The Knowability of Supernatural Revelation

Examples of Pseudo-Miracles

The history of pagan and non-Christian religions records certain extraordinary phenomena which some writers place on a level with the miracles of Jesus Christ and His Saints. Besides, there are numerous occurrences within the Christian pale which are regarded as miraculous by many, but not accepted as such by the Church. It will be useful to digress a moment to examine the true character of these pseudo-miracles.

1. The “Miracles” of Buddha.—Although Buddha is described as morally spotless, his pretended miracles cannot be genuine. To begin with, the period in which they are supposed to have been wrought is too indefinite. These “miracles” are, moreover, so fantastic that they impress us rather as fairy tales lifted from the “Arabian Nights.” It will suffice to quote two or three examples. On one occasion, we are told, six Brahmins challenged Sakyamuni (former name of Gautama Buddha, meaning, “the hermit of the tribe of Sakya”) to a miracle contest. He accepted the challenge and erected a vast hall, 100,000 yards in length, wherein he wrought a series of “miracles,” the greatest of which is described as follows: Two kings had made him a present of an artificial lotus flower, the size of a wagon-wheel. It was of gold, with a stem of diamonds. Sakyamuni sat down with crossed legs in the centre of the flower, and immediately above it there appeared another, in which he was also seen sitting surrounded by innumerable buddhas, whom he had created, and who ascended to the eighth heaven, where they held a meeting. Repeatedly Sakyamuni performed the “miracle of the pairs” (yamaka-pātihāriya), i. e., he rose up in the air, flames of fire came from the upper part of his body and streams of water from the lower part. Then the process was reversed. Next fire came from the right side of his body, and water from the left, and so on through twenty-two variations of pairs. He then created a jewelled promenade in the sky, and, walking along it, produced the illusion that he was standing or sitting or lying down, and varied the illusions in a similar way.⁵⁸58E. J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha as Legend and History, London, 1927, pp. 98 sq. For a long time this extraordinary performance (yamaka-pātihāriya) was not understood, but we now possess canonical descriptions of it in Patisambhidāmagga, I, 125 and Mystic, III, 115.—On the pseudo-miracles of Buddhism see further P. Sinthern, S.J., Buddhismus und buddhistische Strömungen der Gegenwart, Münster i. W., 1905, pp. 11 sqq. At another time, when the heretics had pulled up the mango trees for a league around Sāvatthī, Buddha told Ganda, the king’s gardener, who had found a ripe mango seed, to plant it in the ground, and no sooner had he washed his hands over it, than it sprang up into a tree fifty hands high. Then with three strides he rose to heaven and there kept his seventh retreat.⁵⁹59E. J. Thomas, op. cit., p. 114.

It needs no argument to prove that such “miracles” are pure figments of the imagination. But even apart from the character of these alleged miracles, the doctrine of Buddha, which has atheism for its basis and annihilation as its final goal, plainly shows that there cannot be question of divine intervention in its favor.

2. The “Miracles” of Æsculapius and Serapis.—Reputable authors like Tacitus, Suetonius, Pausanias, and Galenus report that Æsculapius (Asklepios, “the great lover of men”) and Serapis, a syncretistic god who was identified with Osiris-Apis, Zeus, Helios, and Mithra, miraculously healed the sick, even such as had been given up by physicians. These cures are said to have been wrought through the use of medicaments prescribed by the gods, either directly in a dream or through priests. In some cases the “cures” seem adapted to the nature of the disease, in some they appear indifferent, while in many others they flatly contradict the usual practice of the medical profession. Where a higher, invisible power is at work, we obtain the impression that some tricky imp is intent upon deceiving men. The patient, to be cured, had first to worship the respective god by prayer or sacrifice. This is evidence enough that these pseudo-miracles were wrought by evil spirits. The manner in which they were effected and their evident purpose, i. e., the promotion of idolatry, exclude every other interpretation.⁶⁰60On the impostures practiced by the priests of Æsculapius, Serapis, Dionysos, etc., see Döllinger, Gentile and Jew, tr. by Darnell, Vol. II, pp. 211 sq. Dr. Döllinger says: “These impostures and juggleries are not to be estimated by a later and Christian standard, for it was an acknowledged principle that it was both lawful and expedient to impose upon the people, to conceal the truth from them, and to confirm them in their errors by public speeches and state ceremonial …. The authorities never troubled themselves to investigate and to compromise the priests, and there were many instances of a neighborhood or city suffering detriment when the reputation of its local sanctuary was diminished by a discovery of the kind. In the time of Pausanias the Eleans were still proud of Dionysos having visited them in person. Three empty cauldrons were placed in a cellar, and sealed up by the priests in the presence of citizens and strangers; the next day they were found filled with wine by the god’s own hand, a prodigy confirmed on oath by all present. At Andros, too, every year, on the festival of Dionysos, wine flowed from the temple (Paus., ix, 18, 3) … . Servius mentions the temple of the mother of gods being opened, not by the hand, but by prayer (iv, 31). Pausanias was eye-witness to smoke issuing of its own accord from the tomb of the Heraclid Pioniae every time a mortuary offering was made to it. These sacerdotal impostures seem to have been practiced most frequently in the temples of Æsculapius and the Serapaea. The object was to support the credit of these places of healing, the priests on the spot taking care to hire poor people to feign suffering and disease of all kinds, and to pretend to be cured by a miracle wrought in one or other of these temples, or by an oracle therein communicated. (Clementin. Homil., IX, 18, p. 691).” (Op. cit., II, 212 sq.)

