The Knowability of Supernatural Revelation

Objections

The possibility of miracles was denied by the pagan philosopher Celsus,³²32Cfr. Origen, Contra Celsum, l. IV, c. 5 (Migne, P. G., XI, 1036). by the Jewish Rationalist Baruch Spinoza,³³33Tractatus Theol.-polit., Hamburg, 1670, c. 6, de Miraculis. and by innumerable others on the ground that every miracle involves an inadmissible breach of the laws of nature. Thus David F. Strauss says: “Our age is indebted to the laborious researches of many centuries for the knowledge that all existing things are interconnected by a chain of causes and effects which suffers no interruption. While it is true that the individual objects and spheres of the world with the course of their conditions and variations are by no means so completely shut off against one another as to be impervious to outside influences and interruptions, the operation of one object or sphere reaches over into that of the others, the free will of man disturbs the development of many objects of nature, and natural causes react upon human liberty: and all the while the ensemble of finite things forms an inside circle, which owes its existence and character to a higher being, and into which no new factors can enter. This conviction is so strong that in everyday life the opinion or assertion that a supernatural cause has directly interfered with nature is regarded as an evidence either of ignorance or of fraud.”³⁴34Das Leben Jesu, Vol. I, 13th ed., Tübingen, 1904, pp. 80 sq. Paulsen says in his famous work on ethics: “Since the human mind has been saturated by natural science, which starts from the assumption that whatever happens, happens according to fixed laws, and shows the truth of this assumption more and more in detail, miracles and magical effects have become extremely obnoxious to reason.”³⁵35System der Ethik, Vol. I, 9th ed., Stuttgart and Berlin, 1913, p. 439. And again: “Miracles are exceptional effects, makeshifts by means of which the world, which usually follows its own bent, is readjusted from without.”³⁶36Ibid., p. 440. Harnack says: “We are firmly convinced that what happens in space and time is subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this sense, as an interruption of the order of nature, there can be no such things as miracles.”³⁷37Das Wesen des Christentums, 66th–70th thousand, Leipsic, 1920, p. 17; English tr. by Th. B. Saunders, What Is Christianity? 4th ed., London, 1923, p. 23. Pfleiderer writes: “It is only with the introduction of the idea of nature as a law-abiding nexus of mutual effects produced by singular causes, that a miracle is definitely recognized as a phenomenon which abolishes that connection and, therefore, is contrary to nature. Former generations in their naïveté did not fully realize this fact because they were unfamiliar with the concept of nature on which it is based. … It is only since the second half of the seventeenth century, when the concept of nature was clearly delimited by mathematics and physical science, that courageous thinkers like Spinoza asserted the incompatibility of this concept with the assumption of miracles in the strict sense of the term, and now this conviction has become predominant in the world of science. … Schleiermacher correctly observed that there is no reason for assuming that the divine omnipotence should manifest itself more admirably in interrupting the continuity of nature than in promoting its unalterable course, which, like nature itself, rests upon divine institution. Every absolute miracle destroys the entire connection of nature forwards and backwards; nay, it abolishes the very concept of nature itself. … Besides, it is manifestly incompatible with the immutability of God to assume that He sometimes operates in an orderly and sometimes in a disorderly manner, that He sometimes confirms and sometimes upsets the order of nature. Since we have recognized the order of nature as the manifestation of divine omnipotence, we cannot possibly assume an antagonism between the former and the latter, as if God were shackled or impeded by the order of nature and felt bound to break this bond now and then, or to brush aside this impediment. … The assumption of miracles contradicts both the true concept of God and the correct idea of nature as a chain of causes and effects governed by definite laws.”³⁸38Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1896, pp. 566 sqq.

Similar objections are found in the writings of Volkelt,³⁹39Vorträge zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart, Munich, 1892. Sabatier,⁴⁰40Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion Based on Psychology and History, New York, 1907, pp. 67 sqq. Ménégoz,⁴¹41German tr. Der biblische Wunderbegriff, by Baur, Freiburg, 1895. Siebeck,⁴²42Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie, Freiburg, 1893. and many others. It is not necessary to refute this contention after what we have said in the previous section on the possibility of miracles.

