which it is the most excellent because its object puts it in intimate union with God. St. Thomas subsumes the virtue of religion under justice,²³23Ibid., art. 5, ad 3; cfr. Suarez, op. cit., c. 4, n. 10 sqq. because religion resembles, though it does not possess all the properties of, that cardinal virtue. On account of man’s absolute dependence upon God, religion, though it instructs him how to serve God as he is in duty bound to do, is not able to establish that complete equality between demand and act that belongs to the essence of justice, nor is a quantitative calculation of religious service according to the principles of strict justice compatible with the nature of religion.

For further reading, see page 126.