The Knowability of Supernatural Revelation

In the preceding two chapters we have demonstrated the possibility and necessity of supernatural revelation. Before we approach the question whether God actually revealed Himself to mankind, we must inquire how the existence or the reality of a supernatural revelation can become known to man. It is evident that if God deigns to reveal Himself, men must be able to receive that revelation and be aware of its divine provenience. For a supernatural revelation that would not be knowable as such would be useless, and a useless revelation would contradict the wisdom of God.

The means by which the divine origin of revelation can be ascertained and true distinguished from false revelation, are called criteria (κριτήριον, from κρίνειν, to separate, to sift) or notes of revelation (notae revelationis). They are also termed motives of credibility (motiva credibilitatis) because they supply the human intellect with reasons for regarding the revealer as worthy of belief and his communication as credible (iudicium credibilitatis). The judgment thus formed, when there is question of mediate revelation, concerns first of all the human witnesses who announce the revelation. Thus the fact that there has been a revelation, and the content of that revelation, become credible, i.e., we hold it reasonable to believe a witness when he asserts that God has communicated something to him for our information. This belief leads to the final persuasion that it is reasonable to accept the truths revealed on the authority of God.

The so-called criteria of revelation have reference mainly to the first announcement of the revealed doctrine or doctrines. Once the divine origin of revelation is established with certainty, this suffices for all time.

In this chapter we will deal, first, with the criteria of revelation in general, and, secondly, with the two most important of these criteria, miracles and prophecies.

§ I. The Criteria of Revelation in General

1. Definition of a Criterion

1. As divine revelation itself (assuming it to exist), and as its eventual human agent, so, too, the selection of definite criteria by which revealed truths may be known with certainty, depends upon God’s free choice. Per se men would be obliged to believe any human witness who claimed to have received a communication from God, as soon as his natural credibility was well established. Therefore, it is only from revealed documents (the historical authenticity of which will be demonstrated presently) that we can ascertain which criteria were provided by God. In other words, the criteria of revelation, like the concept of revelation itself, must be sought for in the Bible. Reason is able to suggest only the properties which every general criterion must possess, and which consequently must be found also in the criteria of supernatural revelation.

Hence we may define a criterion of revelation as an objective, generally valid and certain mark or note accompanying revelation, and attesting its supernatural, divine origin.

a) Such a criterion must inhere in supernatural revelation, because it is through it that human reason is to obtain a certain knowledge of the supernatural origin of the doctrines revealed. This lies in the nature of things, for it is through the criteria that we are led to know the divine origin of a revelation, and consequently the latter must somehow be connected with the former, which relationship postulates a close connection between the two.

b) Such a criterion must, moreover, be objective, for purely subjective criteria (e.g., emotion, taste, pleasure, etc.) are unreliable guides, and man may feel himself greatly drawn towards a doctrine which does not in the least correspond to divine revelation.

c) Such a criterion must, furthermore, be generally valid. All men are expected to recognize revelation by this sign or note, and hence the criterion itself must be so clear, plain, and easily intelligible that it will convince every intelligent man, regardless of his degree of culture. When there are several criteria, it will suffice if some of them clearly indicate the divine origin of the revelation. The one or the other may demand greater learning for its application; but the majority must be sufficiently simple to permit of a sure judgment even by the unlettered.

d) Finally, a criterion must be certain, that is, it must furnish reliable evidence of the supernatural, divine origin of revelation. As there is question here mainly of historical facts, we must not expect metaphysical or physical, but in most cases be content with moral certitude, which excludes all reasonable doubt.

2. Division of the Criteria of Revelation and their Evidential Value

a) The criteria of revelation are partly internal, partly external. The former are furnished by revelation itself, whilst the latter are historical facts which, though really distinct from the revealed truths, have an external connection with them, in so far as they accompany, precede, or follow them.

b) Both kinds of criteria are expressly mentioned in Sacred Scripture. The external criteria occur in John V, 36, where Christ says: “For the works which the Father hath given me to perfect; the works themselves, which I do, give testimony of me, that the Father hath sent me.”¹1John V, 36: “Opera enim, quae dedit mihi Pater, ut perficiam ea, ipsa opera, quae ego facio, testimonium perhibent de me, quia Pater misit me.” Also in John V, 39, where the Saviour declares: “Search ye the scriptures, for you think in them to have life everlasting; and the same are they that give testimony of me.”²2John V, 39: “Scrutamini scripturas, quia vos putatis in ipsis vitam aeternam habere, et illae sunt, quae testimonium perhibent de me.” The internal criteria are mentioned in John VII, 17: “If any man will do the will of him [i.e., my Father], he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.”³3John VII, 17: “Si quis voluerit voluntatem eius [scil. Patris] facere, cognoscet de doctrina, utrum ex Deo sit, an ego a me ipso loquar.”

