Notion and Possibility of Supernatural Revelation

§ I. Notion of Supernatural Revelation

1. Origin of the Concept

Since it is our task in this volume to set forth the foundations of Catholic belief, and since, according to Catholic teaching, supernatural revelation constitutes a necessary condition of faith, we must first study the true concept of supernatural revelation in the light of dogma before endeavoring to justify it by the aid of reason.

The teaching of the Church concerning the nature of revelation is contained mainly in the decrees of the Vatican Council.¹1Concilium Vaticanum, Sess. III, cap. 2; Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, Enchiridion, n. 1785 sqq. In developing it we shall follow approved theologians.

2. The Supernatural Order

a) The notion of the supernatural is inseparably connected with that of the natural. Only after the limits of the latter are known, is it possible to say just where the supernatural begins.

What do we call natural? Natural is whatever belongs to the nature of an object, no matter whether that object is material or spiritual. To the nature of an object belongs first of all its essence, its quidditas, as the Schoolmen were wont to say, i. e., that by which it is what it is and as it is. In the essence are rooted the different faculties, dispositions, and powers. These, when developed and applied, result in operation. All this, so far as it springs from the innermost being and essence of a thing, is natural, just as the essence itself is natural.

Natural are furthermore all the perfections which result from the operation of the dispositions, faculties, and powers inherent in a being. Natural are, finally, the external conditions and presuppositions of a being’s operation, in as far as they are demanded by the constitution and needs of that being’s nature, i. e., the aim and object of its activity and the possibility of its attaining that aim by the use of its own powers.

Having thus delimited the sphere of the natural, we are in a position to define the supernatural. Supernatural is that which transcends the nature, faculties or needs of a being. Supernatural, consequently, is every perfection (for instance, sanctifying grace) which is not demanded by the internal constitution of a being. Supernatural, furthermore, is every perfection of the powers of nature (e. g., habitual grace) which cannot be deduced from either the essence or the dispositions of a being or from its operation and the conditions under which that operation ordinarily takes place.

If we apply these truths to man, we find that every perfection of his nature that is found neither in his essence nor in the faculties, dispositions, and powers of that nature, in other words, which transcends the essence, powers, and needs of nature,—is supernatural.

There are two species of the supernatural, namely, the modally supernatural (s. quoad modum) and the substantially supernatural (s. quoad substantiam). The former is supernatural only by virtue of the manner or form of its communication, not by virtue of what is communicated. To this category belongs, for example, the sudden restoration of health effected by divine intervention in the case of a patient who might possibly have been cured by the slow processes of nature, but not suddenly. Here it is not the cure itself, but its suddenness, which transcends the powers of nature and must consequently be regarded as supernatural.

When not merely the manner of communication, but likewise that which is communicated, transcends the powers of nature, we have what is called by Scholastics supernaturale quoad substantiam. Examples of this would be: the restoration of life to a corpse, the communication of some future, contingent event, sanctifying grace, the supernatural virtues, etc. Nature can do none of these things. Neither can it legitimately require God to bestow any of them upon it.

This definition enables us to perceive the distinction that exists between the supernatural on the one hand, and the unnatural, contranatural, miraculous, supersensible, and suprarational on the other.

Unnatural is that which is not externally befitting to the nature of a thing and which consequently hinders or threatens its well-being or development. Thus it would be unnatural for a man to be cut off in infancy from all intercourse with his fellowmen and to grow up completely isolated in an uninhabited desert. The supernatural, on the contrary, is a perfection which elevates the nature of an object or a being in conformity with its constitution, though no positive disposition for, or natural need of, such elevation can be assumed to exist.

The miraculous, in so far as it implies an effect transcending the powers of nature, belongs to the sphere of the supernatural, and differs from the latter merely as a species from its genus; it always bears the characteristic mark of the exceptional and extraordinary.

The suprasensible must not be confounded with the supernatural because, on the one hand, much that transcends the senses (such as the life of the soul), is natural, whereas, on the other hand, much that is supernatural (such as the miraculous cure of blindness) belongs, at least in one respect, to the domain of sense perception.

The suprarational, finally, differs from the supernatural in this respect, that it expresses merely the relation of the latter to human reason. This is not, however, to be understood as if the supernatural must necessarily transcend the powers of reason in every respect. There are truths which may be made the object of supernatural revelation even though they do not transcend human reason at all. The supernatural in general is suprarational only in so far as its deepest motive, i. e., its divine causation, cannot be adequately comprehended by any created intelligence.²2On the notion of the supernatural see Ign. Ottiger, S.J., Theol. Fundamentalis, Vol. I, pp. 41–49; R. Garrigou and P. Lagrange, De Revelatione, 2nd ed., Paris, 1921, l. I, cap. 4; J. M. de Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, Vols. I and II, ed. Vivès, Paris, 1871; Jos. Kleutgen, S.J., Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Münster, 1872, n. 4 sqq.; F. Hettinger, Fundamentaltheologie, 3rd ed., by S. Weber, Freiburg, 1913, pp. 105 sqq.; J. J. Urráburu, Institutiones Philosophicae, Vol. II, Valladolid, 1891, pp. 604 sqq.; Jos. Pohle, Natur und Uebernatur in Esser-Mausbach, Religion, Christentum, Kirche: Eine Apologetik für wissenschaftlich Gebildete, Vol. I, 5th ed., Kempten, 1923, pp. 375–538; Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 180 sqq., 5th ed., St. Louis, 1926; J. F. Sollier in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 336 sqq.; J. V. Bainvel, S.J., Nature et Surnaturel, Paris, 1903; G. Geiger, Gott und Welt, Natur und Uebernatur, Donauwörth, 1907; A. Rademacher, Gnade und Natur, M. Gladbach, 1908; J. J. Baierl, The Theory of Revelation, Vol. I, Rochester, N. Y., 1927, pp. 5 sqq.; Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, N. Y., 1914, pp. 312 sqq.