3. The “Miracles” of Apollonius of Tyana.—Apollonius Tyanaeus (a native of Tyana in Cappadocia, circa 4 B.C. to 96 A.D.), was a Pythagorean philosopher whose life, written by Philostratus (200 A.D.), has come down to us. He travelled through Asia Minor, Parthia, and India, discussing philosophical problems with the Brahmins, then returned to Greece and visited Rome. Later he went to Alexandria and to Ethiopia. He laid claim to supernatural powers, and many miracles are attributed to him—some so closely resembling those of the Gospels that it has been conjectured that his whole story is a fabrication, intended by its author as a rival to the Christian narrative. It is related that at his command waiters made of black ore sprang from miraculously provided tripods and proceeded to serve wine and water flowing from those same tripods. On another occasion Achilles appeared before his guests, five yards high, grew seven yards before their eyes, and then disappeared as suddenly as he had come, at the cock’s crow. These and many similar tales are no doubt fables; but there are other features of the life story of Apollonius which seem to contain an element of truth. Thus he is reported to have exorcised devils, called a sudden halt to the spread of the plague, and announced the death of the Emperor Domitian at Ephesus at the very moment when that cruel tyrant was assassinated in far-off Rome. There must have been some basis for the great veneration in which Apollonius was held a hundred years after his demise and for the fact that the Emperor Septimius Severus received him among his Lares and Penates and gave him a statue alongside those of Abraham and Jesus Christ. The truth probably is that, as many pagans and Christians believed already during his life-time, Apollonius was a magician who wrought his “miracles” by the aid of the devil. This assumption agrees with the fact that he regarded the promotion of paganism as his life-work.⁶¹61Cfr. J. de Bonniot, S.J., pp. 163–192; A. Seitz, Christus-Zeugnisse, Cologne, 1906, pp. 68 sqq.; Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, p. 746. Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius and some letters ascribed to the latter were published in Philostrati Opera Omnia, ed. Olearius, Leipsic, 1709, and ed. Kayser, ibid., 1870–71.

4. The “Miracles” of the Jansenists.—The history of Christian heresies is as rich in pseudo-miracles as that of paganism. The Gnostics and Montanists of the early centuries performed many strange “miracles.” Later we meet with similar phenomena among the Albigenses, the Anabaptists, the Jansenists, and the Mormons. The historicity of many of the facts reported need not be denied, but there is nothing to prove that they were genuine miracles. Some of them have in fact been shown to be fraudulent, while others find a natural explanation in the peculiar qualities of the persons concerned, and still others, which appear to exceed the powers of nature, betray demonic influence by their intrinsic connection with crime and vice. Prominent among pseudo-miracles of this kind are the phenomena which took place in 1727 and later at the tomb of the Jansenist deacon, François de Paris, in the graveyard of Saint-Médard. Marvelous cures were reported and so persistently noised abroad that soon the sick and the curious flocked to the little cemetery. David Hume in his famous Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding cites these phenomena as an example to show how well miraculous events can be attested without meriting credence.⁶²62An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1894, pp. 124 sq. The Jansenists appealed to these “miracles” in confirmation of the orthodoxy of their belief. But if we examine the occurrences in the cemetery of Saint-Médard a little more closely, we can easily see that they were not genuine miracles. Thousands who visited the tomb of François de Paris were seized by violent convulsions, fell into transports, real or imaginary, and, while in this condition, inveighed against the pope and the bishops. Some of these “convulsionaries,” as they were called, were men who led an ascetic life, whereas others freely indulged in gross vices. A “convulsionary” nicknamed “La Salamandre” remained suspended for more than nine minutes above a fiery brazier, enveloped only in a sheet. Tests of this sort were called “secours,” and the “secouristes” distinguished between “petits-secours” and “grands-secours,” the latter alone being supposed to require supernatural power. The “secouristes” were soon divided into “discernantes” and “melangistes”; the former distinguished between the work itself and its grotesque or objectionable features, which they ascribed to the devil or to human weakness, while the latter regarded the convulsions and the “secours” as a singular work of Divine Providence, in which even the shocking elements had a distinct purpose and significance.⁶³63Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, p. 292. Out of the mass of so-called miraculous cures the Jansenist theologians selected eight as real miracles. They were cases where patients were healed of cancer, dropsy, blindness, paralysis, and a few other serious maladies. But there was absolutely no trace of the divine seal in these happenings. On the contrary, all the circumstances seem to indicate that the “convulsionaries” were hysterics, cured (in so far as they were cured at all) by suggestion. Several of the cures were investigated judicially, and it was proved that the testimony in their favor was either false, preconcerted, and more than once retracted, or the product of a diseased and fanatical imagination.⁶⁴64Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, p. 293. Moreover, “the convulsions and the secours took place under circumstances which mere good taste would reject as unworthy of divine wisdom and holiness. Not only were the cures, both acknowledged and claimed, supplementary of one another, but cures, convulsions, and secours belonged to the same order of facts and tended to the same concrete end. We are, therefore, justified in concluding that the finger of God did not appear in the whole or in any of its parts.”⁶⁵65Ibid.