c) Both the internal and the external criteria of revelation may in turn be negative or positive. The negative criteria enable us to know that there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the divine origin of a doctrine, or that such an origin is possible. If these negative criteria are wanting, the revelation cannot be divine. The positive criteria show, at least in their ensemble, that the revealed doctrine actually comes from God. That some of the positive criteria do not furnish complete certitude, but merely a greater or less degree of probability, does not detract from their value; though insufficient in themselves, they can be utilized with profit to supplement the others.

1. The Internal Criteria of Revelation

a) The internal criteria of revelation are the inherent truth, purity, and sublimity of the doctrines revealed. A negative interior criterion of the divine origin of a doctrine is based upon the certainty that no revealed truth can contradict the evidence of reason, and that divinely revealed truths cannot contradict one another. In applying this criterion to revelation, the known truths of reason serve as a standard, and it is—doubtless with full justice—assumed that a communication from God, the Creator of man, cannot possibly contradict human reason. The absence of contradictions, thus established—aside from suprarational truths or mysteries—is an indication of the truth of the doctrine under consideration. That doctrine may, therefore, be revealed by God. Whether it has actually been revealed, still remains to be shown. But if the alleged revelation contains contradictions, this is a priori evidence that it cannot come from God.

b) The negative internal criterion just described may co-exist with positive interior marks or notes indicating the divine provenience of a doctrine. These notes are present if the revealed doctrine is so perfect, pure, and sublime that it can hardly be credited to human sources. When this is the case, there is a probability of divine revelation. There would be a great probability of supernatural revelation if the natural truths of religion were clearly and perfectly set forth in an alleged revelation, for the difficulties of attaining this goal by purely natural means are so great as to constitute a moral impossibility for the individual as well as for mankind at large. We say; a moral, not a physical impossibility, since the truths in question are not per se inaccessible to human reason. Consequently, we would not, in our case, be justified in assuming the fact of a supernatural revelation with physical certitude. But if, in addition to the natural truths of religion, the revealed doctrine would also contain answers to questions which are of supreme importance to mankind, such as the origin and forgiveness of sin, man’s fate after death, etc.—answers far superior to any ever offered before, and perfectly consonant with the intrinsic needs of human nature—then there would be more than a moral certainty that the alleged revelation was really and truly supernatural and divine.⁴4Cfr. J. Kleutgen, S.J., Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., n. 203. Kleutgen, following Suarez, makes the effectiveness of this criterion depend on divine grace. The philosophical and psychologic material it embodies is insufficient to give certainty. “Moral certainty” appears an ambiguous term here. Does it mean “more than probability” (surely it does), or metaphysical certitude? (This is evidently not intended.)

2. The External Criteria of Revelation

a) The external criteria of revelation are: the character of the witnesses, the spread and effects of the revealed doctrine, miracles, and prophecies.

b) Here, too, we may speak of negative criteria. If the witness, i.e., the first herald of the alleged revelation, is an honest, but ordinary mortal; if the spread and the religious and moral effects of the revealed doctrine can be explained naturally and without a violation of the moral law; it is proper to conclude that the revelation may possibly be of divine origin. If, on the other hand, the herald of the alleged revelation is a vicious, immoral man, it is highly improbable that his message should be supernatural. For although, absolutely speaking, God could make use of wicked men as His messengers, it is unreasonable to assume that, in revealing a doctrine for the first time and establishing a religion, He should employ agents who must appear suspect and unworthy of such an exalted mission.

c) If the doctrine alleged to be revealed tends per se to destroy virtue and morality, and if it is propagated by violence, fraud, or other immoral means, we may safely conclude that it is not from God.

d) Positive external marks of the divine origin of a doctrine are: the eminently virtuous life led by the bearer of that doctrine, the beneficial effects produced by it, and its singularly rapid expansion. When all these factors co-operate, the doctrine in question is most probably divinely revealed.

e) If, in addition, the extraordinary effects of the doctrine and its rapid expansion, as well as the transcendent moral greatness of its protagonist, can be explained only by supernatural divine aid, then every reasonable doubt in the divine origin of the doctrine must vanish.

f) The decisive factors in establishing the divine character of revelation are the external positive criteria of miracles and prophecies, through which God Himself bears witness to the truth and the divine origin of the revealed doctrines.