b) The Supernatural Order.—We may describe the supernatural order, in so far as man is concerned, as his destiny for a supernatural end, together with the various supernatural means appointed for the attainment of that end. By positive divine ordinance the supernatural end of man is the immediate possession and enjoyment of God by beatific knowledge and love. Human nature as such is not equipped for the attainment of this goal, and consequently needs to be supernaturally perfected and assisted. The intellect requires higher instruction to perceive man’s supernatural goal and the means appointed for its attainment, while the will cannot reach out for that goal unless it is elevated and strengthened by supernatural grace.

The foundation of the study of the supernatural order with its treasures of truth and grace is supernatural divine revelation.

3. Divine Revelation

a) Concept of Divine Revelation.—To reveal means to make known something which was unknown before, to unveil to the intellect a truth or a fact of which it had no previous knowledge.

The term revelation may designate both the act of communicating knowledge and the communicated knowledge itself. Here we are interested mainly in the former, i. e., the manner in which knowledge is communicated. Revelation in this sense, that is, as manifestation of the truth, primarily concerns the intellect. It may proceed from any rational being, but we are here concerned only with the revelation that comes immediately from God.

Divine revelation is mentioned frequently both in the Old and in the New Testament. As a rule it is designated by the verb ἀποκαλύπτειν (revelare),³3E.g., 1 Kings III, 21; IX, 15; Prov. XX, 19; Is. XL, 5; Dan. II, 19 sqq.; Matth. X, 26; XI, 25, 27; XVI, 17; 1 Cor. II, 10; Gal. I, 16; Phil. III, 15. to which corresponds the noun ἀποκάλυψις (revelatio).⁴4Rom. XVI, 25; 2 Cor. XII, 1; Gal. I, 12; II, 2; Eph. III, 3. But we also meet with the term φανεροῦν (manifestare)⁵5Eccli. I, 7; Mark IV, 22; John I, 31; II, 11; XVII, 6; Rom. I, 19. and its corresponding noun φανέρωσις (manifestatio).⁶61 Cor. XII, 7. Of less frequent occurrence are the verbs ἀναφαίνειν⁷7Luke XIX, 11. and ἀνακαλύπτειν⁸8Tob. XII, 11. (manifestare) and the adjectival phrases: φανερὸν ποιεῖν, γίγνεσθαι, ἐλθεῖν (manifestare).⁹9Mark III, 12; Luke VIII, 17.

While the expression differs, the sense in all the Biblical passages here under consideration is the same, namely, the manifestation or unveiling of an object or a truth, regardless of whether that object or truth came into being at the moment it was revealed, or whether it existed previously and revelation meant merely the removal of an obstacle to its perception. Revelation opens that which was previously shut, it lights up (φανέρωσις, φαίνειν) that which was dark and hidden, it unveils that which lay concealed (ἀποκάλυψις, revelatio), and, as it were, brings secret things before our eyes in a tangible manner.

b) Natural and Supernatural Revelation.—God has revealed Himself in a twofold manner, naturally and supernaturally. The difference between these two kinds of revelation lies entirely in the means employed. Natural revelation takes place through the created universe, which by its very existence incites human reason to reflect upon its nature and origin. Study shows the created universe to be the effect of a cause substantially different from itself and absolutely self-existing. This cause we call God. Thus the created universe by its very nature—hence the term natural revelation—conducts man to the knowledge of God. In other words, the things that constitute the created universe reveal to us the existence and nature of God, or, in so far as God created the universe for this purpose, He manifests Himself in His essence and existence to natural reason through the created universe.

Supernatural revelation is a special divine operation which does not form part of the creation and preservation of the universe, but consists in the communication to man, by means of intelligible terms, of such truths as will enable him to know and attain his supernatural goal.

c) Supernatural Revelation “quoad modum” and “quoad substantiam.”—Revelation demands a special intervention on the part of God for the purpose of communicating knowledge to man. If the communicated truth pertains to the sphere of the purely natural and is of a kind which reason might have discovered by its own unaided efforts, the supernatural element lies entirely in the manner of communication, and a revelation of this sort is called supernaturale quoad modum.

If the communicated truth transcends the natural powers of the human mind, and can be known only through supernatural revelation, the latter is called substantially supernatural (supernaturale quoad substantiam).

