The Necessity of Supernatural Revelation

1. Having demonstrated the possibility of supernatural revelation, we have now to examine the question of its necessity. We do this, not for the purpose of concluding from the necessity of revelation to its actual existence, as Sabatier charges,¹1A. Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, pp. 44 sqq. but to disprove the Rationalist contention that the revelation of religious truths ascertainable by unaided reason is superfluous²2Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 1807. and to demonstrate the great advantage and utility of supernatural revelation.

2. If revelation is necessary, the reason for its necessity must lie either with God or with man. Revelation cannot be necessary for God because it is an operation ad extra, and therefore a free-will act, and the perfection of God cannot depend on something existing outside the divine essence. Hence, if we speak of revelation as necessary, we mean that it is necessary for man.

3. In order to determine this point more accurately, we must distinguish between absolute and moral necessity, and ascertain whether man’s ultimate destiny is purely natural or supernatural.

4. If man were created for a purely natural end, revelation could not be said to be necessary for him, since nature must be adequately equipped by its Creator to attain all its essential aims and purposes. There might at most be a moral necessity, in so far as revelation served to aid man in reaching his final goal with greater security and ease. But, as a matter of fact, man’s goal is supernatural, and hence the necessity of revelation is absolute, because without it man would not be able either to reach that goal or to recognize the means necessary for the purpose.

5. We are here concerned only with the necessity of revelation for the knowledge of the natural truths of religion. We maintain that revelation is morally necessary to enable man to know the truths of natural religion, and in taking this attitude we reject, on the one hand, Traditionalism, which regards this necessity as absolute,³3Ibid., n. 1622 sqq.; 1649 sqq. and, on the other, Rationalism, which positively denies this necessity.

§ I. The Teaching of the Church

The teaching of the Church concerning the necessity of revelation is contained in the following declaration of the Vatican Council: “This is to be ascribed to divine revelation, that such truths among things divine as are not of themselves beyond human reason, can in the present condition of mankind be known by all with facility, with certain assurance, and with no admixture of error. This, however, is not the reason why revelation is absolutely necessary; but because God in His infinite goodness has ordained man to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine blessings which utterly exceed the human understanding; for ‘eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.’”⁴4Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 2, De Revelat. (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 1786): “Huic divinae revelationi tribuendum quidem est, ut ea, quae in rebus divinis humanae rationi per se impervia non sunt, in praesenti quoque generis humanae conditione ab omnibus expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixto errore cognosci possint. Non hac tamen de causa revelatio absolute necessaria dicenda est, sed quia Deus ex infinita bonitate sua ordinavit hominem ad finem supernaturalem, ad participanda scilicet bona divina, quae humanae mentis intelligentiam omnino superant; si quidem oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus illis, qui diligunt eum.”

And again: “If anyone shall say that it is impossible or inexpedient that man should be taught by divine revelation concerning God and the worship to be paid to Him; let him be anathema.”⁵5Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Revelat., can. 2 (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 1807): “Si quis dixerit, fieri non posse aut non expedire, ut per revelationem divinam homo de Deo cultuque ei exhibendo doceatur: anathema sit.”

And: “If anyone shall say that man cannot be raised by divine power to a higher than natural knowledge and perfection, but that by himself he can and ought by continuous progress to attain at length to the possession of all that is true and good; let him be anathema.”⁶6Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Revelat., can. 3 (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 1808): “Si quis dixerit, hominem ad cognitionem et perfectionem, quae naturalem superet, divinitus evehi non posse, sed ex se ipso ad omnis tandem veri et boni possessionem iugi profectu pertingere posse et debere: anathema sit.”

§ II. Proof for the Necessity of Modally Supernatural Revelation

After mankind had become generally addicted to Polytheism, supernatural revelation was morally necessary to ensure a relatively perfect and certain knowledge of the truths of natural religion on the part of the generality of men.

1. We assert the necessity of modally supernatural revelation, and this only on the assumption of the general spread of Polytheism and the consequent decay of religion and morals.

2. We have in view here, not human nature in the abstract, but man as he actually is, in his present condition, and we are not now concerned about the causes of that condition.