3. The Evidential Value of the Criteria of Revelation

a) The negative criteria are not sufficient to establish the divine origin of a doctrine, but they may aid in discerning a doctrine which pretends to be supernaturally revealed, but in reality does not come from God.

b) Among the positive criteria of revelation, broadly speaking, those known as external deserve to rank above those called internal, for the reason that they accomplish their purpose with greater certainty, rapidity, and ease.

α) The external criteria allow us to perceive the divine origin of revelation with greater certainty. For while the positive internal criteria, under certain conditions, may also generate certitude, they can exert this effect only on those who are enabled by education and experience properly to evaluate the revealed doctrine. On the other hand, there is danger that the evaluation of a revealed doctrine, especially in regard to its sublimity and its capacity for satisfying the innermost needs of man, may be entirely too subjective. The positive external criteria, on the contrary, can be appreciated by all, even the ignorant and unlettered, because they rest upon historical facts which are easy to ascertain. For the same reason (namely, because there is question of objective facts) the danger of deception is practically excluded.

β) The external criteria allow us to perceive the divine origin of revelation with greater facility. In applying them, it is sufficient to investigate a few historical data, whereas the application of the internal criteria demands a careful analysis of the ensemble of the doctrines said to be revealed. The more varied and comprehensive the subject-matter to be examined, the easier it is for error to creep in.

γ) The external criteria enable us to perceive the divine origin of revelation more quickly. This follows from the fact that, instead of the many truths which constitute the subject-matter of revelation, only one needs to be considered, namely, the question of divine origin, which can be demonstrated with certainty by the application of the external criteria. In the end everything depends on the credibility of the witness and the origin of his message.

c) From what we have said it follows that, as a general rule, the external criteria of revelation are preferable to the internal;—which does not, however, mean that the latter are of no value. On the contrary, the more carefully they are applied, the more clearly will the sublimity, beauty, and divine character of a revealed doctrine manifest itself. At times it may even become necessary to employ the internal instead of the external criteria. This would be the case, e.g., if we were compelled to demonstrate the divine origin of revelation against opponents who are either prejudiced against the external criteria or regard the revealed doctrines themselves as contradictions. Since, however, the apologetical demonstration of the Catholic religion is primarily intended for those who already accept the divine origin of revelation, and have revered and loved it from childhood, there is no reason why we should evaluate the criteria of revelation otherwise than in the light of their objective validity.

d) Among the positive external criteria of revelation the most important are miracles and prophecies. The Vatican Council teaches: “In order that the obedience of our faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit should be joined exterior proofs of His revelation, to wit, divine facts, and especially miracles and prophecies, which, as they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain proofs of His divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men.”⁵5Conc. Vat., Sess. III, c. 3 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1790): “Ut nihilominus fidei nostrae obsequium rationi consentaneum esset, voluit Deus cum internis Spiritus Sancti auxiliis externa iungi revelationis suae argumenta, facta scilicet divina atque imprimis miracula et prophetias, quae cum Dei omnipotentiam et infinitam scientiam luculenter commonstrent, divinae revelationis signa sunt certissima et omnium intelligentiae accommodata.” (Cfr. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revelatione, II, 103.) And again: “If anyone shall say that divine revelation cannot be made credible by outward signs, and therefore that men ought to be moved to faith solely by the internal experience of each, or by private inspiration; let him be anathema.”⁶6Sess. III, can. 3: “Si quis dixerit, revelationem divinam externis signis credibilem fieri non posse, ideoque sola interna cuiusque experientia aut inspiratione privata homines ad fidem moveri debere: anathema sit.”

§ II. Miracles

The most prominent criteria of divine revelation are miracles and prophecies. These we shall now study in some detail. We begin with miracles, their definition, division, possibility, knowability, and evidential force.

1. Definition and Division

1. Definition of a Miracle

A. Derivation of the Word.—The word miracle is derived from the Latin miraculum, which, in turn, comes from mirari, to wonder. Etymologically, therefore, a miracle is a wonderful or marvelous event. The theological use of the term can be more exactly defined only in the light of revelation itself. Sacred Scripture employs various expressions to designate the idea here under discussion: signum, portentum,⁷7i. e., sign (Is. XX, 3). ostentum,⁸8τέρας, i. e., something extraordinary (Ex. IV, 21). mirabile,⁹9i. e., something astounding (Ex. XV, 11). virtus,¹⁰10δύναμις, i. e., a display or proof of power (Matt. VII, 22). prodigium.¹¹11i. e., a prodigy (τέρας), as in Ps. CIV, 27. A miracle is always an extraordinary and astounding demonstration of divine power. Very often it is expressly described as a characteristic mark of the supernatural mission of a person or the divine origin of a doctrine.¹²12Cfr. Ex. IV, 1 sqq.; Jos. III, 7 sqq.; Judges VI, 13 sqq.; Matt. IX, 6; XII, 22 sqq.; Mark II, 5 sqq.; XVI, 17; Luke VII, 22; John II, 18; V, 36; IX, 30; XIV, 11 sqq.; X, 25; XV, 24; XX, 30; 1 Cor. XV, 14; 1 Pet. I, 3, 21.