3. The Knowability of Miracles

1. It would be of little avail to demonstrate the possibility of miracles if they could not be certainly recognized as such. Some Rationalists admit the possibility of miracles, but maintain that none can ever be known with certainty. Against these objectors we must show that miracles are knowable.

2. Since we are dealing here with miracles as criteria of revelation, the only kind in question are physical miracles, the effects of which can be perceived by means of the senses.

3. A miracle may be considered either as a historical fact or as a supernatural phenomenon, and consequently our knowledge of miracles may be either historical or philosophical. A miracle is historically knowable in so far as the fact can be shown to have happened; it is knowable philosophically in so far as its supernatural origin can be demonstrated.

4. In saying that miracles are historically and philosophically knowable, we do not mean that the historical and supernatural character of every single miracle can be established with absolute certainty. In some instances doubts may remain both as to the actual occurrence and the supernatural provenience of a miraculous phenomenon. Whenever this is the case, the phenomenon in question cannot be utilized as a criterion of revelation.

5. What we have to show is this: The miraculous character of an occurrence cannot prevent us from demonstrating its historical reality and its supernatural, divine origin. It is in this sense that the two following theses are to be understood.

The historical actuality of miracles can be known with certainty by those who witness them, by those who were absent at the time when they occurred, and by later generations of men.

a) Those who witness a miracle are able to recognize it as such if they have the full use of their senses. The activity of the senses in the perception of a miracle is in no way extraordinary. If, for example, a corpse is restored to life by the word of a man, the eye-witnesses first behold the dead body, then they hear the words of the thaumaturgist, and finally they see the corpse move and show signs of returning life.

b) The extraordinary character of a miraculous occurrence is calculated to attract and hold the attention of men, thus rendering the conditions of sense perception more favorable, and there is no reason why a miracle, in its external manifestation, should not be perceived with at least the same certainty as any other external phenomenon.

c) If a miraculous event has been observed and recognized by eye-witnesses, the knowledge of its occurrence can be communicated to others who were absent when it happened. All that is necessary to render such a communication credible is the existence of an authentic report attesting the facts. The credibility of the witnesses is subject to exactly the same criteria as if the occurrence had been purely natural. The miraculous character of an event does not in any wise derogate from the credibility of those who bear witness to it. It may even instigate others who hear of it to inquire into the facts more carefully and to subject the credibility of the witnesses to a rigorous test. This will be the case especially if the recipient of the message has a personal interest in the matter, and if it would be to his advantage to prove the witnesses unreliable. Undue credulity or carelessness on the one hand would thus be compensated for by incredulity and critical research on the other. If there are no positive reasons for doubt, the mere fact that the miracle occurred in the far-off past cannot shake the credibility of the witnesses.

Objections Refuted

1. Renan writes: “We do not say: ‘Miracle is impossible’; we say, ‘there has been hitherto no miracle proved.’ Let a thaumaturgist present himself to-morrow with testimony sufficiently important to merit our attention; let him announce that he is able, I will suppose, to raise the dead; what would be done? A commission composed of physiologists, physicians, chemists, and persons experienced in historical criticism, would be appointed. This commission would choose the corpse, make certain that death was real, designate the hall in which the experiment should be made, and regulate the whole system of precautions necessary to leave no room for doubt. If, under such conditions, the resurrection should be performed, a probability almost equal to certainty would be obtained. However, as an experiment ought always to be capable of being repeated, as one ought to be capable of doing again what one has done before, and as in the matter of miracles there can be no question of easy or difficult, the thaumaturgist would be invited to reproduce his marvelous act under other circumstances, upon other bodies, in another medium. If the miracle succeeds each time, two things would be proven: first, that supernatural acts do come to pass in the world; second, that the power to perform them belongs or is delegated to certain persons.”⁴³43Life of Jesus, Engl. tr., pp. 44 sq.