All supernatural revelation, therefore, is supernatural quoad modum, i.e., in regard to the manner in which it is made, but not necessarily quoad substantiam, that is, in respect of the truths revealed.

d) Immediate and Mediate Revelation.—With regard to the manner in which it is made, supernatural revelation on the part of God may be either immediate or mediate. It is called immediate when God speaks directly to a man; mediate, when He employs human agents in communicating His message. (Revelation through the agency of an angel is usually regarded as equivalent to immediate revelation.)¹⁰10Cfr. Ign. Ottiger, S.J., Theologia Fundamentalis, Vol. I, Freiburg, 1897, p. 47.

e) Internal and External Revelation.—The manner in which revealed truths are received by man gives rise to a distinction between internal and external revelation. A revelation is internal if it involves only the immanent faculties of the soul, i.e., reason and imagination; it is external if the senses also are affected.

God, in revealing to man truths of the supernatural order, may work immediately upon the reason and the imagination by communicating certain ideas, thoughts, and visions corresponding to these truths; or He may act upon the senses by externally perceptible words, symbols, objects, and events which serve to convey or illustrate the truths He wishes to reveal.

It is to these different methods of communication that St. Paul refers when he says: “God … at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets. …”¹¹11“Multifariam multisque modis olim Deus loquens patribus in prophetis. …” (Heb. I, 1.). Cfr. F. Prat, S.J., The Theology of St. Paul, tr. by J. S. Stoddard, Vol. I, London and New York, 1926, pp. 367 sq. Here are a few examples: John XIV, 16 sq.: “He shall give you another Paraclete, … the spirit of truth, … he shall be in you.”¹²12John XIV, 16 sq.: “Alium Paraclitum dabit vobis, … Spiritum veritatis, … et in vobis erit.” John XVI, 13: “When he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will teach you all truth.”¹³13John XVI, 13: “Cum autem venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem.” These are examples of purely internal instruction. In Jer. I, 13 sqq., the prophet sees the hostile power in a symbolic vision, the signification of which is duly explained to him. In 1 Kings III, 4, Samuel hears the voice of the Lord calling him. In Matth. VI, 26 sqq., certain instructions are given by Christ in connection with external objects, namely, the birds of heaven and the lilies of the field. In Matth. X, 15, a historical event (the punishment of Sodom and Gomorrha) is employed as a means to foreshadow an impending catastrophe.

f) Private and Public Revelation.—According to the purpose for which, and the persons to whom it is given, revelation is either private or public. The former is addressed to individuals for special purposes; the latter, to humanity at large, with religious instruction as its object.

g) The Process of Revelation.—The communication of previously unknown truths by divine revelation is not to be understood, however, as though God implanted in the recipient’s mind ideas or images without any corresponding activity on the part of the mind itself. This would scarcely be consistent with the nature of the intellect, which is an inherently active faculty. In the supernatural as in the natural order, God, in acting upon creatures, takes into consideration the nature which He has given them and the laws of activity which He Himself has implanted in them. The supernatural is calculated to elevate and perfect the natural, not to suppress or destroy it. Consequently, when God reveals something to man, the mind responds to God’s action. In this operation, nevertheless, God the Revealer gives the first impulse, He directs the mental act, and He furnishes the entire subject-matter of the revelation. In revealing His truths, God, on the other hand, adapts Himself to the individual character and temperament of the human recipient, as well as to the purpose of the particular revelation. This explains the great variety of expressions and points of view which we meet with in the records of revelation.

Since the ideas and terms employed in supernatural revelation apply, not to objects immediately corresponding to them, but to objects that are similar, our knowledge of supernaturally revealed truths, whilst perfectly true, remains nevertheless analogous.

h) Revelation and Inspiration.—Supernatural revelation must not be confounded with inspiration.¹⁴14Leo XIII, Encyclical “Providentissimus Deus;” Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1952; Addis and Arnold, A Catholic Dictionary, Revised by T. B. Scannell, 9th ed., London, 1917, pp. 459 sq.; Lagrange, Historical Criticism and the Old Testament, (Engl. tr.), pp. 83 sqq.; Chr. Pesch, S.J., De Inspiratione S. Scripturae, Freiburg, 1906, (reprinted 1925); J. V. Bainvel, S.J., De Scriptura Sacra, Paris, 1910; Æ. Dorsch, S.J., De Inspiratione S. Scripturae, Innsbruck, 1912; Hil. Felder, O. M. Cap., Apologetica sive Theologia Fundamentalis, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1923, pp. 273 sqq.

Inspiration, like revelation, is a divine and supernatural operation; but its object may be any truth, even one previously perceived by reason. On the other hand, God may reveal a truth without moving the recipient to set it down in writing. Inspiration, therefore, is essentially a supernatural impulse by which God directs an author to write down certain matters predetermined by Him, whereas revelation is simply the supernatural communication of hitherto unknown truths.¹⁵15Cfr. Chr. Pesch, S.J., De Inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae, pp. 409 sqq.; see also Vol. IV of this Handbook.