B. Essential Elements of a Miracle.—According to the teaching of divine revelation, every miracle contains four distinct elements, which, taken together, constitute its essence. A miracle is (a) an extraordinary phenomenon, which (b) transcends the powers of nature, (c) is traceable to God as its author, and (d) serves a good purpose.

a) A miracle is an extraordinary phenomenon.

α) A miracle is a phenomenon which occurs in the natural sphere, but transcends the order of nature, and cannot, therefore, be ascribed to nature’s powers or subjected to her laws.

In spite of the use of the word “extraordinary,” a miracle need not necessarily be an absolutely rare phenomenon, though in comparison with the phenomena of nature it will always be exceptional. At times (e.g., during the life of Christ and His Apostles) miracles have been quite numerous.

β) In order to come within the scope of the notion of a miracle, the phenomenon must belong to the physical or natural order; an event in the supernatural order or even in the suprasensible order is not considered by most Catholic theologians as technically a miracle. These phenomena are physically verifiable. The conversion of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ at the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, the operation of the Sacraments, and the continued creation of human souls are not, strictly speaking, miracles. Nor was the creation of the world a miracle, for the order of nature did not yet exist when God called the universe into being by His omnipotent fiat.

b) A miracle represents an effect which transcends the powers of nature, i.e., the physical forces, material and mental, of which we have ordinary experience in this life.¹³13Cfr. Jos. Rickaby, S.J., God and His Creatures, London, 1905, p. 265.

α) An apparition that can be satisfactorily explained as resulting from the powers of nature is a natural phenomenon and cannot, therefore, be classed as a miracle. We do not, however, mean to say that a miracle must transcend the powers of nature in every respect. There are phenomena which per se (ratione sui or quoad substantiam) transcend the powers of nature, e.g., the mutual penetration of bodies; there are others which transcend the powers of nature only in regard to the subject in which they inhere (quoad subiectum), e.g., the raising of a dead body to life; nature, too, can produce life, but not in a corpse. Finally, there are phenomena which are supernatural only as to the manner of their origin (miracula quoad modum), e.g., the sudden cure of a fever which could have been gradually healed by natural means.

β) This distinction, which is luminously explained in the two Summae of Aquinas, agrees substantially with the division of miracles into supernatural, contranatural, and preternatural, found in the Thomistic treatise De Potentia.¹⁴14Summa Theologica, Ia, qu. 105, art. 8; Summa contra Gentiles, l. III, c. 101; De Potentia, qu. VI, art. 2, ad 3. Supernatural miracles are effects which completely transcend the powers of nature; those contrary to nature (contra naturam) are phenomena which run counter to the natural character of the thing with which they are connected, as when a man walks upon the water; preternatural miracles conform fully to those phenomena which are supernatural only in the manner of their occurrence (quoad modum).

C. God is the sole cause of every miracle, but this fact by no means excludes the instrumentality of angels¹⁵15The existence of the angels is known to us only from revelation. We here mention them, as well as the evil spirits, hypothetically, that is to say, if there are such beings, and in so far as our opponents admit their existence. (Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 308 sqq.) or men, who by their prayers can exert a moral influence towards the working of a miracle or co-operate with God as instrumental causes in producing miraculous effects.

a) The activity of the angels may extend even farther. Among the miracles reported in Sacred Scripture there are many which an angel could perform by means of his natural powers. If we had to limit the criteria of revelation to miracles that can be traced to the immediate action of God, and could admit only a moral or instrumental co-operation on the part of creatures, there would be very few miracles which could be used as evidence, for all those phenomena which an angel is able to produce by his own power would have to be eliminated. This position would render the argument from miracles rather precarious and run counter to the teaching of the Bible, which designates as miracles many phenomena that do not exceed the natural powers of the angels. Hence, it seems more appropriate not to narrow the definition of a miracle so as to limit it to phenomena which absolutely transcend the powers of created nature, but, following the example of Benedict XIV,¹⁶16De Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Beatorum Canonizatione, l. IV, pars. 1, c. 1 and 6. to extend the term to phenomena which, though they transcend the forces of nature, do not exceed the ordinary powers of the angels. St. Thomas’s definition of a miracle as something that happens beyond the order of all created nature,¹⁷17Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 110, art. 4. would in that case no longer apply to all miracles in general, but only to a limited class, namely, those called absolute; all others would be strictly relative.

b) Every true miracle, therefore, must transcend at least the known powers of nature. Whether its immediate cause is God Himself or an angel, is a question that need not detain us here, since it is evident that a good angel will always act in conformity with the divine will.