The question remains whether these prodigies are explicable by natural causes or whether the devil had a hand in some of them. J. Forget, whom we have been quoting, says that “each of these opinions has its adherents, but the former seems difficult to uphold despite, and in part perhaps because of, the light which recent experiments in suggestion, hypnotism, and Spiritism have thrown on the problem.”⁶⁶66Ibid.—Cfr. Bonniot, op. cit., pp. 129–226; the New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, Vol. IV, pp. 95 sqq.; S. P. Tregelles, The Jansenists; their Rise, Persecution, and Existing Fragments, London, 1851.

4. Miracles as Criteria of Divine Revelation

1. For a miracle to be used as a criterion of divine revelation it is not enough that its historical and philosophical truth be fully established; it must also be shown that the miracle was wrought in confirmation of revealed doctrine. This property of a miracle, based on its relation to revelation, is called its relative truth. It is from it that a miracle derives its demonstrative power. Genuine miracles may happen anywhere, even in places where non-revealed or false religions are current; but they are never wrought in support of heterodox beliefs.

2. The divine origin of a doctrine can be confirmed by a miracle either immediately or mediately. The confirmation is immediate if the miracle is wrought expressly for the purpose of demonstrating the divine origin of the doctrine in question. It is mediate if the miracle is primarily intended to establish the divine mission of the one who proclaims the doctrine. Mediate is quite as valuable as immediate confirmation, since it is evident that God would not confirm as His messenger anyone who proclaimed a false doctrine.

3. Once a doctrine has been confirmed by a miracle, the confirmation remains valid for all time.

Miracles evidently wrought in confirmation of the supernatural divine origin of a doctrine must be regarded as a valid and an unexceptionable proof of its truth. This thesis is based upon the omniscience and veracity of God.

God is infinite truth, and, as such, can neither deceive nor be deceived, for both mendacity and gullibility are contrary to His essence. Hence God cannot positively confirm the testimony of a liar, as He would do if He supported with His omnipotence a man who falsely claimed to be His messenger and undertook to work a miracle to establish his claim. By working a miracle in favor of such a deceiver, God would aid and abet criminal conduct and proclaim falsehood as truth, which would be absolutely contrary to His veracity. Whenever, therefore, the message of a man who claims to be sent by God is confirmed by a genuine miracle, that message must be true and the messenger is trustworthy, for he bears the divine seal.

Objections Refuted

1. D. F. Strauss maintains that the argument based on miracles proves nothing because it moves in a vicious circle. “That a doctrine is divine,” he says, “is proved by miracles; but that these miracles are of divine and not of diabolic origin, I am expected to deduce from the doctrine itself.”⁶⁷67Die christliche Glaubenslehre, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1840, pp. 224 sq.

Criticism.—It is true that Catholic apologists sometimes employ miracles as criteria of doctrines and, vice versa, doctrines as criteria of miracles. But in doing so they do not move in a vicious circle; as would be the case if, in judging of miracles, they postulated the divinity of the doctrine in behalf of which these miracles are wrought, and which is to be demonstrated through them. We Catholics do not argue thus. We simply investigate a doctrine as contained in historically trustworthy sources and judge it in the light of reason. If we discover no contradiction, and see that the doctrine is in conformity with the moral law of nature, we conclude that it may be divinely revealed and, consequently, confirmed by miracles. The quality of the doctrine which miracles are designed to confirm is one of the criteria by which we distinguish the genuine from the spurious. If to this argument are added others, which in their totality establish the conviction that a genuine miracle has been wrought, we justly regard that miracle as a decisive proof for the divine origin of the doctrine.

2. G. E. Lessing denies the validity of miracles (and prophecies) as motives of credibility for the reason that “accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason. I do not at all deny that prophecies were fulfilled in Christ,” he says; “I do not deny that he wrought miracles; but I do deny that these miracles, the truth of which is not confirmed by any miracles wrought at the present time, and which, therefore, are nothing more than reports (no matter how uncontradicted and irrefutable) of past miracles, can compel me to believe in Christ’s other teachings.”⁶⁸68Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, Werke, ed. Laube, Vol. IV, p. 109.