Rousseau expresses himself similarly. “Where are the miracles [of which we hear]?” he asks. “They are in books. Who wrote those books? Men. Who witnessed those miracles? Men. Who report and bear witness to them? Men. Hence all the testimonies that can be adduced are purely human. Men report what other men claim to have seen. Can I rely upon such purely human testimony when there is question of a miracle? Impossible! To establish a miracle requires stronger evidence than purely human testimony, which is never safe against deception.”⁴⁴44Profession de la Foi, Paris, 1848, p. 437.

Strauss rejects the knowability of miracles on the score that “there cannot be found in all history a miracle which is attested (a) by a sufficient number of (b) adequately trained witnesses to exclude the possibility of self-deception;—of witnesses, moreover, who (c) can be proved to have been so honest and to have had so much at stake as to render intentional deception unthinkable; there is on record no miracle, in fine, which (d) happened in such a frequented place that the detection of its untruth would have been inevitable.”⁴⁵45Die christliche Glaubenslehre, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1840, p. 240.

These writers are unanimous in asserting that no miracle has ever been securely established. This assertion is based on their extravagant demands regarding the knowability of miracles. Experimental confirmation cannot rightfully be demanded in the case of a miracle, since there is question not of phenomena which happen according to unalterable laws of nature, but of free demonstrations of the divine omnipotence. No special education or training is required to attest a miracle; all that is necessary is an open eye and ordinary common sense. Rousseau goes decidedly too far in refusing assent to human testimony when it involves a miracle.

The conditions set up by Strauss are fulfilled in a number of recent scientific tests, such as that of the sudden cure of Peter de Rudder, on April 7, 1875, at Oostacker, Belgium; that of A. Chagnon at Lourdes, August 21, 1891; that of J. Dehant at the same place, September 13, 1878, and many others.⁴⁶46Alfred Deschamps, S.J., M.D., Sc.D., published a pamphlet on the de Rudder case in 1906 (Catholic Truth Society of Scotland), which Sir Bertram C. A. Windle summarizes in a chapter (“Some Plain Facts about Miracles of Healing”) of his book On Miracles and Some Other Matters, London, 1924, pp. 29–39. Peter de Rudder was an inhabitant of a village called Jabbeke, between Bruges and Ostend, Belgium. In 1867, when he was forty-four, his left leg was broken below the knee by the fall of a tree. The fracture was what is known as “compound”—that is to say, the tissues covering the bones were torn, so that the broken ends were exposed to the influence of the air and its bacteria. The fracture was set and dressed by a neighborhood physician, but the ends of the bones failed to reunite, and suppuration set in. After some months the attending physician and several other medical men who had been called in for consultation, decided to amputate the leg. However, de Rudder refused his consent. In January, 1875, his condition had grown so bad that two doctors who visited him again told him that amputation was his only hope. Those who saw him on the sixth of April testified immediately after the cure that the fragments of the broken leg were piercing through the skin and were separated from each other by a suppurating wound about three centimeters in length. On April 7, eight years and two months after his leg was broken, de Rudder went to a shrine at Oostacker, near Ghent, which had been set up by some pious person in imitation of that at Lourdes. While sitting on a bench there, he suddenly felt that his leg was cured, rose up without his crutches, passed through the files of persons around the grotto, and knelt down to make his thanksgiving for his cure. The case was carefully investigated by Dr. Deschamps and others, and there can be no reasonable doubt that he was cured by a miracle. The salient facts are summed up by Dr. Windle as follows (ibid., pp. 33 sqq.): “(1) The man had both bones of his leg broken at the age of forty-four, and let it be noted that the age is an important factor, for union is readier and more rapid in the youthful. (2) The bones refused to unite under medical treatment, and remained ununited for more than eight years. … (3) The bones suddenly reunited at Oostacker and remained soundly knit for twenty-three years [de Rudder died of pneumonia at the age of seventy-five, in 1898]. (4) The post-mortem condition shows that the bones had been broken and reunited. … There was an instantaneous cure. … The muscles were at once restored to their perfect condition. … There was no shortening … because there was suddenly found an amount of the necessary material to fill the gap, an amount altogether in excess of that which normally exists in any human being in a free state, and therefore available.” Cfr. Leopold Fonck, S.J., Die Wunder des Herrn im Evangelium, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Innsbruck, 1907, pp. 15 sq., with bibliography; G. Bertrin, Histoire Critique des Événements de Lourdes, Paris, 1909; IDEM, art. “Lourdes” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX, pp. 389 sqq.; Dr. F. de Grandmaison de Bruno, Twenty Cures at Lourdes Medically Discussed, London, 1920; Dr. E. le Bec, Medical Proof of the Miraculous, New York, 1922.