§ II. Possibility of Supernatural Revelation

In this section we shall consider the possibility (1) of supernatural revelation in general, (2) more specifically of the revelation of mysteries, and (3) of mediate revelation.

1. The Possibility of Revelation in General

1. Having explained the concept of supernatural revelation, we must now demonstrate its possibility. This is necessary in order to justify Catholic teaching against the attacks of Monism, Deism, and Rationalism, all of which for a priori reasons flatly deny the possibility of supernatural revelation. Monism cannot admit the possibility of divine revelation because it refuses to acknowledge the existence of a supramundane, personal God. Deism is compelled to deny the possibility of revelation because it holds God to be so immutable that He cannot exert any influence whatever on the created universe. Rationalism must oppose revelation because, while it does not, at least in its moderate form, deny the possibility of a communication from God to man, it regards the transmission of definite truths as unlikely, since it is incompatible with its peculiar theory of knowledge.

Our argument presupposes the theistic point of view, i.e., the belief in a supramundane, personal God, who is the Creator of the universe.

2. In employing the term “supernatural revelation” we have in mind immediate, not mediate, divine revelation, which latter we shall consider later on. Once the possibility of immediate revelation is established, there is no serious obstacle to the divulgation of revealed truths.

3. Whatever is capable of being, becoming, or happening is called possible. Possibility is either intrinsic or extrinsic. A thing is intrinsically or metaphysically possible if the elements of which it is to consist are capable of being united into one essence, or if the various parts of a concept can be combined without contradiction. In this sense, e.g., a golden ring or a steel pen is possible. A thing is extrinsically or physically possible if there exists a cause sufficient to call it into being. It is morally possible if that cause is a free, rational agent, whose character and subjective inclination are such as to move it to realize a possible notion. A thing is called morally impossible if the difficulties in the way of its realization are so great that, though the physical power of the cause, absolutely speaking, is sufficient to overcome them, in matter of fact the intended goal would be attained only in rare cases. Hence, for man, something may be physically possible and at the same time morally impossible.

To demonstrate the possibility of supernatural revelation we have to show that there is no intrinsic or extrinsic reason why God could not communicate with man. The course of the argument is mapped out for us by the three factors which have a share in revelation, namely, (1) God, (2) man, and (3) the truths to be communicated. The possibility of revelation on the part of God belongs to the sphere of both intrinsic and extrinsic, that on the part of man, mainly to the sphere of intrinsic possibility.

4. As regards the nature of the truths to be communicated by revelation, all that is required is that they shall not be known to the recipient before they are supernaturally revealed.

Hence we have first to prove the possibility of a supernatural revelation quoad modum. This possibility has been defined by the Vatican Council as an article of faith: “If anyone shall say that it is impossible or inexpedient that man should be taught by divine revelation concerning God and the worship to be paid to Him; let him be anathema.”¹⁶16Conc. Vat., Sess. III, can. 2, de Revelat.: “Si quis dixerit, fieri non posse aut non expedire, ut per revelationem divinam homo de Deo cultuque ei exhibendo doceatur: anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 1807).

We assert that immediate supernatural divine revelation is possible, and we prove this proposition (1) from the essence of God, (2) from the nature of man, and (3) from the character of the truths to be revealed.

Since supernatural revelation is a divine manifestation of truths to man, it must be regarded as possible if it is in accord with the essence of God, with the nature of man, and with the truth to be communicated by the former to the latter. Now, supernatural revelation is in accord with the essence of God, with the nature of man, and with the truths to be communicated by the former to the latter. Therefore, supernatural revelation is possible.

1. Supernatural revelation is in accord with the essence of God.

a) Supernatural revelation corresponds admirably to the power and perfection of God. It is a peculiar kind of outward divine activity. This activity, by which God produces something different from Himself, does not involve a contradiction or an imperfection. That peculiarity of revelation by which it produces a change in the intellectual life of man and furnishes him with new matter for thought, can also be easily reconciled with the theistic concept of God. If men can enrich the knowledge of their fellowmen by instruction, surely God, who has given them this faculty, must a fortiori be able to produce the same effect by direct action. Moreover, God not only gave man the power to communicate his thoughts, but Himself physically co-operates in every human act. Every act which man performs is entitatively of divine origin. Besides, God not only has full command of all those means over which man disposes in order to communicate his thoughts to others, but in consequence of His divine concursus, He can influence the human mind without the aid of words or pictures, and cause it to form new ideas.

That God, to whom all possible and actual truths are constantly and clearly present, does not lack matter to communicate to His creatures, goes without saying.

Finally, God is undoubtedly able to offer to man full certitude that it is He who is speaking. In our ordinary intercourse with our fellowmen we have no difficulty in ascertaining to whom we are indebted for this or that information. The power to communicate ideas is inborn in the human soul. Should not God, to whom we owe this faculty, be able to give our mind the light and power necessary to recognize Him with certainty when He speaks to us?