Criticism.—The principle enunciated by Lessing must be admitted in the sense that the conclusion of a syllogism can never claim a higher degree of certainty than the premisses from which it is derived. If these premisses possess only moral certainty, then no physical or metaphysical certainty can attach to the conclusion. But it is not true, as Lessing contends, that historical evidence, which by its very nature produces moral certitude only, can never become the basis of an absolute obligation. True, there are a great many historical reports to which we need pay no attention in ordering our philosophy and conduct; but there are others which involve a strict and universal obligation. To this latter class belong the reports concerning the miracles wrought by Jesus Christ. That these miracles actually occurred, Lessing himself admits to be historically certain. As they were admittedly wrought for the purpose of showing that Christ was sent by God, equipped with divine power to teach and legislate for the entire human race, it is historically certain that Christ came on earth as a teacher and lawgiver, to whom men owe submission. That the certainty upon which this obligation rests is purely moral, excuses no one from the duty of obedience, for moral certainty excludes all reasonable doubt. Whenever a man would have to act contrary to his reason in order to escape an obligation, the moral law of nature demands submission. We all follow this rule in everyday life. A child is obliged to obey his parents. This obligation presupposes that the persons whom he regards as such are really his parents. Of this fact, however, a child can never have more than a moral certitude. Consequently, the child’s duty towards his parents has for its foundation moral certitude only. Similarly every citizen is obliged to obey laws, the existence of which, as a rule, is for him purely a matter of moral certainty. Human nature is so constituted that the absolute requirements of the moral law, upon the fulfilment of which the development and perfection of mankind depend, rest largely upon moral certainty as the basis of obligation.

2. Lessing’s second argument against the conclusive force of miracles is that “their truth is not confirmed by miracles wrought at the present time.” This statement has no objective foundation. As soon as it is certain that a duly accredited historical event was a genuine miracle, and that this miracle was wrought to confirm the supernatural origin of a new religion, we are no longer permitted to doubt the divine character of that religion, but must accept it with all the doctrines and precepts which it proposes.

In matter of fact, however, for the sake of human weakness, God in His goodness continues to work miracles which can stand the acid test of criticism.

For further reading, see page 340.

§ III. Prophecies

1. Definition of Prophecy

A prophecy, broadly speaking, is a prediction of some future contingent event which cannot be foreseen by purely natural means. For a more accurate definition we have to fall back upon Sacred Scripture. The Hebrew nebhu’ah (from nabha’ = to spring forth like water from a fountain, to speak; Greek ῥέω) is rendered in the Septuagint by προφητεία (from προφάναι = to speak for someone, to act as interpreter).⁶⁹69Cfr. Zorell, Novi Testamenti Lexicon Graecum, Paris, 1911, p. 497; M. Hagen, S.J., Lexicon Biblicum, Vol. III, Paris, 1911, pp. 687 sqq.; R. Cornely, S.J., Introductio in V. T. Libros Sacros, Vol. II, Paris, 1887, pp. 267 sqq.

The fundamental meaning of the word is indicated in Exodus VII, 1: “Aaron frater tuus erit propheta tuus (Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet)” and IV, 16: “Ipse loquetur pro te ad populum, et erit os tuum (he shall speak in thy stead to the people, and shall be thy mouth.)”

Throughout the Bible προφητεία, like the Latin prophetia, is employed in a threefold meaning, to wit:

a) In the broad sense of speaking enthusiastically, under divine inspiration, of things pertaining to God. Such speech may contain an explanation of divine utterances, praise of God, or moral instructions addressed to the people, as in Num. XI, 25–29; 1 Par. XXV, 1–3; 1 Kings XI, 4 sq.; XIV, 1–5, 24, 31, 39.

b) In a narrower sense the term prophecy signifies the communication of hidden things, no matter whether they belong to the past, the present, or the future, as in Matt. XXVI, 68.

c) In the strict and ordinary sense prophecy means the prediction of future events which cannot be foreknown by natural means. (Cfr. Mark X, 32–34). It is in this sense that we employ the term here.

A prophecy in theological parlance is the certain and definite prediction, based upon divine causality and fulfilled in time, of future events which cannot be foreknown from natural causes. If a prophecy is to be accepted as a criterion of revelation, we must add to this definition the phrase, “and which serves as a proof of the divine origin of a revealed doctrine.”

1. The object of prophecy is a future event which cannot be foretold from its natural causes. To this category belong primarily all future events that depend solely upon the free will of God or man.⁷⁰70Of course, we must not conceive of the divine will as arbitrary. “In these days,” says Fr. Rickaby, “when the great philosophic difficulty against theism is the prevalence of evil, it is of the first importance to beware of any theistic statement which seems to represent God as mere Will, arbitrary, unconditioned, and untrammelled by any regard to the eternal fitnesses and possibilities of nature. In the presence of evils such as we daily experience, to ally such sheer, imperious, overruling and overwhelming Will with Goodness, is a task which one shrinks from contemplating. Happily, it is not the task of the philosopher and the Christian. No lord paramount θυμὸς or βούλησις can run counter to the εἴδη. If we might put words into the mouth of our Creator, words suggested by our great dramatist, we might fancy God saying:
I can do all that doth become a God:
Who can do more, is none.
That alone ‘doth become a God,’ which is consonant with the εἴδη, or fixed intelligible nature of things, which are the expressions of His nature as imitable beyond Himself. God is the first measure of every being and of every nature, by virtue of what He is Himself in His own being and His own nature, not by mere virtue of His will.” (God and His Creatures, p. 264, note.) Concerning such an event no creature can pass a certain judgment, because the event does not as yet exist and cannot be deduced with necessity from its causes. A prophecy that deals with such things is called absolute. A prophecy is relative if it refers to future events (e.g., an earthquake or a famine) the certain knowledge of which exceeds the intelligence of men, but not that of all created spirits.