But there is another question to which attention must be called, namely, whether the effect produced may not be the work of demons. The evil spirits are undoubtedly able, by their purely natural powers, to produce effects which nature, such as we know it from our limited experience, cannot produce. For the correct evaluation of such effects it is, therefore, necessary to study the phenomena themselves, their accompanying circumstances, and, above all, the purpose for which the alleged miracle is wrought, and never to lose sight of the principle that God in His wisdom and holiness can not possibly allow the demons to produce effects which a prudent man would unhesitatingly ascribe to divine or angelic intervention, since it would otherwise be impossible for mankind to escape pernicious errors.

D. Every true miracle must serve a definite good purpose. God in His wisdom cannot act without a purpose, and His perfection does not permit that purpose to be anything but good. A miracle cannot have for its object something that is morally bad, for God is infinitely holy. Nor can a miracle aim at improving the physical order of nature, with a view to correct some defect in the original scheme of creation. This would be incompatible with the omniscience and wisdom of the Creator. Broadly speaking, therefore, every miracle, being a manifestation of the divine sovereignty and omnipotence, must by its very nature serve to promote the glory of God. Besides this general purpose, there may be other special purposes for which miracles are wrought, such as: (a) The manifestation of the divine presence;¹⁸18Gen. XXVIII, 12 sq.; Job XXXVIII; Ez. I; Matt. III, 16 sq.; John XII, 28; Acts II, 2 sqq. (b) the authentication of genuine messengers of God;¹⁹19Cfr. the passages quoted above. (c) the healing of diseases or other services rendered to humanity;²⁰20Gen. XVII, 16; 4 Kings II, 21; Matt. IV, 23 sq.; Acts III, 7. (d) the punishment of human misdeeds.²¹21Gen. XIX, 24; Ex. VII–XII; Acts V, 5 sqq.

E. In the light of these explanations we can now broadly define a miracle as an extraordinary effect which exceeds at least the known powers of nature and can be traced to a divine cause.

a) We here employ the term “divine cause” in its wider sense, as including the angels. The purpose of a miracle is not mentioned because the definition is intended to comprise all miracles, and, on account of the divine causality involved, every miracle must necessarily be good.

b) As a criterion of revelation a miracle is an extraordinary effect exceeding at least the known powers of nature, traceable to a divine cause, perceptible by the senses, and serving as an argument or proof for the divine origin of revelation. This definition contains two new marks, of which the one mentions a special property of the miraculous phenomenon, while the other connects it with revelation. A miracle, to be available as argument or proof, must be a phenomenon which is perceptible by the senses, because it is intended to serve as a means of accrediting a divine messenger among men, who are not able to observe whatever miraculous processes may be taking place in that messenger’s soul. The purpose of a miracle, to serve as a proof for the divine origin of revelation, is expressly mentioned in this definition because it does not follow from the nature of a miracle as such, and because only a miracle that has been wrought expressly for this purpose can be employed as a criterion of divine revelation. Were this not so, there would be no necessary connection between the miracle and the revelation of which it is a criterion. If this connection is not made expressly by a reference to the miracle, on the part of God or of the human witness, it must at least be plainly discernible from the accompanying circumstances.

c) An extraordinary effect which transcends the known powers of nature, but is not traceable to a divine cause, is called a pseudo-miracle. Many such pseudo-miracles are mentioned in Sacred Scripture.²²22Deut. XIII, 1–3; Jer. XXIII, 32; Matt. XXIV, 24; Mark XIII, 21 sq.; 2 Thess. II, 8–11; Acts XIII, 11–18, etc. To distinguish them from true miracles, special attention must be paid to the teleological element, i.e., the purpose for which they are wrought. That purpose in most cases indicates what value is to be attributed to the alleged miraculous phenomenon. It is also necessary to examine the circumstances under which the effect is produced. Once it has been ascertained that the extraordinary effect is not produced by God, we may safely conclude that neither is it the work of a good angel. Whatever exceeds the powers of nature in such a phenomenon must, therefore, be attributed to evil spirits.