True, we are not able a priori to explain just how and by what means God communicates His truths to men. But that is no reason why we should deny the possibility of such a communication. Even the natural process of cognition in our own soul, and its connection with the objects of the outside world, is not fully clear to us; yet no sane man would therefore deny the possibility of interior cognition or of the reality of objects existing outside the mind.

Consequently, there is no obstacle to supernatural revelation on the part of divine omnipotence. God can enter into immediate intercourse with His rational creatures; He possesses all truth; He is able to make Himself known to man as the author of a supernatural communication.

b) Supernatural revelation also corresponds to the wisdom of God, which requires that every divine act should be directed to a rational end. Revelation puts man in the possession of new knowledge. It will not do to say that such a mode of instruction contradicts the wisdom of God, because it is nothing more or less than a subsequent improvement of human nature, the supplying of some perfection which man lacked when he first came from the hands of the Creator. According to the Catholic view, supernatural revelation, if it was to be de facto realized, had from all eternity to be included in the divine plan of leading the human race to its final goal. Nor can it be proved that revelation, if it was contained in the divine scheme of creation, would of necessity have had to take place at the very outset of human development. Gradual progress towards higher perfection might have corresponded just as well to the intentions of the all-wise Creator as primordial perfection. Finally, it is absurd to maintain that revelation involves an undue interference with the evolution of the human race. It does interfere with natural evolution, but this interference, in the form of divine instruction, is not an undue disturbance of human development any more than is the instruction of a child by his parents and teachers. On the contrary, this instruction, being imparted by divine wisdom, must be regarded as a suitable means of advancing man’s intellectual development.

2. Supernatural revelation is possible on the part of man. In order to receive a knowledge of divinely revealed truths, the human mind must be open to them. This receptivity exists as long as man is not in the full possession of truth; for, until he knows all truth, he is capable of knowing more, i.e., susceptible of instruction. As human knowledge, in the natural sphere, progresses steadily, yet is never complete, and rests largely upon human authority, there is no reason why the limits of human knowledge could not be enlarged by supernatural instruction and why divine authority should not have a place side by side with human authority in furnishing the mind with the greatest imaginable guaranty of truth. Were we to refuse our assent to a divine communication which excludes error and deception, we could not logically admit human authority as a source of knowledge, and all sciences (e.g., geography, ethnology, history), which by their very nature depend upon human observation and authority, would be impossible, nay, mutual intercourse between men would cease, and the social order itself would come to an end. Man from early youth to old age depends in many things entirely upon the authority of others, and this authority constitutes for him a source of knowledge of at least equal importance with personal experience and introspection.¹⁷17Cfr. F. W. Foerster, Autorität und Freiheit, 19th to 21st ed., Kempten, 1922, p. 62.

In the reception of revealed truths, as we have seen,¹⁸18Supra, p. 15. human co-operation is not in any way impaired, much less entirely abolished, but the activity of man’s mind is rather brought to higher perfection. Consequently, the Rationalist contention that the soul would remain entirely passive in receiving revealed truths, and that the communication of such truths is therefore impossible, has no foundation in fact.¹⁹19O. Pfleiderer (Das Wesen der Religion, 2nd ed., Leipsic, 1878, pp. 378 sq.) says: “From this it follows above all, that we must not conceive of revelation as if it absolutely excluded all independent activity on the part of man, as would manifestly be the case if it were conceived as the supernatural communication of definite, ready-made dogmas, notions or views. Such a proceeding is beyond all analogy, nay, outside of all psychological possibility. Not a single view or opinion or shred of knowledge enters the human mind as the ready-made product of an external cause. What we receive from the outside are mere impressions, emotions, etc., which are formed into definite views and opinions by the mind acting in conformity with the laws of nature. … It is impossible that religious concepts should originate differently. A religious concept not formed by ourselves in harmony with the general laws of our intellectual activity, … would not fit into the context of our other ideas, and would, therefore, remain uncomprehended. … It would be impossible to be convinced of the truth of such concepts, for conviction can only grow out of the rational connexion of one set of ideas with others. Finally, too, such an extraneous concept would not be recognizable in relation to its origin, i.e., as a revelation coming from God. The purely formal criterion of objective evidence plainly does not suffice, else every dreamer could claim for his most absurd imaginings the character of divine revelation.” Therefore, according to this writer, revelation can consist only in “an influence exerted by God upon the emotions,” and revelation is “the redemption from sin effected by God in man and reconciliation with God.” These false views are sufficiently refuted by what we say in the text. Cfr. also D. F. Strauss, Die christliche Glaubenslehre, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1840, pp. 274 sqq.

Equally untenable is the theory of those who assert²⁰20 See Supplementary Note 1, p. 329. that revealed truths have a purely relative character and are essentially of no more importance than the utterances of men endowed with great genius.

The Modernist view that revelation and natural religion coincide in the emotional experience of the Absolute has been refuted in the first volume of this Handbook.²¹21Volume I, pp. 12 sqq., 78 sq.

To safeguard the character of supernatural revelation, two factors must be considered, namely: (1) the nature of human cognition, which excludes complete passivity in the conscious acceptance of truth, and (2) the absolute unchangeableness and infallibility of God.