2. The prediction which constitutes a prophecy must be certain, that is to say, the prophet must not merely venture a guess or express an opinion, but be positive and firmly convinced of the truth of what he foretells. However, it is not necessary that he have a perfectly clear conception of all the details of his prophecy.

3. The prediction must, moreover, be couched in definite terms. If it were equivocal, it would be possible to adapt the prophecy to subsequent events. The history of pagan manticism affords many examples of oracles which were so ambiguously phrased that they were sure to come true, no matter what happened.⁷¹71Here are a few of the best known oracles: “Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam delebit opum vim”; “Aio te Aeacida (Pyrrhum) Romanos vincere posse”; “Ibis redibis nunquam peribis in armis.” Cicero justly says (De Divinatione, II, 56): “Tuis [i.e., Apollinis] oraculis Chrysippus totum volumen implevit partim falsis, ut ego opinor, partim casu veris, ut fit in omni oratione saepissime, partim flexiloquis et obscuris, ut interpres egeat interprete et sors ipsa ad sortes referenda sit, partim ambiguis, et quae ad dialecticum deferendae sint.” And in another passage (ibid., 54): “Callide, qui illa [i.e., Sibyllae dicta] composuit, perfecit, ut quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur.”

4. A prophecy must be confirmed by the event. Only after a prediction has come true can it be judged with certainty to have been, not an empty phrase, but a true prophecy. Needless to add, only a fulfilled prophecy can be utilized as a criterion of revelation.

5. A prophecy must be traceable to God as its author. An absolute prophecy, which deals with future free actions, must, in the nature of things, be the work of God. If it comes true, therefore, no further investigation is required as to its origin. A relative prophecy, on the other hand, may be the work of a created spirit. Consequently, when there is question of a relative prophecy, the first thing to make sure of is whether it is communicated to us by a good angel. In Sacred Scripture only those prophecies are regarded as genuine which come mediately or immediately from God. Any other prediction can be called a prophecy only in the improper sense of the term.⁷²72Cfr. the stereotyped phrase: “Haec dicit Dominus,” or, “Factum est verbum Domini” in the prophetical writings of the Old Testament; Deut. XIII, 1 sqq.

2. The Possibility of Prophecy

1. Since prophecy proceeds from God and is fulfilled among men, its possibility must be demonstrated from a twofold point of view, the divine and the human.

2. Every prophecy, being a supernatural enrichment of human knowledge, is a miracle, and because of the divine communication of its content, involves a revelation. What we have said in a previous chapter about the possibility of miracles and of revelation in general, also applies to prophecy. But prophecy offers two new elements, of which we have not yet had an opportunity to treat, namely, (a) a foreknowledge of the future and (b) the connection between prophecy and the free will of man. Both these elements are embraced in the notion of prophecy, and hence the possibility of prophecy must be shown in regard to them. Remember that we are here speaking of absolute prophecy.

3. The possibility of prophecy was denied mainly by the Rationalists, who thought it endangered free will. Against these sceptics we maintain that prophecies are possible, first, on the part of God, and, secondly, on the part of man.

a) Prophecies are possible on the part of God. This portion of our thesis can be proved from the perfection of the divine knowledge.

A prophecy, being a certain prediction of future events that cannot be known by natural means, presupposes a communication from God. Such a communication is possible if God knows with absolute certainty all future events, both those which are necessary and those which are contingent upon free-will decisions. That He possesses such a knowledge follows from the infinite perfection of the Divine Intellect. God, in the first place, knows from all eternity when and how He Himself is going to act. It would be contrary to the nature of the most perfect Being to operate unconsciously. Every divine act must be guided by clear and full knowledge. In addition to this, everything that happens or will happen in the future stands out clearly before the Divine Intellect from all eternity. Without this knowledge there could be no order in the world and no government worthy of the omnipotence and wisdom of the infinitely perfect Creator. If God is the ultimate cause of all being, as He must be if He is the most perfect Being, He must have predetermined the history of the created universe in every detail. This would have been impossible had He not known in advance everything that was going to happen from the creation until the end of time. The knowledge of God, therefore, comprises the entire development of the universe, not only on the material, but also on the spiritual side, including the future free-will actions of angels and men. Consequently, prophecy is possible on the part of God. He needs only to communicate His knowledge of the future to a man by way of revelation (the possibility of which has been demonstrated above) to enable the latter to predict future events with certainty.

b) Prophecies are possible also on the part of man, as can be shown from the relation existing between prophecy and free will.