2. Hume held that experience refutes all testimony concerning miraculous occurrences. “The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians,” he says, “is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains.”⁴⁷47David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, Oxford, 1894, p. 113.

“But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.”⁴⁸48Ibid., p. 114.

“The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.”⁴⁹49Ibid., pp. 115 sq.

The same objection is repeated in somewhat different words by other writers. Thus Zeller says: “When there is question of the credibility of a miraculous tale, the real point at issue is: What is more probable—that something has here actually happened which contradicts our whole experience, or that the tradition which hands down such a report is false? The answer is obvious. For as the probability of an assumption can be measured only by its agreement with others which we know to be true, and since experience offers innumerable examples of inaccurate observation, false tradition, intentional and unintentional fiction, in general, of incorrect and unreliable reporting, whereas we have not one authentic example of a fully attested miracle, not one genuine instance of an effect not produced by natural causes, we can imagine no case in which the historian would not be compelled to find it far more probable that he was dealing with an inaccurate report than with a miraculous event.”⁵⁰50Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. IV, 1860, p. 101.

Hume argues against the knowability of miracles on the strength of historic evidence. He does not deny that a miracle could be proved by the testimony of eye-witnesses. His whole argument is based on the assumption that the only reliable evidence is that which agrees with past experience. So long as I have myself not witnessed a miracle, I cannot accept the testimony of another who claims to have had that experience. But this is a false principle. A witness is generally assumed to be trustworthy if he has knowledge of the event to which he testifies and if he is willing to tell the truth about it. The acceptance of his testimony in no wise rests upon any knowledge which we may happen to possess on the subject from our own experience. If historical reports could claim credibility only when they agree with ordinary experience, history would have to surrender a large tract of its terrain, for so long as we had not taken part in a military campaign, a pagan sacrifice, a gladiatorial contest, or a parliamentary debate, we should have to reject all reports of such events as incredible. The same conclusion would hold for all other spheres of human knowledge, for there is not one in which men are not compelled to accept the testimony of others as a means of acquiring knowledge for themselves. Scientific progress is incompatible with Hume’s demands.

Equally untenable is the English sceptic’s further contention that the case against miracles is as complete as any case based upon human observation can possibly be, because a constant and uninterrupted experience has given us a knowledge of the laws of nature which miracles are supposed to violate. For, apart from the fact that the laws of nature are not violated by miracles, experience can tell us only what happens when nature is left to its own resources. The witnesses to a miracle, on the other hand, assert that something has happened which cannot be deduced from the laws of nature. Their report is based on actual observation. An effect which, so far as human experience goes, has never been produced by men or by any purely material power of nature, transcends the capacity of nature. This fact we establish by the same empirical method by which we have ascertained the laws of nature. What has never happened in the experience of the human race, cannot have happened; that is to say, what the known powers of nature have never effected before, cannot be effected by them now. Hence, if it is certain that a miracle has happened, we know that a supernatural power must have been at work. Uniform experience and the report of miracles, therefore, refer to two entirely different objects, and to hold that experience must always be right, is to assume that there is no cause which could produce an effect transcending the powers of nature.⁵¹51For a more detailed refutation of Hume see J. H. Newman, Essays on Miracles, new impression, London, 1911, pp. 10 sqq., 155, 175 sq.; C. Gutberlet, Lehrbuch der Apologetik, Vol. II, 4th ed., pp. 124–145; van Weddingen, De Miraculo, Louvain, 1869, pp. 367 sqq.; Ign. Ottiger, S.J., Theologia Fundamentalis, Vol. I, pp. 209 sqq.; Eug. Müller, Natur und Wunder, ihr Gegensatz und ihre Harmonie, Freiburg i. B., 1892, pp. 190 sqq.; IDEM, Das Wunder und die Naturwissenschaft, Freiburg i. Sw., 1898.