3. The phrase “relatively perfect and certain knowledge” in our thesis implies that some sort of imperfect knowledge of religious truths is morally possible even without revelation. We speak of the knowledge of natural religion, not of the attainment of man’s natural end, which could be reached even with an imperfect knowledge of the truths in question.

4. Our thesis refers only to those natural truths which correspond to man’s natural end and destiny, such as the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the existence of God and of the moral law of nature, at least in its principal requirements.

5. We assert the necessity of revelation for mankind as a whole, in order that a relatively perfect knowledge of natural religion might become general. Room is left for individual exceptions to this rule.

Proof. Supernatural revelation must be regarded as morally necessary in the sense indicated, if a relatively perfect and certain knowledge of the truths of natural religion is morally impossible without it. This, as history and experience teach, is actually the case. Therefore, supernatural revelation is morally necessary.

We base the moral necessity of revelation for the knowledge of the truths of natural religion on the moral impossibility of acquiring this knowledge without revelation. “Necessary” and “impossible,” as well as “morally necessary” and “morally impossible” are correlative terms. Necessary is that without which something—a being, a state, the performance of a task—would be impossible. A thing is morally necessary if without it a task would be so difficult that it would not be performed under normal conditions. In this sense we assert the necessity of supernatural revelation for a relatively certain and clear knowledge of the truths of natural religion on the part of the whole of mankind under actually existing conditions. We do not assert the physical necessity of revelation, but assume that, absolutely speaking, man’s natural powers and faculties, even in his present state, would suffice to furnish him with a relatively clear and certain knowledge of the truths in question. If he did not possess the faculties required for this purpose, we should have to admit that the Creator failed to equip human nature with the means necessary for attaining the end for which it was created,—which would be incompatible with His wisdom and goodness and involve a contradiction.

The moral necessity of supernatural Revelation becomes plainly evident when we consider the religious and moral condition of the pagan nations of antiquity and study the natural ways and means which they had at their disposal to improve that condition. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to call attention to a few outstanding facts. At the period in question the idea of God had lost its influence upon the religious life of men. Pristine Monotheism had been relegated to the background and was discernible only in vague outline. In its place Polytheism, Pantheism, and Dualism held undisputed sway. Human weaknesses and vices were quite generally attributed to the different gods of the pagan pantheon, scandalous stories were told concerning some of them. The worship rendered to the gods was in conformity with the belief which people entertained about their character. Sexual immorality, cruel sacrifices, even of human lives, and intemperance were employed as means of currying the divine favor. The moral life of the people was modeled upon what they believed to be the example of their gods. These things were not merely tolerated, but enjoyed the patronage of the civil authorities, who, together with the priests and philosophers, were the champions and promoters of immorality.⁷7Abundant proofs for these assertions apud J. J. I. Döllinger, The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ, tr. by N. Darnell, 2 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1906.

Under such conditions it was impossible for pagans to acquire clear ideas on the subject of natural religion. There were only two ways which might have led them to that goal, namely, personal study and investigation and formal instruction, for which they had a right to look to their philosophers; but in matter of fact both these ways were closed to them.

The ancient pagans were unable to arrive at a knowledge of the truths of natural religion by personal study and enquiry. It is by no means easy to obtain a clear and accurate knowledge of these truths, since they demand serious study, for which some men have no talent, whilst others lack the time or inclination. An aggravating circumstance in the case of the ancient pagans lay in the false beliefs with which they were imbued. Hence, but few of them were able to arrive at a knowledge of the truths of natural religion, and even these few needed much leisure and a long time to complete their investigations. All, even the wisest, were subject to manifold errors. Hence it is not too much to say that it was morally—nay, to some extent even physically—impossible for any nation, and for the human race at large, to acquire this knowledge by purely natural means.⁸8St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, l. I, c. 4.

Nor could the pagans of classical antiquity gain a knowledge of these truths from their teachers, for

a) The heathen philosophers did not try to change the religious opinions of the people. Cicero says that philosophy was content with a few bald notions and exercised no influence whatever upon the masses, whom it purposely ignored.⁹9Quaest. Tuscul., II, c. 1. Horace penned the cruel line:

“Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.”¹⁰10Odes, III, 1, 1.