3. Supernatural revelation is possible with respect to the truths to be revealed. In itself, every enrichment of human knowledge is a desirable good, and a truth is desirable in proportion as its possession benefits man in his everyday life. Therefore, truths upon which the well-being and perfection of human nature depend are to be valued more highly than such as are merely theoretical or indifferent. Now the truths of revelation furnish answers to precisely those questions which are of decisive importance for man’s earthly existence. In addition, they acquaint him with his highest goal and show him the way to attain that goal, at the same time furnishing him, by virtue of their divine origin, with the best possible guaranty of absolute certitude. The communication of such truths, therefore, must be of the greatest conceivable benefit to humanity.

As the main objections that are raised against this thesis have been dealt with in a previous section, we can now proceed to consider the possibility of the revelation of mysteries.

2. Possibility of the Revelation of Mysteries

In establishing the possibility of supernatural revelation we have postulated that the truth which is to be revealed must be as yet unknown to the recipient. Under this supposition we showed supernatural revelation to be possible quoad modum. The question now arises whether a substantially supernatural revelation is possible; in other words, can God reveal mysteries to man? The Rationalists assert that He cannot. While they admit the possibility of the revelation of truths accessible to reason, they deny that God can communicate to man truths which transcend his understanding. To refute this contention, we must first explain what is meant by a mystery.

1. Definition of a Mystery

a) A mystery (from the Greek μυστήριον) is defined by Webster as a profound secret, something wholly unknown or kept cautiously concealed, and therefore exciting curiosity or wonder; something that has not been or cannot be explained. Every object of human knowledge involves a mystery, in so far as its nature or existence cannot be fully understood by unaided reason. In a narrower sense a mystery is anything which is beyond the reach of reason in the natural sphere of knowledge. To this category belong the physical essences of all material and spiritual objects, the future free acts of rational creatures, and the nature and existence of many things which are inaccessible to us on account of external obstacles, as, for example, the interior of the earth, the heavenly bodies, etc. All these belong to the order of nature and are consequently called natural mysteries.

b) A supernatural mystery in the strict theological sense is a truth which transcends the powers of human reason to such an extent that man cannot understand its essence or possibility even after it is revealed. God has revealed, for instance, the existence of the Trinity, but its innermost raison d’être and true nature remain a mystery to us. Therefore, this dogma is a mystery which exceeds the powers of reason (supra rationem). It is not unreasonable (contra rationem) because it does not contradict the principles of human cognition, but neither is it rational (secundum rationem) because reason is not able fully to comprehend this truth and to bring it into harmony with the principles of philosophy. The mystery of the most Holy Trinity cannot be shown to be either in harmony with, or contrary to, human reason; it simply exceeds the powers of reason.

c) This does not, however, mean that there is nothing about this mystery that we can understand. We can gain a sufficient knowledge of it to be able to speak of it correctly in a limited way. We have some idea of the terms in which the mystery is presented to us; we know how these terms must be combined to form a logical judgment, and consequently are in a position to distinguish a correct definition of the mystery from a false one. Withal, however, our knowledge of the Divine Trinity remains very inadequate. The same is true of other mysteries of religion. In speaking, e.g., of God’s nature and personality, we constantly employ analogous terms; the innermost essence of God and the manner in which unity of essence and trinity of persons coexist in Him, remain hidden to our intellect.²²22See Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 5th ed., St. Louis, 1925; on the dogma of the Trinity in its relation to reason see Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 194–201, 5th ed., St. Louis, 1925.

d) The subjoined argument applies only to supernatural mysteries in the strict sense of the term.

From the nature of a mystery, as defined above, it follows that we cannot demonstrate its possibility by means of positive arguments. We lack the necessary understanding of the concepts which must be combined in order to constitute the notion of a mystery, and, as a result, cannot form a reliable judgment as to the intrinsic interrelation of subject and predicate.

For precisely the same reason, on the other hand, the human intellect cannot demonstrate the impossibility of mysteries.²³23Ign. Ottiger, S.J., Theologia Fundamentalis, Vol. I, Freiburg, 1897, pp. 53 sqq.

e) In ecclesiastical terminology, which forms the basis of the explanation just given, there corresponds to the English term “mystery” the Greek μυστήριον. Among the pagans this word denoted a religious rite to which only adepts were admitted, and which concealed doctrines that were supposed to ennoble this earthly life and to create belief in a future existence. Only a few privileged persons were admitted to these rites, and they were under a strict obligation of secrecy. To impress this obligation on the neophyte his mouth and eyes were bandaged during the ceremony of initiation. From μύειν = to close (mouth and eyes), to initiate into mysteries, comes the word μυστήριον.²⁴24On the Biblical and classical meaning of μυστήριον see F. Prat, S.J., The Theology of St. Paul, tr. by J. F. Stoddard, Vol. II, London and New York, 1927, pp. 383 sqq.