The fact that there are innumerable examples of inaccurate observation should, of course, inspire us with caution, but it is no reason for rejecting all reports of miracles as a priori untrustworthy. The aversion displayed towards miracles by modern hypercritics is as reprehensible as the credulity to which not a few pseudo-miracles owe their existence. Only the via media of just and sober criticism can lead to the truth.

Our second thesis is that the supernatural, divine origin of a miracle can sometimes be established with certainty.

The proof for this proposition is based on the relation of miracles to the created causes operating in the universe. We argue as follows: The supernatural divine origin of a miracle can be established if it can be shown that an occurrence transcends the powers of nature and is not attributable to demonic influences. Now, it can be demonstrated that a miracle transcends the powers of nature and is not attributable to demonic influences. Therefore, the supernatural divine origin of a miracle can be established with certainty.

Every miracle is produced by one of three causes; either (1) by nature, i. e., man and the material forces of his environment; or (2) by the influence of evil spirits, or (3) by almighty God. (Divine omnipotence, as we have observed on a previous page, is here to be taken in a wide sense, so as to include the activity of the angels.) A miracle must be attributed to God as soon as it has been shown that it is not an effect of either of the other two causes named.

1. It can be shown that a miracle transcends the powers of nature, i. e., man and the material forces of his environment. True, we do not know the powers of nature well enough to be able to say positively, in every single instance, whether or not a given effect exceeds those powers. The fact that new elements, powers, and laws of nature are being constantly discovered, is clear evidence of the incompleteness of our knowledge. Even when the essences and powers of things are known to us, it is often impossible to tell exactly how far their natural operations extend. In spite of this defect, however, we are able in many instances to determine negatively what nature cannot do. We occasionally have a similar experience in the realm of pure nature. Thus we cannot say precisely how heavy a burden a man can carry, or where yellow ceases and green begins in the solar spectrum. Nevertheless no one doubts that it is impossible for any man to carry off a mountain or that yellow is a color distinct from green. Though we are frequently unable to judge with certitude concerning the powers and properties of nature, we do not find it difficult to do so as soon as the limits of our knowledge are extended. In the same way it can often be shown that a given phenomenon transcends the powers of nature. In some cases the effect itself is of a kind that manifestly exceeds the material powers of nature and of man, as when a corpse is raised to life or a material substance (e. g., bread) is suddenly multiplied on a large scale. In other cases it is plain from the manner in which the effect appears, that it cannot be produced by the powers of nature. This is the case especially if the reported effect and its apparent cause stand in no relation to each other. Thus everybody knows that spittle mixed with clay is not an adequate means of healing blindness (John IX, 6 sqq.) and that a simple word cannot cure leprosy.

Hence, when there is question of establishing the miraculous nature of a fact or of an event, it is not necessary to examine what nature with all its powers may be able to do, but simply to make sure that the natural powers credited with producing the miraculous effect could not possibly have caused it.