There is question here only of such prophecies as have free-will acts for their object. The liberty of the will is neither abolished nor limited by a prediction of future acts. For a free-will act is not performed because it has been predicted, but it could be predicted because some one knew it would be actually performed. Not the foreknowledge and previous announcement is the cause of the act, but the act is the cause of the foreknowledge and prediction.

In this connection it is well to remember, what has been previously intimated, that God not only knows in advance all the future free actions of His rational creatures, but predetermines them and sees to it that they are executed in consonance with His decrees. Predetermination and Divine Providence no more spell interference with human liberty than does divine foreknowledge. For God, who is the adequate cause of all actuality, does not give the act detached from the operation of the free will of man, but with liberty as the proximate determination of its being. It is only in this way that God can operate as the universal cause of all things. His predetermination of all things does not infringe upon the freedom of the human will because, unlike man, He works from the inside.⁷³73On predestination versus free-will see Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 152, 187 sqq., 199 sqq., 206 sqq.

3. The Knowability of Prophecy

1. The knowability of prophecy, like that of miracles, is either historical or philosophical.

Since prophecy, considered as a criterion of revelation, essentially comprises the fulfilment of the prediction made, a prophecy cannot be regarded as genuine unless it is certain that the prediction actually preceded the event and that the latter could not possibly have been foreknown by natural means or brought about artificially either by the prophet himself or by accident.

When we say that prophecies are knowable, we do not mean that all prophecies can be known as such, but only that at least some of them can be recognized with certainty, and that there is nothing in the nature of a prophecy as such that conflicts with its cognoscibility.

2. We maintain that the historical actuality of a prophecy can at times be known for certain both by eye-witnesses of the event and by others.

a) Eye-witnesses can know the historical fulfilment of a prophecy with absolute certainty. They are present while the prophet is making his prediction, they see him, hear his words, and are in a position to make sure that he is foretelling a definite future event. Later, when that event happens, they can see the fulfilment of the prophecy with their own eyes and compare the prediction with the event.

b) Those contemporaries who are absent when a prophecy is made, and those who live at a later period, can obtain a reliable knowledge of the facts and thus gain certainty concerning the prophecy and its fulfilment.

3. We maintain further that the supernatural divine origin of a prophecy can be known with certainty.

The proof for this proposition rests upon the relation of prophecy to the causes operating outside the Divine Essence.

The supernatural, divine origin of a prophecy is certain if the prediction is derived neither from human knowledge nor from demonic communication, and its fulfilment is not attributable to accident or deceit. This can be demonstrated with entire certainty in many cases.

a) It can be demonstrated that a fulfilled prophecy was not the result of human prescience. As a rule the purpose for which the prophecy is made shows this sufficiently. If the object of the prophecy consists in free future actions, either of God or man, human foreknowledge is absolutely excluded, especially if the circumstances of time, place, and manner accompanying the predicted event are stated in detail. But even if an event is produced by necessary causes (e.g., an earthquake or a famine), it is impossible for any man to foretell it, especially if it lies far ahead in the future.

b) It can be shown that a prophecy does not emanate from demonic sources. In the case of absolute prophecies a diabolical origin is per se excluded. No created intellect, even though it immeasurably transcends that of man in depth, acumen, and power of combination, and even though it may have the experience of thousands of years to fall back upon, is in a position to predict with certainty acts that will be performed at some future time by God or by any rational creature endowed with free will.

In the case of relative prophecies the attending circumstances are the decisive factor. The person of the prophet, the manner in which he predicts the future, the purpose of the prediction and its effects will enable us to establish with certainty whether the prophecy is genuine or not,—always bearing in mind that God cannot permit men to be hopelessly misled in regard to a new religion.

c) It can be shown, finally, that the fulfilment of a prophecy was not the result of an accident or of studied deception. Accidental or artificial fulfilment of a prophecy is impossible when the predicted event transcends the powers of nature (as in restoring a dead man to life) or when the prediction comprises details which have no necessary or moral connection one with the other.⁷⁴74Cfr. Cicero, De Divinatione, l. I, 13: “Quidquam potest casu esse factum, quod habet in se omnes numeros veritatis? Quattuor tali iacti casu venerium efficiunt; num etiam centum venerios, si quadringentos talos ieceris, casu futuros putas? Aspersa temere pigmenta in tabula oris lineamenta efficere possunt; num etiam Veneris Coae pulchritudinem effici posse aspersione fortuito putas? Sus rostro si humi A litteram impresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris Andromacham Ennii ab ea posse describi?” And again (ibid., 23): “Sic enim se profecto res habet ut nunquam perfecte veritatem casus imitetur.”

If it is doubtful whether the fulfilment of a prediction has been brought about by accident or by artificial machinations on the part of the prophet, that particular prediction is not a prophecy that can be utilized as a criterion of divine revelation. For the rest, we may be sure that God in His wisdom and holiness will see to it that the spread of a false religion is not promoted by the accidental or artificial fulfilment of a false prophecy.