This term was divested of its pagan connotations and adapted by the writers who, under divine inspiration, composed the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament mysterium is employed to designate a purely natural mystery, e.g., a secret committed to some one, and also such truths, secrets or mysteries as can be revealed only by divine revelation, e.g., the hidden meaning of a dream, and such as are founded on the very essence of God.²⁵25Prov. XX, 19; Eccles. XXII, 27; Dan. II, 18, 28 sq., 47; Wisd. II, 22; VI, 24. The New Testament employs μυστήριον in a more limited sense, namely, to denote those truths which can become known to man only by means of divine revelation and which remain obscure even after being revealed. The Evangelists employ this word only three times, namely, where they report Christ as declaring that it is given to the disciples alone to know the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven.²⁶26Matt. XIII, 11; Mark IV, 11; Luke VIII, 10. The incomprehensibility of the revealed mysteries is even more plainly expressed by St. Paul. In Rom. XI, 25 the divine guidance of Israel is called a mystery, and the incomprehensibility of God’s judgments is emphasized.²⁷27Cfr. F. Zorell, Novi Testamenti Lexicon Graecum, Paris, 1911, s. v.—Other pertinent texts are 1 Cor. II, 6 sqq.; XV, 51; Col. I, 26 sq.; 1 Tim. III, 9, 16; Apoc. I, 20; XVII, 7.

The Vulgate, besides mysterium, also employs the word sacramentum,²⁸28E.g., Tob. XII, 7; Wisd. II, 22; VI, 24; Dan. II, 18; Eph. I, 9; III, 3, 9; Col. I, 27. Cfr. F. Prat, S.J., The Theology of St. Paul, Vol. II, p. 384; Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. I, pp. 5 sqq. and though their derivation is different, uses the two terms synonymously. The fundamental meaning of sacramentum is a thing consecrated to the Deity, something sacred and holy, not something unknown or inscrutable. In the latter sense the word is first used by Tertullian, who probably found it in his Latin Bible.²⁹29Cfr. Prat, op. cit., p. 385; A. Réville, Du Sens du Mot Sacramentum dans Tertullien, Paris, 1889; A. d’Alès, La Théologie du Tertullien, Paris, 1905, pp. 321–323; F. de Backer, Sacramentum, le Mot et l’Idée dans … Tertullien, Louvain, 1911; J. de Ghellinck et al., Pour l’Histoire du Mot “Sacramentum,” Louvain, 1924.

f) In proving the possibility of the revelation of mysteries we do not, as noted above, employ the positive method, since this would be effective only if we fully understood the matter revealed. We must content ourselves with showing that the supernatural revelation of a mystery involves no contradiction, and that it is consequently unreasonable to assert that a mystery cannot be the object of divine revelation. Our argument, therefore, will be mainly negative in character.

g) What we have said about the obscurity of mysteries applies, of course, only to our limited and imperfect human knowledge; for God, who is omniscient, there are no mysteries.

2. The Possibility of the Revelation of Mysteries an Article of Faith

The possibility of the revelation of mysteries is an article of faith defined by the Vatican Council as follows: “If anyone shall say that man cannot be raised by divine power to a higher than natural knowledge and perfection, but can and ought, by a continuous progress, to attain at length of himself to the possession of all that is true and good, let him be anathema.”³⁰30Conc. Vat., Sess. III, de Revelat., can. 3: “Si quis dixerit, hominem ad cognitionem et perfectionem, quae naturalem superet, divinitus evehi non posse, sed ex seipso ad omnis tandem veri et boni possessionem iugi profectu pertingere posse et debere: anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 1808).

3. The Proposition Demonstrated

The supernatural divine revelation of mysteries involves no contradiction.

The proof of this thesis is based (1) on the nature of mysteries, (2) on their manifestation by God, and (3) on their reception by man.

The supernatural divine revelation of mysteries would be impossible only if it could be demonstrated that the existence of mysteries in God involved a contradiction, or that God could not communicate the knowledge of mysteries to men, or that men were incapable of receiving such knowledge when communicated. None of these propositions can be established. Therefore, the impossibility of the revelation of mysteries cannot be proved.

1. The existence of mysteries in God involves no contradiction. This is proved:

a) By the relation of human knowledge to the divine essence. The proper connatural object of the human intellect is suprasensible truth presented in sensible form. Such truths can in some instances be clearly and certainly known. But, as both experience and the authority of leading thinkers show, much remains mysterious and obscure. Even the most careful observation and the most ingenious experiments cannot solve every riddle. Thus science is still uncertain concerning the innermost essence of force, of magnetism, of electricity, and of light; it cannot tell what causes the mutual attraction of bodies, in what the essence of extension consists, how ideas are formed in the mind, what gives the imagination its power, and so forth. Yet these are all questions appertaining to the sphere of immediate, every-day experience. How much more pronounced must the weakness and deficiency of the human intellect be in more exalted spheres! How obscure in particular must the divine essence appear to us, since we can reach it only in a round-about way by means of ratiocination, by ascending from the consideration of visible creatures to the contemplation of their invisible Creator and Supreme Cause! How slight is the analogy between the palpable effect with all its imperfections and the infinitely perfect Cause! And, what makes our plight still worse, we are compelled to express the notion we form of the divine essence in inadequate terms, derived from the created universe. In view of this deficiency of human knowledge it is plainly unwarranted to assert that there can be nothing mysterious for us in God. Our knowledge of the divine nature is too imperfect to justify us in passing a certain judgment on this point.