Objections Refuted

The Rationalists try to explain all miracles by purely natural means. They say:

a) The thaumaturgist has cleverly utilized powers of nature as yet unknown to us; or

b) Hidden powers of nature may have accidentally produced the effect precisely at the moment when the alleged miracle was to be wrought; or

c) There may have been fraud and deception practiced; or

d) Suggestion, hypnotism, occultism, or hysteria may have played an important rôle.

We reply:

a) Where there are positive indications that the thaumaturgist employed natural means, this fact must, of course, be taken into consideration. But if the assumption is arbitrary, inspired solely by the desire to explain a miracle in a purely natural way, it is to be rejected.

b) The accidental coincidence of favorable circumstances may explain the appearance of a miraculous effect in some cases, but that the expected effect in a number of instances should occur accidentally, at the precise moment when the thaumaturgist utters his command or performs a certain action, is absolutely improbable in the light of experience. Moreover, Divine Providence could not possibly permit such a coincidence to be used in confirmation of an alleged divine claim which has no basis in fact.

c) Whether or not an alleged miracle is the result of fraud or intentional deception, must be ascertained a posteriori in each individual case. A thorough investigation of all the surrounding circumstances, of the purpose for which the alleged miracle was wrought, and of the person of the thaumaturgist, will usually establish the truth. If, in spite of the most careful research, the matter remains doubtful, the phenomenon in question must not be cited as a miracle.

d) Hypnotic suggestion plays a part only in connection with those miracles which occur in relation to the living. For this reason the theory under consideration confines itself to the explanation of cures wrought by suggestion. However, since suggestion acts immediately upon the nerves, only such diseases as have their seat in the nervous system can be cured by hypnotism. The cure of other organic diseases can be effected only mediately by the influence of the nerves upon the metabolism of the body, and therefore cannot take place suddenly.⁵²52Cfr. E. Wasmann, S.J., Eine plötzliche Heilung aus neuester Zeit in the Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, Vol. LVIII (1900), p. 126. This is attested by the representatives of the suggestion theory themselves. Thus Bernheim says: “Suggestion works no miracles; it heals in accordance with the biological laws that govern the human organism.”⁵³53Hypnotisme, Suggestion, Psychothérapie, 2nd ed., Paris, 1903, p. 503; cfr. Koch-Preuss, A Handbook of Moral Theology, Vol. IV, pp. 278 sqq.; G. Surbled, Catholic Moral Teaching in its Relations to Medicine, tr. by H. J. Eggemann, Vol. I, St. Louis, 1929; O’Malley and Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, N. Y., 1906, pp. 120 sqq. Charcot, the father of modern faith-healing, writes: “The domain of faith-healing, we must admit, is a limited one. In order to attain results, the faith-healer must take up cases in which a cure can be effected solely by that power which the spirit wields over the body. No outside influence is able to make faith-healing go beyond these limits; for we can do nothing against the laws of nature.”⁵⁴54La Foi qui Guérit, Paris, 1897; cfr. K. Knur, Christus Medicus? Freiburg, 1905, pp. 64 sqq.; J. de Bonniot, S.J., Le Miracle et ses Contrefaçons, Paris, 1887, revised edition, 1895. This work is unfortunately out of print; we cite the German translation, Wunder und Scheinwunder, Mayence, 1889, pp. 256–305.

Healing by suggestion, therefore, is possible only in certain well-defined cases and must not be assumed to have taken place except when it is indicated by the circumstances and the conduct of those who co-operated in effecting the cure.