The demonstrative force of prophecy is equal to that of miracles. An absolute or a relative prophecy is a mediate or an immediate divine confirmation of the supernatural origin of a revealed doctrine. What has been said above about the conclusiveness of miracles applies with equal force to prophecies, and hence we need not add anything to what we have already said on this head.

Pseudo-Prophecies

1. The cryptic utterances of the ancient pagan oracles, the predictions of the seeresses known as Sibyls, of whom there were at least ten in widely separate parts of the world (Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, Italy, etc.), and the modern phenomena of clairvoyance and “second sight” are often put on a level with the prophecies of the Bible. But this procedure is absolutely unjustifiable, as a short comparison will show.

The predictions of the ancient oracles were commonly rough-cast, obscure, and enigmatical. Of those that were definite, some lay entirely within the range of human knowledge; others, though exceeding the limits of that knowledge, did not transcend the ken of a pure spirit. The agents who answered questions or revealed hidden knowledge at the place where the oracles were given cannot have been good spirits. This is evident from the fact that these institutions were the most powerful supports of paganism. The manner in which the mediums (priests or priestesses) answered the questions or petitions addressed to the oracle, indicates the influence of demonic powers where all natural explanations fail. Thus the Pythia at Delphi, the most famous oracle of the ancient world, sat upon a golden tripod, inhaled the intoxicating vapors that rose from the spring, chewed the narcotic laurel berry, drank of the Castalian spring—a fountain sacred to the god Apollo on Mount Parnassus—and uttered mystic words, which were interpreted and arranged by “prophets” specially trained for the purpose.⁷⁵75Cfr. Döllinger, The Gentile and the Jew, Vol. I, pp. 221 sqq. Virgil thus describes the frenzied condition of the Sibyl, when about to deliver her response (Aeneid, Dryden’s tr., VI, 72–81): “Her colour changed; her face was not the same;
And hollow groans from her deep spirit came.
Her hair stood up; convulsive rage possessed
Her trembling limbs, and heaved her labouring breast;
Greater than human kind she seemed to look;
And with an accent more than mortal spoke:
Her staring eyes with sparkling fury roll;
When all the god came rushing on her soul.
Swiftly she turned, and, foaming as she spoke:
‘Why this delay? (she cried) the powers invoke!’”
The oracles were so contrived as to fit all possible cases, or, as Cicero says, so that whatever took place might seem to have been predicted, inasmuch as all accurate information of persons and times was wanting. The composer, he adds, took shelter in obscurity, so that the same verses might be accommodated to a variety of periods and objects (De Divin., l. II, 54); or, as Boethius, commenting on Plutarch, expresses himself, “the authors poured out words and phrases combined at hazard into the sea of undefined time in such a way that their fulfilment was sheer accident.” (Plut., Marc., 3; Quaest. Rom., 83).

The etymology of the word Sibyls is obscure. They were half historical, half mythical seeresses or prophetesses, believed to be inspired by a deity. Heraclitus, a philosopher of the fifth century B.C., mentions one Sibyl. Varro, the great Roman polymath, knew ten. The most famous was the Erythrean Sibyl, whom Pausanias assigns to the period of the Trojan War. The Sibyls either lived in grottos or travelled about the country. Only scant fragments are preserved of their oracles. An ancient collection of Sibylline Books, so called, was kept in a stone chest in the temple of Jupiter at Rome and destroyed by fire in the year 83 B.C. A late collection, made under the auspices of the Roman Senate, was burnt by Stilicho at the beginning of the fifth century. Of the fragments of Sibylline verses that have come down to us, only a few antedate the third century B.C. The majority were composed partly by Christian and partly by Jewish writers, who incorporated into their lines some genuine pagan oracles, either in their original form or in a later redaction. It is impossible to determine at the present time which portions are of Christian, which of Jewish, and which of pagan provenience, and this uncertainty is one reason among several why the Sibylline oracles cannot justly be put on a level with the prophecies of the Bible.⁷⁶76Cfr. E. Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes, Vol. III, 4th ed., Leipsic, 1909, pp. 555 sqq.; Döllinger, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 112 sqq.; Maase, De Sibyllarum Indicibus, 1879; Sackur, Sibyllinische Texte und Forschungen, 1898; J. P. Arendzen, Men and Manners in the Days of Christ, London, 1928, pp. 136 sqq.