2. Division of Miracles

Miracles may be classified into groups under different aspects.

a) With regard to their relation to the forces of nature, we distinguish absolute and relative miracles.

An absolute miracle is one which transcends the powers of created nature, that is to say, of creation as a whole. The degree in which it transcends the powers of nature may differ.

b) This difference gives rise to the division into substantial and modal miracles. Substantial miracles (miracula quoad substantiam) transcend the powers of nature with regard to their substance, whereas modal miracles transcend the powers of nature merely with regard to the manner in which they are wrought.

c) Closely related to this division is that into supernatural miracles (miracula supra naturam), miracles against nature (miracula contra naturam), and preternatural miracles (miracula praeter naturam). The supernatural and preternatural miracles are identical with those which we have just called substantial and modal. Those against nature are sometimes called restraining miracles, because, on account of their opposition to the natural disposition of the subject, they involve a supernatural restraint of opposing forces.

d) Relative miracles are those which merely exceed the known powers of nature, i.e., the material world, and consequently can be wrought not only by the Creator, but also by His angels. The distinction between substantial and modal miracles may be applied to relative miracles also provided we do not lose sight of the fact that the different degrees of the supernatural refer solely to nature as known to us, and not as it may be beyond our knowledge.

e) Another division of miracles is based upon the subject in or on which the extraordinary effects are produced. From this point of view we distinguish between miracles of nature and miracles of the spirit. The former are wrought in the corporeal world, i. e., the bodies of men or external nature. To this class belong the miraculous cures of diseases and the conversion of material substances. The spiritual miracles appertain to the intellectual and moral life of man. This category comprises the miraculous conversion of sinners.

f) Another classification, drawn from different fields of human experience, is that of cosmological, anthropological, and historical miracles. Miracles of the first-mentioned class occur in the outside world, those of the second, in connection with man, and those of the third, in the gradual development of the human race.

Historical miracles were particularly frequent in the early days of Christianity.

Anthropological miracles may be physiological, intellectual, or moral.

2. The Possibility of Miracles

1. A miracle, as we have seen, is an extraordinary effect produced by God in the realm of human experience. Atheism, Deism, and materialistic Monism cannot consistently admit the possibility of such effects. For, if there is no God, or if God is not distinct from the universe, or powerless to act upon it, the necessary postulates of a miracle are absent, namely, the existence of a supramundane personal God and a causal relation between that God and the world. Only from the theistic point of view can the possibility of miracles be consistently maintained.

2. Taking this point of view, therefore, we shall demonstrate the possibility of absolute miracles; once this is established, relative miracles offer no difficulty. We shall deal with the two principal factors in every miracle, namely, God and nature, prescinding from the angels, because they can co-operate in the working of miracles only dependently upon God, at His command, or at least with His permission.

3. The Vatican Council defines: “If anyone shall say that miracles are impossible, and therefore all the accounts regarding them, even those contained in Holy Scripture, are to be dismissed as fabulous or mythical; or that miracles can never be known with certainty, and that the divine origin of Christianity is not rightly proved by them; let him be anathema.”²³23Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Fide, can. 4. (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 1813).

The Catholic Church, therefore, teaches that miracles are possible. The proof for this thesis is derived (1) from the notion of God and (2) from the concept of nature.

1. Miracles are possible if they are consonant with God as their cause, and nature as their subject. They are consonant with both, therefore, they are possible.

a) Miracles are consonant with God’s omnipotence. They transcend the powers of created nature and could be shown to be impossible only if it could be proved that the divine omnipotence had completely exhausted itself in the act of creation or in the preservation of the created universe, or that it were limited to the existing order of nature. Neither the one nor the other proposition can be demonstrated.

α) God’s omnipotence did not exhaust itself in the act of creating the world, for this world, as one glance at man and his environment shows, is extremely limited and susceptible of improvement. Now the divine omnipotence is infinite; God must be able to realize all possible forms of being and consequently has unlimited room for displaying His power even on the supposition that the existing universe was created in a state of high original perfection.

β) Nor is God in His omnipotence bound to the existing order of nature; for as He required no substratum out of which to fashion the universe, but called it into being solely by an act of His intellect and will, so He is able to produce effects in nature or human life without making use of creatures and of the powers with which He has endowed them.