b) We arrive at a like conclusion by comparing human reason with the divine intellect. Men differ widely as to talents and intellectual proficiency. Where the intellect is less developed, there is little or no understanding for things which a more highly developed mind grasps without difficulty. But even the vast differences existing between human individuals appear small when compared with the difference that exists between the most highly developed human mind and the infinitely perfect divine Intellect. Both in power of cognition and in respect of its object the two are as far apart as the finite and the infinite. What the human mind is able to absorb from the infinitely rich content of the divine Intellect is so very little that we must regard it as a sign of folly and pride if a mere creature ventures to assert that God cannot possibly know anything that would constitute a mystery for the human mind.³¹31Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, l. I, c. 3.

2. The manifestation of mysteries by God to man does not involve a contradiction. This appears without further argument from the analogy existing between the divine revelation of a mystery and the human communication of a truth which remains more or less obscure to the intellect even after it has been revealed. We meet with such communications every day, and there is no reason for assuming that they are beyond the power of God, whose knowledge infinitely transcends the limits of human understanding.

3. It cannot be proved that man is incapable of receiving revealed mysteries from God. Since a mystery is a truth which remains incomprehensible to the human mind even after it is revealed by God, an impossibility of receiving such a revelation on the part of man could only consist either in the fact that the truth communicated by revelation was absolutely beyond his comprehension, or that man was incapable of receiving anything that exceeded his power of cognition and holding it as true on the authority of another. Now, in the light of what we have said above, the incomprehensibility of a revealed mystery is not to be understood in this sense that it remains wholly incomprehensible after being revealed, and consequently represents for the human mind merely an empty form without a content. No; the mystery is partially unveiled through revelation and presented to the human intellect as an object of new knowledge. On the other hand, the human intellect does not find it impossible or even difficult to accept as true on the authority of God something of which perhaps it understands but very little. Divine authority guarantees the truth of the revealed mystery and consequently human reason has nothing to fear in accepting it.³²32Cfr. J. H. Newman, Grammar of Assent, pp. 124–141.

3. The Possibility of Mediate Revelation

Some moderate Rationalists deny the possibility of mediate revelation on the ground that it would be unbecoming for God to enter into communication with human individuals and reveal to them truths which they, in turn, are to make known to their fellowmen or to the human race as a whole. In the opinion of these writers all divine revelation must necessarily be immediate.

Divine revelation, according to Paul Sabatier, is immediate for all men, for the smallest children of the Kingdom of Heaven as well as for the greatest prophets, because God wishes to admit all men to His immediate personal communion.³³33Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, N. Y., 1907, p. 63.

Against this error we must prove the possibility of mediate divine revelation. In doing so, however, we do not mean to assert that God, if He wished, could not reveal Himself directly to every human being. We admit this possibility, and are not at all inclined to dispute the assertion that such an immediate revelation would offer certain spiritual advantages which mediate revelation lacks. But this, as we shall show, is no reason for denying the possibility of mediate revelation.

In view of what we have said above, our argument for the possibility of mediate revelation may be limited to the new momenta here alleged on the part of God and on the part of man. It applies equally to modal and substantial revelation, both of which, as we shall see later, have actually taken place.

We assert, therefore, that mediate revelation is possible. Our proof for this thesis is based (1) on the essence of God and (2) on the nature of man.

1. Mediate revelation is in conformity with the essence of God. An earthly ruler has the right to promulgate his laws and ordinances through heralds or other agents. This right must belong a fortiori to God, who is the supreme Lord and Lawgiver. Nor does He lack the power to communicate His commands to others. He knows the thoughts and wishes of men, has perfect control of all external circumstances, and hence can easily give the necessary inspiration and preserve revealed truths from being falsified and distorted. The omnipotent God must be able to safeguard the divine mission of His agents and the divine character of their message, even to secondary recipients. Finally, so far as God’s wisdom and goodness are concerned, it may be admitted that the immediate instruction of every individual human being would be quite in keeping with these divine attributes, and even superior to mediate instruction, since by means of it, revelation could take place everywhere at the same time, and there would be less danger of anyone refusing to accept it. This admission, however, does not prove that mediate revelation is impossible. Every communication of supernatural truth, even when it is made through human organs, must be hailed as a valuable gift from God and cannot be rejected as unworthy of Him. If this or that individual refuses to listen to God’s authorized representative, that is his own fault and loss. Those who, for some reason not involving guilt, do not receive the revelation thus mediately given, need not fear punishment, because God in His sanctity and justice permits no one to be lost without his own fault.

2. Mediate divine revelation is in conformity with the nature of man. The herald of divine revelation can communicate to his fellowmen, not only all natural, but also the supernatural truths revealed to him by God, and no one is hindered from receiving such a communication. History teaches that men have always shown themselves amenable to religious instruction, no matter whether that instruction came mediately through human agents or directly from God Himself.

For further reading, see page 339.