If the learned men of antiquity had a truer conception of religion than the masses of the people, they did not show it by their conduct, but shared the current religious superstitions and practices. Plato wished to see in his ideal republic no other religion than that of the fatherland.¹¹11De Republica, l. iv. Cicero demanded that no change be made in the sacrifices offered to the various gods.¹²12De Leg., l. II: “Iam illud ex institutis pontificum et haruspicum non mutandum est, quibus hostiis immolandum cuique deo.” Epictetus says that sacrifices should be offered to the gods according to paternal custom and tradition, with a pure intention and all due respect.¹³13Enchir., c. 31.

b) The pagan philosophers of antiquity were unable to offer their followers any real certitude in religious matters because they were themselves in doubt on most important points of belief. Socrates’ teaching on the nature of the deity was flagrantly inconsistent. On one occasion he asked his hearers to renounce all efforts to know the gods, and to be content with believing that they ruled the world according to their good pleasure,¹⁴14Xenophon, Symp., c. vi, 65, 7. whilst on another occasion he attributed to them omniscience and omnipresence¹⁵15Xenophon, Mem., I, 1, 19. and prayed to the rising sun.¹⁶16Plato, Symp., 36. Cicero called the nature of the gods “a difficult and obscure question” and declared that the opinions of the wisest men differed so widely on this subject that the Academicians had prudently refrained from espousing any of them.¹⁷17De Natura Deorum, l. I, c. 1: “Perdifficilis et perobscura est quaestio de natura deorum. De qua tam variae sunt doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, ut magno argumento esse debeat, causam esse inscientiam prudenterque Academicos a rebus tam incertis assensionem cohibuisse.” Aristotle described God as a simple, perfect being, who is happy in contemplating himself, but exercises no influence whatever on the outside world and is utterly indifferent to the doings of men.¹⁸18Cfr. E. Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. II, Part 2, 3rd ed., Leipsic, 1879, pp. 375 sqq. Plato taught that matter is eternal and exists independently of God.¹⁹19Cfr. Zeller, op. cit., Vol. II, Part 1, 5th ed., pp. 747 sqq. Cicero, after quoting various theories concerning the human soul, says that nobody can tell which of them is true, and the dispute promises to be unending.²⁰20Disp. Tuscul., l. I, c. 11: “Harum sententiarum quae vera sit, deus aliquis viderit: quae verisimillima, magna quaestio est.”

The ethical teaching of the pagan philosophers of antiquity is equally unsatisfactory. On many points they merely re-echoed the current opinions of the masses, which were quite frequently on a low plane. Under these circumstances it is not surprising to hear Cicero voice distrust of all philosophical schools²¹21Disp. Tuscul., III, c. 28: “Quid? Ex ceteris philosophis nonne optimus et gravissimus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare, multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda?” and declare that there is hardly any religious opinion, no matter how absurd, that has not been espoused by some thinker.²²22De Divinat., l. II, c. 58: “Nescio, quomodo nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.” The ancient philosophers were unable to instruct the masses in religion because they did not know the truth, and some of them openly admitted their ignorance. In the dialogue “Alcibiades,” which was formerly attributed to Plato, but is now believed to be the work of some other writer of the pre-Christian era, it is stated: “We must, therefore, wait, until some one comes to show us how to conduct ourselves towards the gods and towards our fellowmen.”²³23Alcibiades, II, 13.

It is quite evident from what we have said that, without supernatural revelation, a clear and certain knowledge of the truths of natural religion was impossible, and hence supernatural revelation was a moral necessity for the generality of mankind. This necessity, which we have thus shown to exist for the highly cultured nations of classical antiquity, must be maintained a fortiori for all those pagan nations and tribes which were intellectually less developed and morally perhaps even more deeply steeped in vice than the Greeks and Romans.²⁴24Cfr. W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker, Paderborn and Münster, 1885–86; B. C. A. Windle, On Miracles, London, 1924, pp. 104 sqq.

For further reading, see page 339.