γ) Hence, God in His omnipotence can produce any effect exceeding the powers of nature as a whole, and it is not necessary to prove this proposition of every class of miracles in particular. Only with regard to the manner of producing a miraculous effect it may be well to add a few remarks on miracles contra naturam. The working of this class of miracles has been variously explained. Some writers²⁴24For instance, Legrand, d. 1780. assume that in case of a miracle of this kind (for instance, the preservation of the three youths in the furnace of fire), those powers of nature which would of themselves exert an effect contrary to the miracle are temporarily suspended by the withdrawal of God’s conserving influence, and that their effects and the laws under which they operate, are also suspended. Suarez and others held that the laws of nature continue to operate, but their failure to produce their usual effects is the result of a withdrawal of divine cooperation.²⁵25Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, l. III, c. 99. In both hypotheses the laws of nature would be suspended.

δ) It cannot be denied that God, if He wished, could thus influence nature; but this theory has no sufficient basis in fact, and as there is available a simpler and more plausible explanation, we prefer to adopt the latter. According to the hypothesis set forth above, the powers of nature, or at least their operation and the laws under which they operate, are suspended while a miracle is being wrought. This is an arbitrary assumption. For if the powers of nature and the laws under which they operate are not noticed by us in some particular case, this does not prove that they do not exist; a superior power may have paralyzed the inferior powers and their laws. Nature occasionally presents phenomena of this sort. Thus the magnetic needle is diverted by an electric current, the chemical properties of some substances are impeded in their activity in plant organisms by the vitality of the latter, the free movements of the human body seem to be exempt from the law of gravity, and natural objects of various kinds are influenced in their existence and development by human interference.

In a similar way we may explain the so-called restraining miracles. The higher power which suspends the forces of nature and its laws is the omnipotence of God. As soon as this supernatural influence ceases, nature resumes its normal course. What was temporarily suspended, was not the operation, or the laws governing the operation, of the natural causes, but merely their effect. This theory, now generally held by theologians, is preferable to the other because it involves no destruction of natural powers or operations, and consequently does not have to postulate a restoration of these powers. It is more solidly founded for the reason that it interferes as little as possible with the ordinary course of nature and falls in line with natural causality, thus corresponding admirably to the supernatural operation of God, which is directed not to the destruction of nature, but to its conservation and perfection.

b) Miracles are consonant with the immutability of God. As God decreed from all eternity to create a certain order of nature, so He predetermined that there should be exceptions to that order, and fixed the time at which they were to occur. This is an obvious postulate of God’s absolute perfection and immutability. Every change in nature was foreseen and predetermined by the Creator from all eternity. Hence, the changes incident to miracles do not affect the essence of God, but only the created universe. This rule applies to miracles as well as to the ordinary processes of nature.

c) Miracles do not interfere with the wisdom of God, which requires that means be duly adapted to ends in all His outward operations. Such adaptation is manifest in nature and its laws. But while it primarily serves the preservation and development of nature, miracles are designed chiefly for moral ends, namely, to lead men to a better knowledge and love of God and to enable them to make sure of His communications. Miracles, therefore, take their place beside God’s other works, not in order to correct nature, but to serve certain special purposes, which nature could not attain at all, or only in an imperfect manner. If nature’s manner of operation is thereby incidentally altered for a short while and within a limited sphere, this is for the sake of a higher end and entails no disadvantages either to nature or to man.

Add to this the consideration that nothing is more apt to incite and challenge the attention of men than the extraordinary phenomenon of a miracle. Nothing so clearly manifests the existence and power of God as the supernatural and palpable working of His omnipotence within the sphere of human experience;²⁶26Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, l. III, c. 99. nothing, in fine, furnishes a surer guaranty for the divine origin of revelation than its confirmation by miracles. Thus the wisdom of God is not only not denied by assuming that He works miracles, but it is set off in the clearest light.

d) Miracles agree perfectly with God’s holiness, in virtue of which He must regard Himself as the supreme goal to which all things tend. This is a general and immutable law to which the moral law of nature must conform. The laws governing material objects are of an altogether different type. They affect the interrelation and mutual co-operation of various kinds of material substances, which are subject to change without detriment to their relation to the Creator as their ultimate end and object. Miracles affect only the physical, not the moral laws of nature, and thus God’s holiness is properly safeguarded.²⁷27Cfr. St. Thomas, De Potentia, qu. VI, art. 1, ad 3; Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 105, art. 6; Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 251 sqq.

e) Miracles are moreover in admirable conformity with Divine Providence. The government of the universe, in the interest of uniform direction and proper care for the welfare of all creatures, demands stability in the operations and laws of nature. This stability would be endangered if miracles would approach in number the ordinary operations of nature, for it would then be extremely difficult to distinguish the rule from the exception, and an orderly and normal existence on earth would become impossible. No such disorder is to be apprehended from the miracles described in Holy Scripture. Though miracles are more frequently wrought at some periods than at others, their total number, if we take into account the experience of all mankind throughout the centuries of its history, is so small in comparison with the regular operations of nature, that they must always be regarded as exceptions to the rule. Therefore, too, we must seek a natural explanation for surprising phenomena until it is positively certain that they transcend the powers of nature.