2. Clairvoyance is defined as the faculty of perceiving things without the use of the organ of sight or under conditions in which the eye with its natural powers would be useless. Clairvoyance extends to past, present, and future events. Various methods are employed by its practitioners. Some see by direct vision at a distance (opaque substances being no hindrance); others look into a black surface, or into water, or into a crystal; others describe objects laid on the forehead or chest, and so forth. Too little is known about the predictions of clairvoyants to enable us to form an opinion of their nature and value. Forel admits that the alleged preternatural phenomena of clairvoyance are not yet sufficiently investigated.⁷⁷77A. Forel, Der Hypnotismus, 10th ed., Stuttgart, 1921, pp. 472 sq.: “Zweifelhaft, wenigstens weder wissenschaftlich genügend erhärtet noch erklärt, sind angebliche übersinnliche Tatsachen, wie das sogenannte Hellsehen oder die Telepathie, die sogenannte direkte Gedankenübertragung u. dgl. m. Bei den seltenen Personen, bei welchen solche Experimente gelingen sollen, scheint eine streng wissenschaftliche, jede Möglichkeit unbewusster Eingebung ausschliessende Kontrolle meistens gefehlt zu haben, und da, wo sie stattfand, meistens ein vollständiges Fiasko der Experimente die gewöhnliche Folge der Experimente gewesen zu sein.” Cfr. E. L. Fischer, Der sog. Lebensmagnetismus oder Hypnotismus, Mayence, 1883, p. 55; C. Gutberlet, Apologetik, Vol. II, 4th ed., pp. 195 sqq.; R. Tischner, Über Telepathie und Hellsehen, Munich, 1920.

3. More closely akin to prophecy is the phenomenon of second sight, of which many cases are on record, especially in Scotland and Westphalia (Germany). Second sight is an extraordinary power of vision, physical or mental, possessed by certain individuals, whereby they are enabled to see things happening at a distance, or to foresee future events, especially deaths, funerals, conflagrations, and the accompanying circumstances. This sight never extends beyond living persons and material objects,—phantasms of the living, as they are called in the publications of the Society for Psychical Research. No sufficient explanation of this strange power has as yet been found. Many of the phenomena ascribed to second sight are probably attributable to hallucinations. But not all of them can be explained thus. There are well attested cases in which future events were foreseen and predicted with remarkable accuracy and a wealth of detail. They are too numerous to be brushed aside as mere accidents. But how is second sight to be explained? Man’s ordinary faculties of acquiring knowledge do not offer a sufficient explanation. Divine influence cannot be admitted, since the objects of second sight are too common, and no purpose worthy of a miracle is discernible. The only remaining supposition would seem to be the influence of pure created spirits. That these have the power to produce the phenomena of second sight cannot be doubted. But one can perceive no adequate reason why they should exercise such an activity. Since second sight usually is not productive of any particular good, be it physical or moral, and its effects are quite indifferent, we cannot reasonably assume that the angels have a hand in it. Nor are there any stringent reasons for postulating the co-operation of evil spirits. Hence, we must set aside second sight as an enigma which cannot as yet be satisfactorily explained.

This admission, however, in no wise affects the evidential value of prophecy. For in order to employ prophecy as a criterion of revelation, we need not explain the nature of all the phenomena that in some way resemble it, but it suffices to show that prophecy is a criterion of revelation and can be established as genuine.⁷⁸78Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Apologetik, Vol. II, 4th ed., pp. 185 sqq.; W. Ludwig, Spaziergänge eines Wahrheitssuchers ins Reich der Mystik, Leipsic, 1890; M. Perty, Über die mystischen Erscheinungen der menschlichen Natur, 2nd ed., Leipsic, 1872; J. B. Becker, Die Weissagungen als Kriterien der Offenbarung, Mayence, 1890, pp. 167 sqq.; Fr. Zurbonsen, Das zweite Gesicht (die “Vorgeschichten”) nach Wirklichkeit und Wesen, 5th ed., Cologne, 1921. Dr. Zurbonsen, who has studied the phenomenon of second sight very carefully, arrives at the following conclusions: (1) Second sight is the sudden emergence of a clairvoyant dream into a waking condition. (2) It represents a strong presentiment arising out of the subliminal consciousness of the soul, which presentiment (3) shapes itself in an explosive manner into a picture of the foreboded reality. (4) The phenomenon probably is caused by a sudden immersion of the soul into the universe, whereby the slumbering faculty of prescience is transformed into prevision. (5) Second sight permits us to conclude that the soul is infinitely spiritual, but in itself is an abnormal psychological phenomenon, based on the dislocation of intellectual powers. Msgr. Gutberlet substantially agrees with these conclusions, though he does not regard them as entirely satisfactory, because they do not explain the proper essence of the phenomenon. “The difficulty,” he says, “lies in the certain foreknowledge of events in their minutest details. … The ‘immersion of the soul in the universe’ cannot furnish this knowledge, and the soul is not endowed with an infinite spirituality which would enable it to foresee objects and events that do not as yet exist. This power can only be ascribed to a spirit who is equally present to all divisions of time from all eternity. It must be admitted that truth also transcends time from all eternity; this is confirmed by the phenomena of second sight; but the question at issue is: How does it come into the soul of the seer? The truth is not in the universe, but has a purely ideal existence, and consequently cannot be perceived by immersion into the universe. In any event, the faculty of second sight cannot enter into competition with the miracles of Christianity, for second sight is limited to a few objects and to definite places and nations, shows a certain conformity to law, and hence points to a natural origin. Christian miracles are found everywhere and in connection with all possible kinds of events.” (Gutberlet, Lehrbuch der Apologetik, Vol. II, 4th ed., Münster i. W., 1922, p. 194).

For further reading, see page 342.