The same considerations must govern us in judging cures wrought by means of occultism. The explanation of the Gospel miracles given by occultists are as varied as the occultistic theories themselves. Fraud and hallucination, the hidden powers of mediums, demonic and other spiritual influences are called into play.⁵⁵55The opinion is gaining ground that while there is much deception and fakery on the part of mediums, a certain percentage of telepathic and telekinetic phenomena are undoubtedly genuine. It is not, however, possible as yet to explain these phenomena satisfactorily. There are reasons for assuming that some mediums are endowed with peculiar powers which, while supranormal, are quite natural, though the mediums themselves, almost without exception, believe that they are in contact with spirits of another world. Cfr. T. K. Oesterreich, Der Okkultismus im modernen Weltbild, 3rd ed., Dresden, 1923; A. Ph. von Schrenck-Notzing, Materialisationsphänomene, Munich, 1923 (Engl. tr. by E. E. Fournier d’Albe, The Phenomena of Materialization, London, 1920); R. Lambert, Okkultismus und Spiritismus, Stuttgart, 1921; A. M. Lepicier, The Unseen World, 2nd ed., London, 1909; J. Liljencrants, Spiritism and Religion, N. Y., 1918; Koch-Preuss, A Handbook of Moral Theology, Vol. IV, pp. 280 sqq. But common sense tells us that miracles and occult phenomena cannot be assigned to the same category merely because there are certain remote analogies between them.

The influence of evil spirits in connection with miracles will be discussed later.

To explain miracles, some writers maintain that the sick whom Christ cured suffered from hysteria. Hysteria is a nervous affection in which the victim loses control over the emotions and yields to imaginary sensations.⁵⁶56Bonniot, Le Miracle et ses Contrefaçons, Germ. ed., pp. 305–398. This disease must never be assumed to exist on a priori grounds, but each individual case must be judged on its own merits, and only if the symptoms are unmistakable, may the existence of hysteria be asserted.

2. It can be shown that some miracles are not the result of demonic influences.

To make sure that a phenomenon which transcends the known powers of nature is attributable to demonic influence, it is necessary first of all to investigate the phenomenon itself as well as its accompanying circumstances.

a) The phenomenon itself may clearly manifest its miraculous character, e.g., when it is certain that new substances were created out of nothing, or that an event occurred which took no time. For only divine omnipotence can operate in this manner. Every finite, created being requires a substratum upon which to exercise its faculties. Creatural activity is limited to effecting some change in an already existing being, and that within the limits of time. Only the infinitely perfect Creator possesses the entire plenitude of being and undivided activity in one single moment (eternity). For this reason the effects of divine omnipotence are not subject to the limitations of time.⁵⁷57Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 306 sqq., 402 sq.

b) If the extraordinary event does not clearly point to a divine origin, we must examine the accompanying circumstances. An extraordinary effect produced by God must bear the stamp of holiness, must be worthy of His Divine Majesty, and conducive to the welfare of men. Of extraordinary effects which are the work of evil spirits we may, on the contrary, expect that they should possess marks which in some way betray their origin. At the same time we must stick to the principle that God in His providence and holiness cannot possibly permit men to be hopelessly deceived by extraordinary demonic effects. Least of all is this to be assumed when such effects bear on the founding of a new religion.

The circumstances here in question are mainly: the person of the thaumaturgist; the manner in which the extraordinary effect is produced; its purpose and its results.

α) If the thaumaturgist is a proud, ambitious notoriety-seeker, his pretended miracles are, to say the least, very suspicious. For it does not seem consistent with the dignity of God that He should make use of an unworthy instrument, especially in establishing a new religion.

β) If the manner in which the alleged miracle is wrought bears the earmarks of absurdity, superstition, obscenity, or impiety, or if it is wrought while the thaumaturgist is unconscious of what is going on, or is in a state of violent excitement, divine co-operation is excluded.

γ) If the purpose of an extraordinary phenomenon is evil or unworthy of God, there can be no real miracle. Thus if the activity of the pretended thaumaturgist serves pecuniary profit, if he works “miracles” to make money, or to become famous, or to satisfy idle curiosity, or to confirm an evidently false doctrine, he cannot be a messenger of God.

δ) If hatred and discord are the immediate effects of a pretended miracle, or if it leads to insubordination to legitimate authority or to a general deterioration of morals, it cannot be the work of God.

ε) That divine revelation expressly denounces certain occurrences as pseudo-miracles, furnishes us with an additional and a sufficient means—should all others fail—of distinguishing truth from falsehood, the genuine from the spurious.