2. Miracles are consonant with the concept of nature. A miraculous occurrence happens within and transcends the limits of nature. This proposition implies that nature is not absolutely necessary and unchangeable and that its powers are not infinitely perfect.

a) Absolute necessity cannot be ascribed to nature either with regard to its existence or with regard to the degree of its perfection. God was entirely free to create or not to create, and therefore the perfection of what He did create depended entirely upon His free will. In matter of fact the created universe is not perfect, but susceptible of improvement, and, since it does not exist of necessity, may lose some of its perfections by supernatural intervention. What is true of nature in general, is likewise true of its various powers, which stand in a necessary relation to the substance in which they inhere, and by their activity reveal the value and innermost essence of the latter. Our general judgment of the qualities of nature, therefore, is based upon the powers of nature and the manner in which these powers are exercised. It is in them and in their manner of operation that we first observe the variability of nature.

b) The created universe, therefore, together with the ensemble of its powers and laws, under the supernatural influence of divine omnipotence, constitutes a variable quantity, and hence, so far as nature is concerned, miracles are manifestly possible.

c) Of this variability of nature, however, as observed above, God makes but limited use. All the variations which we meet in the case of a miracle can be traced to a threefold source: (α) God either impedes the operation of the powers of nature (as when He enables a man to walk upon the water), or (β) He perfects those powers by increasing them (as when a sick person is suddenly cured), or (γ) He acts independently of nature’s laws (as in the case of the miraculous multiplication of loaves and fishes).

d) Apart from such supernatural intervention on the part of God, the order of nature remains constant. It operates according to definite laws, the individual phenomena stand in uninterrupted connection with one another and with the ensemble, the quantity of matter and energy at nature’s disposal, in spite of various changes, always remains the same. In this sense only (not in the sense that all “conditions lying outside the causal nexus of nature” are eliminated) can we speak, as Wundt does, of “a closed causality of nature.”²⁸28W. Wundt, Logik, Vol. II, 4th ed., Stuttgart, 1920, p. 332.

e) The champions of the so-called preformation theories place an exaggerated emphasis on the constancy and independence of nature as against God. They assume in nature an original necessity of, or disposition favorable to, miracles. Leibniz²⁹29Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, n. 54, 62. held that while a miracle transcends the natural power of all creatures, it is nevertheless a necessary constituent of the existing universe, because it is postulated by the idea of the best possible world, which in his philosophy is identical with the world as it actually exists. Houtteville³⁰30La Religion Chrétienne Prouvée par les Faits, Paris, 1722, pp. 24 sqq. and Bonnet³¹31Palingénésie Philosophique, Vol. II, 1769, pp. 180 sqq. asserted that miracles are so deeply rooted in the powers of nature that they occur at the appointed time according to general laws unknown to us, without any special intervention on the part of God. Houtteville limited his theory to physical miracles, ascribed spiritual miracles to a special supernatural operation on the part of God, and placed the general laws according to which all miracles happen on a level with the laws of nature. Bonnet went a step farther and included the spiritual in the same class with physical miracles, postulating a special order of nature and corresponding general laws over and above the regular order.

Apart from the untenability of Leibniz’s philosophical system (Optimism), his theory is clearly incompatible with the supernatural character of miracles. If nature demands miracles for its perfection, then miracles may transcend the powers of nature, but they do not transcend its requirements, as they form part and parcel of the natural order.

According to Houtteville, physical miracles, and, according to Bonnet, both physical and spiritual miracles, differ from the ordinary phenomena of nature only in this respect that they are governed by laws unknown to us. A miracle, therefore, does not transcend the powers of nature; in other words, it is not a miracle at all. Moreover, the assumption of a real preformation involves the theory of miracles in great difficulty. What men, in conformity with Holy Scripture, are ordinarily inclined to attribute to the immediate intervention of divine omnipotence, is in this hypothesis effected by the powers of nature acting according to extremely complicated but undemonstrable laws. Thus, at the moment when Christ commanded Lazarus to rise from the grave, his soul, in obedience to some general law, reunited itself with his body; and the blind man (John IX) had his sight restored while he washed himself, because from the moment of its creation his body had been predestined to receive the faculty of sight at that precise juncture.